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Are analysts biased? An analysis of analysts’ stock recommendations for stocks 
that perform contrary to expectations 
 
Abstract 
The finance literature suggests that analysts’ stock recommendations have negligible 
impact on market prices. Some studies suggest this lack of market impact may be partly 
driven by the affiliations between investment banks and the firms their brokerage arms 
cover (conflicts of interest). However, most of these studies fail to take into account 
other factors including institutional and trading issues and psychological biases which 
may well be just as important in influencing analysts when they gather, process and 
interpret information about stocks. 
 
The aim of the current study is to establish the factors which are associated with 
analysts issuing stock recommendations that lack market impact. I find that 
nonconforming analysts’ stock recommendations are associated with overconfidence 
bias (as measured by optimism in the language they use) and representativeness bias (as 
measured by previous stock price performance, market capitalisation, book-to-market 
and change in target price). Thus, stocks that receive a buy rating and subsequently 
underperform the respective benchmark are associated with a high level of optimism in 
the tone of the language used by analysts in their investment reports that they prepare to 
justify their recommendations, have positive previous price momentum, have large 
market capitalisation, have low book-to-market ratio and have their target prices 
changed in the same direction as the stock recommendation. Not surprisingly, there is 
also a relationship between the investment bank issuing the recommendation and the 
firm. In addition, stocks that are awarded sell rating and subsequently outperform the 
benchmark have characteristics opposite to those of nonconforming buys. 
 
Finding that potential conflicts of interest significantly predict analysts’ nonconforming 
stock recommendations supports recent policy-makers’ and investors’ allegations that 
analysts’ recommendations are driven by the incentives they derive from investment 
banking deals. These allegations have led to implementation of rules governing 
analysts’ and brokerage houses’ behaviours. However, finding that cognitive biases play 
a major role in the type of recommendation issued suggests that these rules may work 
only in as far as regulating conflicts of interest, but will have a limited role in regulating 
psychological bias, as my results suggest that analyst bias is inherent in their work. 
Surveys of what fund managers expect of analysts indicate low rankings of analysts’ 
investment advice as manifested in their recommendations (e.g., All-America Research 
Team Survey 2002). My results further indicate that fund manager concern is likely to 
continue because not all behavioural factors in analyst stock recommendations can be 
controlled. 
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Chapter 1  
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces the thesis, its research aims and the rationale for focusing on the 
stock recommendation nexus. The chapter consists of six sections. Section 1.2 presents 
the background of my research. Section 1.3 presents the research questions. Section 1.4 
presents my research objectives in relation to the research gaps which this thesis seeks 
to fill. Section 1.5 provides justification for focusing on stock recommendations. 
Section 1.6 outlines my research approach. Section 1.7 provides a brief overview of the 
conclusions drawn from the research and Section 1.8 outlines the structure of the 
chapters that follow. 
 
1.2 Background of the research 
Investment banks are key participants in the equity markets. Their main functions 
include issuing securities on behalf of companies and governments, trading securities in 
the primary and secondary markets on behalf of individual and institutional investors, 
managing portfolios for clients and providing other financial advice and support 
services (Haugen, 1997; Bodie et al., 1999). Traditionally, the activities of investment 
banks are grouped into corporate finance, brokerage services and proprietary trading 
(Michaely and Womack, 1999).  
 
Sell-side analysts form part of the research group in the brokerage arm of the investment 
bank. Their main task is to gather information on the industry or individual stocks from 
customers, suppliers and firm managers, analyse this data, form earnings forecasts and 
make stock recommendations (Michaely and Womack, 1999) and price forecasts. The 
role of securities analysts in the brokerage firm can be viewed as a marketing aid to 
brokers because they provide tools (i.e. forecasts and recommendations) that help 
brokers maximise revenues (Chung, 2000) and sales efforts (Brennan and Hughes, 
1991). 
 
Some studies highlight the importance of analysts’ information gathering activities in 
the pricing of stocks in financial markets. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) show that stock 
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prices cannot perfectly reflect all information that is available, and therefore analysts 
devote enormous resources to gathering new information. Analysts deserve to be 
compensated as information gatherers. Beaver (2002) indicates that efficient analyst 
information processing facilitates efficient security price setting while Fernandez (2001) 
shows that analysts produce information that is the “life-blood” of both the market and 
the individual investor. 
 
1.3 Research problem and research questions 
Although research attests to the importance of financial analysts for the efficient 
functioning of the stock market, in the recent past there have been some doubts about 
the credibility and objectivity of analysts’ stock recommendations. Specifically, there 
was concern that analysts’ recommendations were overly optimistic and did not seem to 
reflect the true beliefs about the value of the stocks. Around mid-2000, the percentage 
of buy recommendations reached 74% of the total recommendations outstanding while 
the percentage of sells fell to 2% (Barber et al., 2004). There are various reasons that 
policy-makers, investors and researchers believed might be responsible for the unequal 
distribution of buy and sell recommendations. For instance, some studies argued that 
analysts would be denied access to management if they issue pessimistic 
recommendations. Denying analysts access implies that analysts would not be able to 
obtain the private information from management which they needed to make decisions 
about the value of stocks. However, a more likely reason was probably because 
analysts’ optimistic recommendations could earn their investment employers enormous 
fees on corporate finance transactions. 
 
The problem of optimistic research reports and the public outcry over analysts’ conflicts 
of interest led to intervention by policy-makers and other professional bodies. They 
responded by implementing regulations to govern brokerage firms and analysts. In 
September, 2000, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) implemented 
Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD).  Reg FD was meant to curb the practice of 
asymmetric information provision where top executives in companies would disclose 
information to particular analysts, often to those working for investment banks with 
whom they have business relationships. In August, 2002, the National Association of 
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Securities Dealers (NASD) and SEC issued NASD 2711 and Rule 472 respectively. 
Overall, these two regulations require analyst research reports to display the proportion 
of the issuing firm’s recommendations that are buys, holds and sells. In April 2003, the 
“Global Analyst Research Settlement” was reached between the top ten US brokerage 
firms and the SEC, New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), NASD and the New York 
Attorney General. According to this settlement, these brokerage firms had to pay huge 
penalties for any alleged misconduct that resulted in investors losing huge amounts of 
money from trading on their analysts’ stock recommendations during the technology 
bubble.  
 
Since the implementation of these regulations, there have been various studies carried 
out to test their efficacy, particularly in curbing the alleged conflicts of interest which 
were believed to be the main determinant of the disproportionate number of optimistic 
reports. Although there are certain studies that do not find evidence to support the 
implementation of some regulations such as Ke and Yu (2005), most of them (e.g. 
Barber et al., 2004; Madureira, 2004) conclude that the regulations do achieve their 
intended motives particularly with regard to restraining conflicts of interest. The 
question that is not answered by these studies, however, is whether conflict of interest is 
the one and only factor that influences analysts’ stock recommendations or whether 
there are other factors in addition to conflicts of interest such as psychological biases 
that may be playing a role. This is the purpose of this thesis. 
 
Research also finds that although analysts issued optimistic reports on most of the 
stocks they covered, their optimistic recommendations lacked market impact. For 
example, Barber et al., (2001) and Mikhail et al., (2004) show that after accounting for 
risk and transaction costs, investors do not earn better than average returns as a result of 
taking advice from analysts’ recommendations. Womack (1996), on the other hand, 
finds that new “buy” recommendations of stock continue to go up for four to six weeks 
after the new stock recommendation is made while “sell” recommendations drift lower 
for six more months. His results suggest that the average level of recommendation has 
little investment value but changes in level are valuable although for a limited time. 
Ryan and Taffler (2005) find that only new “sells” and recommendations for  smaller, 
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less followed stocks have investment value. From the findings in these studies, the 
question that comes to mind is, what could have influenced analysts to issue 
recommendations that lack necessary market impact? 
 
Other studies allude to the fact that information which analysts actually use differs from 
that used to justify their recommendations (e.g., Breton and Taffler, 2001;  Amir et al., 
1999; Rogers and Grant, 1997).  It seems analysts use non-financial, qualitative data 
that is not found in companies’ financial statements. If analysts do not rely exclusively 
on the companies’ reports, then where do they get information from that they use to 
make their recommendations? 
 
Bradshaw (2002) documents that analysts frequently justify recommendations with 
target prices and that, not surprisingly, analysts issue more favourable recommendations 
for stocks with higher target prices relative to current prices. Brav and Lehavy (2003) 
and Asquith et al., (2005) document a significant market reaction to a change in target 
prices, both unconditional and conditional on contemporaneously issued stock 
recommendations.  However, these studies do not establish a clear link between 
recommendations and target prices so that we can clearly understand what the role of 
target prices that are issued concurrent with stock recommendations is. 
 
The research problem addressed in this research is: What are the factors that are 
associated with stock recommendations which do not perform as expected? Essentially I 
argue that nonconforming analysts’ stock recommendations are not associated with 
conflicts of interest alone but with other factors such as previous performance of the 
stock. The factors that are hypothesised to be influencing analysts’ nonconforming 
stock recommendations are classified mainly into overconfidence bias, 
representativeness bias and corporate relationships between investment banks and firms.  
I basically investigate the factors driving new buy and sell stock recommendations but 
where the stocks themselves subsequently perform in an extreme opposite direction to 
the one expected. 
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1.4 Research objectives 
Specific objectives of this study are summarised as follows: 
• To explore whether analysts’ stock recommendations in the recent period 
still have limited economic value using an appropriate return-generating 
model.  
 
• To determine the factors underlying analysts’ stock recommendations that 
render them less effective.  
 
• To develop and test a model that can predict and explain analysts’ outputs, 
specifically, their nonconforming stock recommendations. 
 
1.5  Rationale for focusing on stock recommendation nexus 
There are various reasons why analysts’ recommendations are particularly interesting. 
First, issues relating to analysts’ biased recommendations are highly topical and of 
considerable public policy importance. In particular, analysts’ recommendations have 
received substantial public attention because of the role that analysts played in the 
bankruptcy of Enron and their conflicts of interest debacle, as investigated by the New 
York Attorney General and the SEC and the subsequent implementation of  rules and 
regulations to govern financial analysts and brokerage firms. 
 
In the case of Enron, management used complex accounting methods that overstated 
earnings and concealed additional debt by setting up off-balance sheet partnership 
transactions. These were designed to boost the company’s credit rating, its capacity to 
borrow and to raise its stock price beyond what would be justified by an objective 
valuation of the firm’s underlying assets and profitability. At the same time, Enron’s 
executives were deriving millions of dollars from the same partnerships. Enron’s 
nefarious practices have raised questions about accounting principles, auditing 
disclosures and corporate governance and it is glaringly clear that investors used 
unreliable and inaccurate information (Federal News Service, February 12, 2002). 
Despite analysts’ tacit task of gathering information about companies, they were not 
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able to pick up the accounting schemes used by Enron. As a result, 19 out of 22 sell-side 
analysts continued to recommend “buy” right up until the large fall in Enron’s stock and 
its ensuing bankruptcy (The Investment Dealers’ Digest: IDD, May 27, 2002). It is 
debatable whether analysts were genuinely unaware of Enron’s accounting schemes due 
to the fact that they were unable to read and interpret its financial statements, or whether 
they were fully aware but decided for some other reason to ignore the situation.  
 
It could be argued that although management had made efforts to conceal its activities 
in the company’s financial statements, there were plenty of clues that should have made 
analysts aware of the situation early enough. After all, that is what analysts are paid to 
do. It is especially striking that in addition to their inability to detect Enron’s accounting 
machinations, no analyst downgraded Enron neither after the chief executive’s surprise 
resignation, after revelations about repeated Enron stock sales by company executives, 
nor after news stories that raised questions about Enron’s balance sheet (Financial Post, 
March 2, 2002). 
 
On the issue of analysts’ conflicts of interest investigated by the New York Attorney-
General, analysts were found to make “buy” and “strong buy” recommendations for 
stocks which were not necessarily undervalued but were recommended because their 
investment bank employers could earn enormous fees on corporate finance transactions. 
Analysts would also be rewarded for their part in promoting these deals via additional 
compensation. In particular, Merrill Lynch research analysts were accused of 
misleading investors by issuing “flattering” research reports to generate investment 
banking business. More than 30,000 emails were revealed where Merrill Lynch analysts 
were privately defaming companies while publicly telling investors to buy the shares 
(Financial Times, April 10, 2002).  
 
This behaviour was largely blamed on the compensation structure of analysts. Clearly, 
major Wall Street firms needed to take immediate steps to reform analysts’ 
compensation structures. As long as analysts were paid based on banking deals they 
generated or worked on, there would always be a question over the recommendations 
they made (Federal News Service, Feb 12, 2002). Eventually, Merrill Lynch agreed that 
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the firm should strengthen the ‘Chinese wall’ between analysts and its investment 
banking business, and compensate analysts based on the quality of their 
recommendations (Investor Relations Business, June 3, 2002). The separation of 
research and corporate finance was meant to ensure that recommendations made by 
analysts are not influenced by the economic incentives that arise from their firms 
investment banking deals. However, some observers believe that the agreement to 
separate investment banking and research is less likely to change the investment 
corporate culture because analysts are still not entirely independent of investment 
bankers (Financial Times, May 23, 2002). The insistence on the separation of the two 
roles serves to attest to the key role of the recommendation itself in analyst activity. 
 
To date Rule NASD 2711 and Rule 472 have been implemented by the SEC and NYSE 
respectively. In general terms, they both require analyst research reports to display the 
proportion of issuing firms’ recommendations that are buys, holds and sells. Rule 472 
specifically addresses the issue of analysts’ compensation. Studies to date (e.g. Barber 
et al., (2004) and Madureira (2004) show that these two rules are, to some extent, 
effective in attaining their objectives. 
 
The second reason why analyst stock recommendations are interesting is that they are 
viewed as a key input to investors’ decision-making processes. Hirst et al., (1995) 
analysed investor reactions to financial analysts’ research reports and concluded that in 
using this information, investors take into account the incentives facing analysts in 
making their investment recommendations when judging the likely future performance 
of stocks and pay great attention to the strengths of the arguments underlying analysts’ 
recommendations. Dugar and Nathan (1995) and Michaely and Womack (1999) show 
that investors discount the optimism exhibited in investment banker analyst research 
reports. Krishnan and Booker (2001) suggest that the information provided by analysts 
to support their recommendations reduces the tendency of investors to sell winners too 
soon and hold losers too long. 
  
The third reason is that, conversely, surveys of what fund managers expect of analysts 
indicate low ranking of analysts’ investment advice as manifested in their 
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recommendations while company and industry knowledge and ‘other factors’ are rated 
more highly (e.g., All-America Research Team Survey 2002 – Institutional Investor 
website). Fund managers also emphasised among other requirements the importance of 
“trustworthiness”. The emphasis on factors other than the stock recommendation could 
be an explicit recognition that the analyst’s recommendation is variously either (a) not 
to be trusted, (b) biased or (c) of no empirical value. Many institutional investors have 
now established their own research departments to conduct analysis in-house because of 
the perceived lack of professionalism in the way sell-side analysts do their jobs (Boni 
and Womack, 2001). The fact that institutional investors deem it necessary to incur the 
substantial expense of conducting analysis in-house is an indication that expert 
investment advice as proxied, in principle, by analyst stock recommendations, is key to 
them, but that they cannot place as much reliance as they previously did on the sell-side 
analyst any more. 
 
Lastly, the extant empirical research evidence attests to the lack of investment value of 
analysts’ stock recommendations in general. However, these studies do not provide a 
reason for this lack of market impact. The aim of this study is to establish the factors 
which may be playing a major role in influencing analyst stock recommendations to 
lack market value, in particular, the role of analysts’ cognitive biases. Inter alia, I draw 
on the recent study by Fogarty and Rogers (2005). They use Diction in conjunction with 
other content analysis software to study financial analysts’ reports and conclude that 
analyst’ reports are characterised by bias, skew and lack of science. They suggest that in 
order to understand financial analysts and their job, we need also to analyse their textual 
data. With this suggestion in mind, I build on their study by using analysts’ textual data 
to measure their psychological biases together with other key empirical measures of 
factors driving their investment recommendations.  
 
1.6 Research approach 
This section provides a brief overview of the methodological features of the current 
study. The research approach adopted draws on the previous studies which evaluate the 
performance of analysts’ stock recommendations using event study methodology. In the 
first instance, this study sets out to test seven hypotheses (chapter 3). These hypotheses 
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are basically testing whether factors that proxy for overconfidence bias (OPTIMISM, 
CERTAINTY), representativeness bias (ACTIVITY, PRICE_MOM, FIRM_SIZE, 
BTOM, TGTPRC_CHNG) and relationship between investment banks and firms 
(INVEST_RELATE) have any impact on analysts’ nonconforming stock 
recommendations.  
 
There are four stages in my research. In the first stage, performance of stock 
recommendations and target prices is evaluated using event study methodology where 
the event date is identified as the date that a stock recommendation is changed from its 
previous category to new buy or new sell categories. Cumulative buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns are measured over the subsequent twelve month period using the 
reference portfolio return generating benchmark to estimate expected return. Chapter 4 
provides a full description of how the evaluation process is carried out. 
 
In the second stage, new buy and new sell recommendations associated with subsequent 
stock performance in an opposite direction to the one expected are selected for further 
analysis. These recommendations that perform contrary to expectations are classified as 
recommendations lacking market impact. Chapter 7 presents the performance of stocks 
that are awarded a buy and a sell rating and how I selected my conforming and 
nonconforming stock recommendations. 
 
In stage three, I employ logistic regression analysis to test for the factors that might be 
associated with such buy and sell recommendations that lack market impact. RATING 
is the dependent variable and takes the value 1 if the recommendation is a new buy 
which significantly underperforms the benchmark and 0 if the recommendation is a new 
sell that significantly outperforms the benchmark. Chapter 8 describes the procedure I 
use and the results of this stage of my research. 
 
The last part of my thesis is similar to stage 3. However, I specifically test for 
representativeness bias in analysts’ nonconforming stock recommendations using only 
stock based characteristics, which are momentum, size and book-to-market, while 
analyst following serves as a control variable. Again using logistic regression, my 
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dependent variable is RATING. RATING takes the value 1 if a buy recommendation 
underperforms the benchmark and 0 otherwise. Chapter 9 provides complete 
information on how the analysis is conducted and the empirical results. 
 
1.7 Overall conclusions 
The findings in this study show that there are certain factors that are associated with 
analysts’ nonconforming stock recommendations. I hypothesise that the main drivers of 
analysts’ nonconforming stock recommendations are their psychological biases (in 
particular, the overconfidence and representativeness biases) and corporate relationship 
existing between investment banks and firms. There is evidence in support of 
overconfidence bias (as measured by Diction variable Optimism). The overconfidence 
bias found in analysts’ research reports is interpreted as showing that analysts believe 
they have superior investment abilities and tend to overestimate the likely performance 
of the stocks they follow. This argument is consistent with other studies such as those of 
Odean (1998b); Barber and Odean (2001) and Massey and Thaler (2005) who document 
that when investors are faced with difficult tasks they tend to overestimate the precision 
of their information and thereby become overconfident.  
 
My results further show that, in addition to overconfidence, other factors that serve as 
measures of representativeness bias (i.e., previous price performance, size of the firm, 
book-to-market and target prices) and corporate relationships play a major role in 
influencing nonconforming stock recommendations that analysts issue. The logistic 
regression results show that if the stock has done well in the past, has large market 
capitalisation, has low book-to-market ratio (i.e., is ‘growth’ stock), has the target price 
changed in the direction of the stock recommendation and has corporate relationship 
with the investment bank for which the analyst is working for, then it is likely that the 
analyst will issue a buy recommendation which will subsequently not perform as 
expected. The reverse holds true for new sell recommendations that outperform the 
benchmark. However, I need to point out that no analysis is performed to establish 
whether stocks that perform as expected have the opposite characteristics, as the thrust 
of this research is specifically to establish factors underlying stock recommendations 
that perform contrary to expectations. 
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The preference for stocks that have positive previous price performance, large market 
capitalisation and low book-to-market ratio is consistent with the findings of Stickel 
(2000) and Jegadeesh et al., (2004). This is also in line with the representativeness bias 
argument of Solt and Statman (1989), Shefrin and Statman (1995) and DeBondt and 
Thaler (1985) that analysts believe that past good performance and large market 
capitalisations represent good future performance.  
 
Although I hypothesise that target price is a proxy for representativeness bias, it actually 
appears to be a very difficult variable to interpret as it is highly correlated with stock 
recommendation. This may be a reason why other studies (e.g., Brav and Lehavy, 2003 
and Asquith et al., 2005) have studied both target prices and stock recommendations 
together. It may actually be that target prices are not proxies for representativeness bias 
per se, but as Asquith et al., (2005) put it, only serve to peddle the stocks for which 
analysts issue buy (sell) recommendations. 
 
My finding, that conflicts of interest (as measured by INVEST_RELATE) are 
associated with nonconforming stock recommendations that analysts issue, supports 
recent policy-makers’ and investors’ allegations that analysts’ recommendations are 
driven by the incentives that analysts derive from investment banking deals. It also 
justifies the recent implementation of the new rules to govern analysts and brokerage 
firms. However, given that I find other factors influencing analysts other than their 
conflicts of interest, it is likely that the rules will have a limited effect in curbing 
analysts’ overconfidence and representativeness biases which appear to be inherent 
when analysts issue their recommendations particularly those recommendations that 
lack market impact.   
 
1.8 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis comprises ten chapters, with chapters 8 and 9 containing my empirical 
results. Chapter 1, this chapter, has introduced the background to my research as well 
as my research questions and thesis area of focus. The objectives of the current research 
and the justification for concentrating on the stock recommendations nexus are then 
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presented. An overview of the research approach is then outlined followed by the 
snapshot of overall conclusions.  
 
Chapter 2 presents the extant literature on the role of analysts in the stock market and 
the role of analysts in the documented market anomalies relevant to my thesis. The role 
of analysts in the stock market is anchored in traditional finance literature while the 
literature on market anomalies is, inter alia, linked to recent developments in 
behavioural finance research. The second part of this chapter provides my conceptual 
framework built from these two strands of the literature. The conceptual framework 
addresses the research questions and research objectives by defining the hypothesised 
factors driving analysts’ stock recommendations that lack market impact. The final part 
of this chapter identifies the gaps in the literature followed by the presentation of my 
research questions. 
 
Chapter 3 presents my hypotheses and the variables used to test these hypotheses. I 
have seven null hypotheses. Null hypotheses 1 and 2 test for overconfidence (as 
measured by Optimism and Certainty) and representativeness biases (as measured by 
Activity) using the tone of language that analysts use in their research reports which 
they prepare to justify their recommendations. Null hypotheses 3 to 6 test for whether 
previous stock performance, size of the firm, book-to-market and target prices have any 
influence on the issue of stock recommendations that lack market impact. All these 
factors are used as measures of analyst representativeness bias. Null hypothesis 7 
measures the effect of corporate relationships existing between investment banks and 
firms on the type of recommendation that analysts issue. 
 
Chapter 4 presents the methodological approach I have adopted in this study. It 
commences by discussing the methodology employed to evaluate the performance of 
stock recommendations and target prices so that I can identify those stock 
recommendations that have not performed as expected. The method for selecting 
nonconforming stocks is then discussed followed by the presentation of the content 
analysis method used to process analysts’ textual data. The chapter ends with a 
summary.  
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Chapter 5 presents my pilot study. This chapter is used to test whether I can generate 
operational measures of analyst bias from analysis of their investment circulars using 
Diction software. The chapter starts by discussing the pilot study objectives and data, 
followed by the pilot study results. Discussion and summary concludes the chapter. 
 
Chapter 6 provides my sample selection process, details of the data and description of 
the stock recommendation and target price characteristics of my sample data over the 
time period starting from January 1997 to December 2003. Specifically, the first part of 
the chapter presents information on the sources of the data used in this study and the 
data itself. The second part shows how the final sample is selected, and the final part 
describes the final samples of stock recommendations and target prices I use in 
subsequent analysis.  
 
Chapter 7 analyses the subsequent market reaction to changes in stock 
recommendations and target prices over the sample period and different sub periods. It 
then presents the numbers of new buy and new sell recommendations that are not 
performing as expected in order to identify the appropriate cases to employ in the main 
empirical analysis conducted in the next chapter. Summary and discussion end the 
chapter. 
 
Chapter 8 empirically investigates the factors that are associated with analysts’ 
nonconforming stock recommendations by using logistic regression analysis. The 
factors tested for are as postulated by the conceptual framework I establish in chapter 2 
section 2.4 and are mainly measures of analysts’ cognitive bias and corporate 
relationships. The chapter starts by providing a description of both new buy and new 
sell recommendations that lack market impact, and then presents the results of logistic 
regression when hypothesised factors that influence nonconforming analysts’ stock 
recommendations and control variables are used as regressors. The dependent variable 
is RATING. RATING equals 1 if analysts issue buy recommendations which 
subsequently underperform the respective benchmark by at least -20% and 0 if analysts 
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issue sell recommendations which subsequently outperform the respective benchmark 
by at least +20%.  
 
Additional analysis using linear regression analysis is carried out to investigate whether 
the factors that drive stock recommendations that lack market impact may also explain 
the target prices issued concurrently with stock recommendations. 
 
Chapter 9 uses a larger sample size (compared to the sample size in chapter 8) to test 
the null hypotheses 3, 4 and 5 in chapter 3. The aim is to investigate the role of 
representativeness bias (as measured by momentum, size and book-to-market) in 
analysts’ nonconforming buy and sell recommendations during the whole sample 
period, during the bull and the bear markets, and before and after the implementation of 
NASD 2711. The main reason why only three hypotheses are tested is to obtain a 
clearer picture of the role of representativeness bias in analysts’ stock recommendations. 
 
The chapter starts by presenting the characteristics of nonconforming new buy and new 
sell recommendations and then presents the logit results of the factors differentiating 
between nonconforming buy and sell recommendations. Additional analyses are carried 
out to establish whether the factors differentiating between nonconforming buys and 
sells are similar or are different during the bull and the bear markets, as well as before 
and after the implementation of NASD 2711.  
 
Chapter 10 summarises the findings of my study and draws conclusions relating to my 
original research questions. The practical and theoretical implications as well as an 
acknowledgement of its limitations are also presented and suggestions for future 
research are provided. 
 
My contribution to knowledge is also evaluated. My thesis provides evidence that adds 
to current concerns regarding the factors that drive analysts’ stock recommendations 
and whether conflict of interest is the only such factor. I find clear evidence that 
analysts’ stock recommendations are driven by other factors (e.g., analysts’ 
overconfidence (as measured by optimism in the language they use) and 
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representativeness (as measured by stocks’ previous price performance, firm size, book-
to-market and target price changes) in addition to conflicts of interest. These findings 
imply that the regulations that have been deployed to govern analysts and brokerage 
firms, however successful in dealing with analysts conflicts of interest, may have 
limited impact on analysts’ overoptimistic behavioural biases which are probably 
inherent in the nature of the task.  
 
In summary, this chapter has laid the foundation for my thesis. It introduces the overall 
research problem and research questions. It establishes the importance of my research 
and its original contribution to knowledge. The research approach is described, the 
thesis outline is presented and overall conclusions are briefly presented. Subsequent 
chapters build on this foundation commencing with the next chapter, Literature Review. 
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Chapter 2 Literature review 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter summarises previous work related to the current study. Two strands of 
literature are examined: (a) the role of financial analysts in the stock market and (b) 
financial analysts’ behaviour and market anomalies. Although these two sets of 
literature are closely related, they are often explored separately. I therefore follow the 
same practice in this review.  
 
The chapter is organised as follows: section 2.2 looks at the role of analysts in the stock 
market, section 2.3 summarises the role of financial analysts in the documented market 
anomalies literature, and section 2.4 presents the conceptual model.  Section 2.5 
presents the chapter summary, then identifies gaps in the literature and then formulates 
the research questions. 
  
2.2 The role of analysts in the stock market 
Research shows that financial analysts are essential for the efficient operation of the 
stock market. However, in the recent past, doubt has arisen about the credibility of 
financial analyst outputs, particularly their stock recommendations. This section 
summarises the vast amount of literature on the role of analysts in the financial markets, 
highlighting the aspects relevant to the current study such as how efficient and effective 
they are in their work, their conflicts of interest and the efficacy of rules and regulations 
established to govern and regulate brokerage firms and financial analysts. 
 
2.2.1 Function of analysts 
There are two classes of analysts: sell-side analysts and buy-side analysts. Sell-side 
analysts gather and evaluate information from public and private sources, generate 
forecasts on companies’ earnings and future prospects, and make recommendations that 
lead to buying or selling of the companies’ securities by investors.   
 
On the other hand, buy-side analysts work for institutional investors such as mutual 
funds, hedge funds or investment advisors. Unlike sell-side analysts, buy-side analysts 
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do not produce research reports for the public since their work product is the proprietary 
possession of their employers. Buy-side analysts effectively use research reports 
produced by sell-side analysts to help make their own assessments. Their research 
reports typically contain both investment recommendation and the supporting 
arguments. This study concentrates solely on sell-side analysts. 
 
Michaely and Womack (1999) categorise the specific information dissemination role  of 
analysts as gathering information on the industry or individual stocks from customers, 
suppliers and firm managers; analysing this data and forming earnings estimates and 
making stock recommendations; and presenting recommendations to buy-side analysts 
and fund managers in presentational and written form. The ultimate goal of this process 
is to find the “fundamental” price of the company’s stock and then to compare this with 
the actual price to see if the stock is overvalued or undervalued. Stock recommendations 
are arrived at in two ways: through analysts’ anticipated changes in company 
fundamentals, in reaction to new news, or company reports such as earnings releases 
(Michaely and Womack, 2003). Evidence on analysts’ response to company reports is 
confirmed by Womack (1996) who finds that approximately 12% of recommendation 
changes were within one day of quarterly earnings reports in the 1989-1991 time period.  
 
Beunza and Garud (2004) present a slightly different view of what the role of financial 
analysts in the financial market is. They show that analysts provide a road map and a 
representation scheme in a phenomenon that is inherently fuzzy and emergent. 
Therefore, “by offering intermediate metrics, the appropriate network of connections 
and temporary comparisons, analysts’ frames facilitate transactions especially when 
there is no certainty out there” (p. 34). Regardless of how their roles are defined, 
financial analysts are expected to conform to individual firm and industry guidelines 
and codes of professional conduct for the preparation and dissemination of their 
research reports (Fernandez, 2001).  
 
Financial analysts’ research reports contain textual information that analysts use to 
justify the recommendations they award stocks. Other information such as target prices 
and earnings forecasts are found in the research reports as well. Asquith et al., (2005) 
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show that the stronger the justifications provided in the report, the stronger the market 
reaction to the report. Their results suggest that the words or the tone of language that 
analysts use to justify their reports is essential to the investors. However, the content 
analysis method that they use is not entirely objective, and also they concentrate on the 
market reaction to the research reports whereas in the current study, the content analysis 
method used to analyse the tone of language used by analysts to justify their 
recommendations is completely objective and is aimed, not only at assessing the type of 
information contained in the research reports, but at linking the tone of language that 
analysts use to the cognitive biases to which they may be prone when they do their 
work. 
 
Fogarty and Rogers (2005) suggest that academic research should not concentrate on the 
direction of analysts’ bottom lines (i.e., stock recommendations and earnings forecasts) 
but should conduct textual analysis as well. In their study, they examined financial 
analysts’ textual data and conclude that analyst output is characterised by three 
elements: influence, skew and lack of science.  The content analysis method they use is 
objective and my thesis draws largely from their study. However, in their study they are 
only analysing and evaluating analysts’ research reports while in this study I analyse the 
research reports and attempt to link the tone of the language used to the type of 
recommendation issued. 
 
2.2.2 Information used by analysts 
Analysts use various sources of information to draw up their recommendations. 
Typically, they use both financial and qualitative information found in companies’ 
annual reports. Breton and Taffler (2001) demonstrate that profit-based information is 
of importance and balance sheet information is much less important, if at all. However, 
Breton and Taffler (1995) discover that analysts’ ability to interpret “window-dressing” 
is very low. Only 3.1% of such schemes are picked up by a sample of skilled investment 
analysts, although 60% believed that they had corrected for such schemes in their 
analysis.  
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Crucially, analysts rely on non-financial, soft, qualitative and imprecise information in 
their primary task of making stock recommendations. Consideration of a firm’s 
management and strategy, although occupying only a small part of analysts’ reports, is 
the key single determinant (Breton and Taffler, 2001). Rogers and Grant (1997) assert 
that financial reports provide 52% of the information cited by analysts and 48% is 
external to the financial reporting process. Cornell (2001) observes that analysts do not 
compare stock prices to fundamental value in their analysis and concludes that analysts 
stock recommendations are based on something other than a comparison of market price 
and fundamental value.  
 
Krische and Lee (2000) investigate the relation between analyst stock recommendation 
and eight quantitative variables  found to have predictive power on future returns in 
prior research. They conclude that analysts’ stock recommendations capture qualitative 
aspects of the firm’s operations that do not appear in the quantitative signals they 
examine. Amir et al., (1999) observe that the explanatory power of broad-based 
financial statement data has decreased and analysts are learning less from the financial 
data. Similarly, Bradshaw (2004) documents that analysts do not use present value 
valuation models to make stock recommendations, but instead rely on valuation 
heuristics. But without using companies’ financial statements extensively, would 
analysts’ reports be sufficiently informative?  Frankel et al., (2002) observe that the 
informativeness of analysts’ reports increases when brokerage profits are higher (i.e., 
higher trading volume and higher volatility) and when they reveal ‘bad’ news, and 
decreases when information processing costs are increased. 
 
Some studies note some shortcomings in the valuation of companies by analysts. 
According to Cornell (2001), analysts concentrate on the short run performance of 
companies, not on fundamental value. Furthermore, he notes that the discussions of 
fundamental value in their research reports are vague and nebulous and rarely involve 
the presentation of a precise, quantitative model that can be dissected and critiqued.  
Because of the lack of an explicit valuation model, it is difficult to understand how 
analysts arrive at their estimates of fundamental value and to discern how and why 
those estimates might change in response to events. What is even more interesting is 
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that analysts’ stock recommendations appear to be pro-cyclical in nature. When bad 
news is announced, analysts will recommend a “sell”, and when good news is 
announced they recommend a “buy”. This point is further substantiated by Juergens 
(1999) who notes that analysts react to firm announcements after the news is released on 
the wires, either by adjusting their earnings forecasts or by revising their investment 
recommendations. The findings of Juergens (1999) are further supported by Conrad et 
al., (2004)  who  document that large price changes are associated with more frequent 
changes in analysts’ recommendations and that “forces other than direct price-to-value 
comparisons have an impact on analyst  recommendations”(p. 27).  
 
Overall, most of these studies allude to the fact that information which analysts actually 
use differs from that used to justify their recommendations. It seems analysts use non-
financial, qualitative data that is not found in companies’ financial statements. However, 
none of these studies on the information used by financial analysts shows clearly which 
exactly are the qualitative factors influencing analysts’ decisions on stock 
recommendations. The objective of this study is to establish some of these factors, 
particularly for stocks that do not perform as expected.  
 
2.2.3 Analysts’ following and herding behaviour 
Different stocks have different levels of analysts’ coverage. The number of analysts 
following a stock appears to vary according to certain factors. Bhushan (1989) 
conjectures that analysts will decide to cover firms by weighting the costs of effort 
expended in information gathering against the benefits of brokerage commissions. 
Bhushan (1989) and Hussain (2000) observe that the number of analysts following a 
stock is positively related to the number of institutions holding the firm’s shares, the 
percentage of the firm held by institutions, firm return variability and size. For example, 
large firms are found to have a larger analyst following than small firms. Lang and 
Russell (1996) document a positive association between analyst following and analyst 
forecast accuracy.  
 
Alford and Berger (1999) model analyst following, forecast accuracy and trading 
volume as simultaneous determinants of the firm’s information environment. They find 
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that analyst following is positively associated with accuracy and trading volume and 
higher for regulated industries. Characteristics of the analyst’s job play a role in 
inducing coverage. For instance, analysts face start-up costs (McNichols and O'Brien, 
1997) such as learning about the firm’s products (Mikhail et al., 1997). 
Merton’s (1987) theory of information dispersal suggests that if investors rely on 
brokers to learn about their investment options, then firms with wider coverage will be 
more valuable because of a larger investor base knowing of the investment opportunity. 
Various studies support Merton’s theory, demonstrating that firms with more analyst 
coverage have lower trading costs (Brennan and Subrahmanyam, 1995) and greater 
trading volume (Alford and Berger, 1999).  
Chen et al., (2002) investigate the impact on company valuation of the affiliation of 
analysts and the type of recommendation they make. They show that the quantity and 
breadth of coverage that national brokerage firm analysts (as compared with regional 
brokerage firm analysts and independent houses) can bring to bear in the market has the 
greatest effect on company value. However, when buy recommendations are isolated 
from the other types of recommendation (i.e., hold and sell), independent house firm 
analysts have the greatest positive impact on stock prices because of their higher 
perceived credibility.  
Most analyst following studies concentrate on the company characteristics which can 
explain the number of analysts following their stocks. However, these studies do not 
address the issue of whether analyst following has any bearing on the type of 
recommendation issued. Effort is made in this study to establish the effect of analyst 
following on the type of stock recommendation that financial analysts issue.  
Prior research has also found that analysts’ forecasts are affected by their herding 
behaviour where analysts make their personal forecasts more consistent with prevailing 
forecasts. Welch (2000) finds that analysts’ earnings revisions have a positive influence 
on the next two analysts’ revisions. Cote and Goodstein (1999) document that the 
objective of herding is to save one’s reputation. Hong et al., (2000) show that older 
analysts are less likely to herd, both in choice of firms followed and deviation from 
earnings consensus.  Herding behaviour among analysts raises ethical questions 
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particularly when analysts use others’ opinions primarily to protect their reputations 
rather than provide more accurate forecasts (Cote and Goodstein, 1999). Although 
research on herding mostly relates to earning forecasts, it is a very common 
phenomenon in stock recommendations as well. This is why Bajari and Krainer (2004) 
conclude that peer group effect is important in explaining recommendations as opposed 
to relationships between brokerage houses and companies.  
2.2.4 Analysts and stock recommendations 
One of the most important tasks of financial analysts is to provide a rating on the stocks 
they follow, in which case they should have a clear perception what they think the 
future value of the stock will be. Like earnings forecast accuracy, predicting future 
stock price performance may be a difficult task for analysts.  The semi-strong form of 
market efficiency argues that investors cannot profit from using publicly available 
information and, presumably, this includes recommendations made by financial 
analysts. However, according to Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) prices cannot perfectly 
reflect the information which is available, since, if it did, those who spent resources to 
obtain it would receive no compensation. This suggests the existence of a certain level 
of inefficiency in the market is necessary to warrant paying analysts as information 
gatherers. Fernandez (2001) confirms that security analysts produce information that is 
the “life-blood” of both the market and investors. 
 
2.2.4.1 Economic value of stock recommendations 
In the recent past, concern has been raised regarding the economic value of analysts’ 
stock recommendations. There is a plethora of studies that attest to the fact that 
analysts’ stock recommendations have economic value. Stickel (1995) finds that 
analysts are able to detect the extent to which a stock is overvalued or undervalued. He 
also finds that “buy” and “sell” stock recommendations have a profound effect on the 
stock return. Womack (1996) and Ryan and Taffler (2005) indicate that both sell and 
buy recommendations do have significant value. However, the recommendations take 
time to be absorbed by the market, particularly new sells. Barber et al., (2003) show that 
the more highly recommended stocks earned greater market-adjusted returns during the 
1996-1999 period than did less favoured stocks and the opposite was true for 2000-2001 
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where highly recommended stocks performed poorly and least favoured stocks 
performed well. This was because analysts failed to forecast the reversal of the bull 
market in the year 2000, although there are problems in their methodology (Ryan and 
Taffler, 2005). Green (2003) focuses on the short-term informational advantage of 
brokerage firm clients and finds that analysts’ recommendations do contain investment 
value even when transaction costs are controlled for. However, his findings suggest that 
profit is only made if clients have early access to the new recommendation. Other recent 
studies (such as Juergens, 1999, Asquith et al., 2005,  Schlumpf et al., 2005, Agrawal 
and Chen, 2005) confirm the economic value of analysts’ stock recommendations. 
 
On the other hand, Barber et al., (2001) conclude that investors might not earn better 
than average net returns when trading on analysts’ recommendations after taking into 
consideration risk and transactions costs. Similarly, Mikhail et al., (2004) show that 
after transactions costs, excess returns earned from identifying high performing analysts 
are insignificant. Fernandez (2001) states that in the past few years, it has been difficult 
for analysts to predict the future because of rapid structural change, greater uncertainty, 
sustained high volatility and irrational behaviour of the market.  
 
Research has also examined whether other information issued by brokerage firms 
concurrent with recommendations have any economic value, in particular, target price 
(price forecasts). Bradshaw (2002) documents that analysts frequently justify 
recommendations with target prices and that analysts issue more favourable 
recommendations for stocks with higher target prices relative to current prices. 
However, it is not clear whether these target prices provide any information over and 
above information in stock recommendations (Michaely and Womack, 2003). Brav and 
Lehavy (2002) and Asquith et al., (2005) document a significant market reaction to a 
change in target price, both unconditionally and conditional on contemporaneously 
issued stock recommendation and earnings forecast revisions. Their results suggest that 
price targets have information content beyond what is contained in stock 
recommendations. Their findings further imply that stock recommendations should not 
analysed in isolation by investors but should be examined together with target prices.  
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Some studies have investigated whether the personal qualities of analysts have 
significant impact on the accuracy of their earnings forecasts and stock 
recommendations in terms of subsequent abnormal returns. Certain factors have been 
found to improve analysts’ forecasting accuracy. Clement (1999) finds that forecast 
accuracy increases with experience and employer size while it decreases with the 
number of firms and industries followed. Stickel (1992) finds that “All-American” 
analysts’ forecasts are more accurate than “non All-American forecasts”. Mikhail and 
Walther (1997) find a positive relationship between accuracy and forecast experience. 
Jacob et al., (1999) investigate the contribution of experience and brokerage variables 
on analysts’ forecasting attributes including forecast accuracy, frequency and horizon. 
They find that accuracy is positively associated with employer size and brokerage house 
degree of industry specialisation, and negatively associated with brokerage house 
turnover. However, they find no evidence that accuracy improves with experience.  In a 
recent study, Tamura (2002) investigates how analysts’ characteristics affect forecast 
errors and the results show that herd-to-consensus analysts submit earnings estimates 
that are not only close to the consensus but are also strongly affected by their 
personalities (optimism and pessimism). 
 
Desai et al., (2000) document that stocks recommended by all-star analysts outperform 
benchmarks controlling for size and industry and stocks recommended by analysts 
focusing on a single industry outperform those recommended by analysts covering 
multiple industries. Chen and Cheng (2003) find similar results to Desai et al., (2000) 
with respect to all-star analysts, but they go further and  establish  that the market 
impact of recommendations, surprisingly, is stronger for inexperienced analysts than for 
experienced analysts after controlling for analyst-company specific effect.  Mikhail et 
al., (2004) find that analysts whose recommendation revisions earned the most (least) 
excess returns in the past continue to outperform (underperform) in the future. Loh and 
Mian (2005) find that recommendations of superior earnings forecasters outperform the 
recommendations of inferior forecasters while Sorescu and Subrahmanyam (2004) 
conclude that experienced analysts offer more informative recommendations. 
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The general consensus seems to be that analysts’ stock recommendations do have 
economic value and their value may be correlated to other factors such as analysts’ 
personal qualities and other information contained in their research reports such as 
target prices. However, when taking into account risk and transaction costs, profit made 
by trading on analysts stock recommendations vanishes. 
 
The key limitation of the existing studies on the value of analyst stock recommendations 
is that they evaluate future performance in general terms. For instance, studies such as 
Womack (1996) and Ryan and Taffler (2005) investigate the performance of new buy 
and new sell recommendations and conclude that in totality, they both (new buys and 
new sells) have an expected significant effect on stocks’ future returns. However, these 
studies do not take into account that in essence, it is not all stocks that actually earn 
positive (negative) abnormal returns as expected after the rating revision is made. It is 
possible that the documented significant reaction to new buys and new sells in 
aggregate is due to the significant out (under) performance of just a few stocks, in which 
case it is not necessarily correct to generalise the results to include all the stocks. 
Arguably, there is mileage in investigating whether all stocks that receive buy (sell) 
recommendation perform as expected. One of the aims of the current study is to 
investigate the reasons for non-conformance by some new buy and new sell stocks 
regardless of overall performance. 
 
2.2.4.2 Stock rating systems 
Until recently, different analysts used different rating systems for their 
recommendations. Typically, they used terms such as strong buy, buy, near term or long 
term accumulate, near term or long term over/out-perform or underperform, neutral, 
hold, reduce, sell and strong sell. Ho and Harris (1998) indicate that one of the reasons 
for having more rating categories than just three (buy, sell, hold) was to provide an 
opportunity to sugar-coat bad news and/or to send more subtle signals. For example, in 
a five level system, a recommendation downgraded to “underperform” may be 
substituted for a harsher change to the bottom category of “sell”. This suggests that 
additional rating categories were used to avoid the harsh statement of negative news.  
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Some studies such as Stickel (1995), Womack (1996), Ryan and Taffler (2005) and 
Laderman (1998) recognise that upgrades of stocks are more common than downgrades 
with only 1% or less of all recommendations made by analysts being new “sells”. This 
is why Dorfman (1996) goes as far as suggesting that investors have developed a belief 
that the “hold” recommendation is another way of recommending “sell”. The disparity 
between the number of analysts’ “buy” and “sell” recommendations was interpreted as 
evidence that analysts’ objectivity and independence are compromised. Analysts had to 
compromise because issuing negative recommendations would deny them access to 
management (Chen and Matsumoto, 2003) 
 
The pattern in the distribution of buy and sell recommendations has changed since the 
implementation of NASD 2711 and SEC rule 472.  Madureira (2004) observes that the 
proportion of sells now exceeds the proportion of buys and he attributes this drastic 
change in the distribution of stock recommendations to the disclosure requirements of 
NASD 2711. The change in the distribution of stock recommendations is accompanied 
by a more clear and easy to understand rating system because of Rule 472 which 
requires that the definition of ratings should be the same as their meaning. Madureira 
(2004) confirms that seven of the ten large brokerage firms that were involved in the 
Global Settlement have adopted the new rating system. This suggests that the blur 
caused by the rating systems used by different brokerage firms may soon disappear. 
 
2.2.4.3 Characteristics of stocks that receive the most optimistic rating 
Some studies investigate the characteristics of stocks that receive optimistic rating. 
Jegadeesh et al., (2004) indicate that analysts prefer high momentum stocks and growth 
stocks. Thus, stocks that receive buy ratings typically have more positive price 
momentum, higher trading volume, higher past and projected growth, more positive 
accounting accruals and more aggressive capital expenditure. Stickel (2000) supports 
the findings of Jegadeesh et al., (2004) by showing that Wall Street darlings who are 
awarded buy recommendations have recent positive EPS momentum and surprise, 
recent positive relative price momentum, and recent positive EPS forecast revisions. 
Bradshaw (2002) and Bradshaw (2004) suggest that analysts prefer the price-earnings-
to-growth model and long-term growth when they value stocks and do not use present 
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value models as would be expected. He argues that buy-and-hold investors would earn 
higher returns when relying on present value models that incorporate analysts’ earnings 
forecasts than on analysts’ stock recommendations. Asquith et al., (2005) show that the 
three methodologies used to value stock generally fall into three categories; earnings or 
cash flow multiples, discounted cash flow (DCF) and asset multiples. However, they 
find that the market does not react differently depending on the valuation methodology 
used by the analyst or whether the analyst uses one or many. 
 
These studies suggest that stock characteristics tend to determine the type of rating 
awarded on them. The drawback of these studies, however, is that they put most 
emphasis on the stocks that receive buy ratings and say little, if anything, about stocks 
that receive sell ratings. Furthermore, these studies do not take into account the fact that 
not all stocks that are awarded buy ratings perform as expected subsequently. The 
current study is similar to these studies in that it assumes that stock characteristics may 
explain some stock ratings issued by analysts. The difference is that the current study 
includes other non-stock characteristics in its models and concentrates on both new buy 
and new sell recommendations that lack market impact. In addition, it concentrates on 
the potential cognitive and behavioural biases analysts may be subject to in their 
judgements, which is a perspective original to the literature. 
 
2.2.5 Analysts’ conflicts of interest 
Until recently, brokerage firms have been spending huge amounts of money on analysts 
to analyse stocks and make investment recommendations.  However, as indicated 
above, research casts doubt on whether investors can benefit from following their 
recommendations inter alia, because of the alleged conflicts of interest between 
brokerage firms and their clients which tainted analysts’ objectivity and independence. 
Michaely and Womack (1999) document that investment banks traditionally have three 
sources of income: (1) corporate financing and the issuance of securities and merger 
advisory services, (2) brokerage services, and (3) proprietary trading. These three 
income sources may have created conflicts of interest within the bank and with its 
clients. In fact, frequent conflicts appeared to occur between a bank’s corporate finance 
arm and its brokerage operation. The corporate finance division of the bank is 
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responsible for completing transactions such as initial public offerings (IPOs), seasoned 
equity offerings, and promoting mergers by new and current clients. The brokerage 
operation and its equity research department, on the other hand, were motivated to 
maximise commissions and spreads by providing timely, high quality information. 
These two objectives may conflict. These conflicts of interest clearly had a negative 
impact on investor perceptions of the reliability of analyst recommendations and Reg 
FD) could have attempted to stop this by, in effect, seeking to separate investment 
banking from equity research.  
 
Dugar and Nathan (1995) and Michaely and Womack (1999) show that market 
participants seem to be aware of the effect of investment banking relationships on 
analysts’ incentives and discount the optimism in investment banker analyst research 
reports more heavily. Lin and McNichols (1998) document that affiliated analysts do 
issue overly favourable recommendations to maintain client relationships and investors 
expect lead analysts to recommend “hold” when “sell” is warranted. Hirst et al., (1995) 
show that investors do distinguish between analysts with differential incentives, 
however, investors only incorporate such differential incentives into their stock 
performance models when the analyst report is unfavourable.  
 
A number of studies have been conducted after the implementation of rules and 
regulations (see section 2.2.6 below) meant to govern brokerage firms and analysts. The 
main aim of most of these studies is to determine whether overly optimistic analysts’ 
research reports were a result of analysts’ conflicts of interest as alleged in the Global 
Settlement (see section 2.2.6.3 below) and if analysts’ behaviour has changed after the 
regulatory intervention. Barber et al., (2004) find that abnormal returns from the buy 
recommendations issued by independent firms exceed those from the investment banks 
and suggest that at least part of the underperformance in the buy recommendations 
issued by the investment banks is in line with biased research by investment banks. Cliff 
(2004) and Agrawal and Chen (2005) draw the same conclusion as Barber et al., (2004). 
However, they go further and show that the reasons for underwriting firms’ poor 
performance are due to conflicts of interest and selection bias. However, Cliff (2004) 
acknowledges that “there is probably more to the story than that” (p. 25) suggesting that 
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there may be other factors to explain why analysts issue particular recommendations on 
stocks while Agrawal and Chen (2005) conclude that investors are sophisticated enough 
to adjust for analysts’ bias.   
 
Other studies do not find conflicts of interest in analysts’ recommendations, when 
comparing analysts’ recommendations before and after the implementation of rules, 
while still others conclude that even if there were conflicts of interest, their magnitude 
does not warrant the Global Settlement. I believe that any study that shows that there is 
no conflict of interest in analysts’ recommendations or that conflicts of interest do not 
explain the level of excessive optimism in analysts’ research reports suggests that the 
effectiveness of rules set up to govern analysts by policy-makers to date to restrain 
overly optimistic analysts’ recommendations may have a limited effect. 
 
Chan et al., (2004) find that brokerage firms trade on their recommendations. Their 
results are inconsistent with the reasons for the Global Settlement (see section 2.2.6.3). 
However, they explain their results further by showing that it may just be that firms 
provide a public show of solidarity to their analysts by trading on their 
recommendations. Bajari and Krainer (2004) find that the magnitude of the effects of 
conflicts of interest on recommendations appears to be too small. They document that 
the main factors influencing stock recommendations are publicly observable 
information and peer group, as opposed to conflicts of interest arising from the 
relationships between companies and brokerage firms. Iskoz (2003) finds differences in 
performance of affiliated and unaffiliated brokerage firms on IPOs only for strong buys 
while Kolasinski and Kothari (2004) conclude that the cause of overly positive 
recommendations has more to do with execution-related conflicts of interest or selection 
bias but with by incentives derived from investment banking business. 
 
Gallant (1990), Boni and Womack (2001), Ho and Harris (1998) and Francis and 
Philbrick (1993) observe that the majority of analysts’ reports were positive because 
companies would limit the analyst’s access to their companies if a “sell” 
recommendation is made for their stock, making it difficult for them to obtain the 
company specific information they need for their analysis. After all, in most cases, it is 
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the company that has control of the disclosure process and therefore on how much 
information to divulge.  
 
The lack of objectivity on the part of analysts was exacerbated by their compensation 
structure. Although analysts are professionals who want to build and maintain their 
credibility, they were obviously torn between promoting the best investment advice and 
thereby a good reputation. For that reason, their compensation was not necessarily 
based on the quality of their research or stock recommendation success over time. Until 
recently, analyst compensation packages generally consisted of base salary, a 
percentage of the investment banking deals in which they were involved and a 
percentage of the trading volume generated by their research coverage. With this 
arrangement, it was possible for analysts to lose objectivity in stock coverage decisions 
and earnings forecasts. Hong and Kubik (2003) explain analysts’ bias by pointing to the 
reward system used by brokerage firms. Their findings imply that analysts who are 
optimistic are much less likely to be fired from the top brokerage firms, and are much 
more likely to be promoted or hired by a more high-powered house. The study also 
finds that analysts are judged less on accuracy when it comes to stocks underwritten by 
their houses. Chan et al., (2002) look into analysts’ conflicts of interest and biases in 
earnings forecasts and conclude that earnings forecast bias is exacerbated by the fact 
that investors handsomely reward stocks that achieve runs of non-negative surprises.  
Rule 472 addresses the compensation structure issue and it is anticipated that objectivity 
problems arising from brokerage firms’ compensation structure will be somewhat kept 
at bay as a result. 
 
As can be seen above, results of the studies on analysts’ conflicts of interest are mixed. 
Some studies document that analysts are influenced by conflicts of interest while others 
conclude that potential conflicts of interest do not fully explain the levels of optimism in 
analysts’ recommendations. The difficulty with these studies is that from the onset they 
assume that the problem of analysts’ optimistic recommendations is mainly caused by 
the analysts’ conflicts of interest, and as a result do not incorporate within the studies 
many other factors that may be just as important in influencing stock recommendations. 
The current study assumes that there are many other factors influencing analysts’ 
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recommendations other than their conflicts of interest. Being able to identify more 
important factors that influence analysts’ stock recommendations is essential in terms of 
developing a more robust model that can predict analysts’ stock recommendations. The 
other drawback of these studies is that they put less emphasis on sell recommendations 
and concentrate entirely on the buy recommendations. I believe that to have a complete 
picture of stock recommendations and the factors underlying them, both buy and sell 
recommendations should be analysed concurrently. 
 
2.2.6 Regulation of financial analysts 
In order to address the concern about financial analysts’ conflicts of interest, the SEC 
and other regulatory agencies have introduced rules and regulations to govern equity 
research as well as the relationship between brokerage firms and financial analysts. The 
following subsections discuss some of these regulations and the findings and 
conclusions of the studies that have investigated their efficacy to date. 
 
2.2.6.1 Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) 
The Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) was implemented on October 23rd, 2000. This 
regulation provides that companies should not disclose material information only to 
selected individuals but should make public disclosure of that information. Reg FD is 
actually meant to curb the practice where top executives in the companies would 
disclose information to certain analysts, often to those analysts with whom they have an 
investment banking relationship. 
 
Various studies have investigated the effectiveness of Reg FD. Some of these studies 
conclude that Reg FD has achieved the intended objectives while others conclude it has 
unintended effects. Gintschel and Markov (2004) find that the price impact of earnings 
forecasts and stock recommendations is lower following the implementation of Reg FD 
and they conclude that this is because analysts no longer have access to private 
information regarding earnings as well as other information relevant for their stock 
valuation task. Their findings thus suggest that Reg FD is effective. Mohanram and 
Sunder (2003) conclude that Reg FD has resulted in analysts’ increased independence 
from management. Interestingly, they also find that analysts who were classified as stars 
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pre Reg FD are not maintaining their edge post Reg FD. Their findings suggest that 
before the implementation of Reg FD, relationships with management mattered more 
than hard work. Other studies such as Ahmed and Schneible (2005), Chen and 
Matsumoto (2003) and Heflin et al., (2003) also provide evidence to support the 
efficacy of Reg FD. 
 
However, other studies do not support the SEC and other agencies’ concern that analyst 
research is highly dependent on information from management. Ke and Yu (2005) do 
not find evidence that the informativeness of analysts’ stock recommendations is due to 
their privileged access to management’s private information. Chen and Marquez (2003) 
focused on the effect of strengthened “Chinese Walls” and mandatory disclosure on 
analyst compensation. They conclude that information barriers due to strengthened 
“Chinese Walls” can increase research efforts and improve quality. However, they also 
point out that this type of regulation can also reduce information production and lower 
the quality of reports if a brokerage firm derives intrinsic benefit from its analyst 
research activity. Their results suggest that some provisions of Reg FD are effective 
while others may have unintended effects. 
 
2.2.6.2 Regulations NASD 2711 and NYSE 472 
NASD 2711, Research Analysts and Research Reports and NYSE’s amendment to its 
Rule 472, Communication with the Public were effected around the same time, on the 
9th July, 2002. Although both rules are titled differently, they have identical 
requirements. They both require that analyst research reports display the proportion of 
issuing firm’s recommendations that are buys, holds and sells. 
 
Few studies have investigated the efficacy of NASD 2711 and Rule 472 to date. Barber 
et al., (2004) observe that from mid 2000, the percentage of buys decreased steadily and 
by the end of June 2003, buys exceeded sells by less than a 3-1 ratio. They conclude 
that although the results may be a consequence of the economic downturn that occurred 
during the sample period, there is strong evidence that the results are due to the 
influence of NASD 2711 which requires brokers’ ratings distributions to be made 
public. Madureira (2004) also attests that these rules are effective in terms of the 
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distribution of stock recommendation ratings. He also points out that the important shift 
starts with the adoption of new rating systems by some of the top brokerage firms, 
which is in line with the requirements of Rule 472. One of the clauses of Rule 472 states 
that definition of rating terms should be in line with their meaning.  
 
2.2.6.3 Global Analyst Research Settlement 
In April 2003, a settlement commonly known as the “Global Analyst Research 
Settlement” was reached between the top ten US brokerage firms and the SEC, NYSE, 
NASD and the New York Attorney General. According to the settlement, the top ten 
brokerage firms had to pay penalties for the alleged misconduct that resulted in 
investors losing huge amounts of money from trading on their analysts’ stock 
recommendations. In addition to the penalties, they also had to pay to fund independent 
research and seven of the brokerage firms had to pay further to fund and promote 
investor relations. In addition to monetary penalties, all brokerage firms were also 
required to make changes in their businesses including cutting off equity research from 
investment banking by strengthening the “Chinese Walls” between the two. 
 
Some studies have looked into the effectiveness of the Global Settlement.  Kadan et al., 
(2004) find that affiliated recommendations are still more optimistic than unaffiliated 
recommendations but the differential optimism is significantly lower after the 
implementation of the Global Settlement. On this basis, they conclude the Global 
Settlement is effective and any other remaining bias found with affiliated analysts can 
be attributed to selection bias. Madureira (2004) finds evidence of an overall change in 
the distribution of recommendations issued by the top 10 brokerage firms after the 
Global Settlement, with them leaning towards less optimistic ratings. 
 
The mixed results found to date regarding financial analysts’ conflicts of interest and 
the efficacy of the rules governing equity research serve to show that the problem of 
optimism in analysts’ recommendations may not be entirely a problem of relationship 
between brokerage firms and companies, but may be a problem instigated by conflicts 
of interest and other important issues. As mentioned earlier, the current study addresses 
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the factors that influence analysts’ recommendations by taking into account the 
potential conflicts of interest, analysts’ psychological biases and other key factors.  
 
To summarise this section, one of the most important analysts’ outputs is their stock 
recommendations. Research has found that, contrary to what an average investor may 
expect, analysts do not use information contained in companies’ financial reports 
appropriately in valuing the stocks they cover, but rely largely on soft, qualitative 
information provided outside of company reports. The latter may be influenced by 
several factors including the relationship that the analysts’ investment banks have with 
the companies whose stock they cover and analysts’ psychological biases. The 
underlying thesis of this research is that the factors which affect analysts at the time 
they gather, process and interpret information, may broadly account for the observed 
lack of market impact of analysts’ recommendations. 
 
2.3 Analysts’ behaviour and market anomalies  
Like any other human beings, analysts are prone to errors in their work. The insights of 
behavioural finance, which is a comparatively new finance discipline using psychology 
to better understand the behaviour of investors and other market participants, may well 
be helpful in explaining such analyst biases. The purpose of this study is to seek to 
understand how psychological biases, together with other market factors, may jointly 
influence analysts to issue stock recommendations that lack market impact. 
 
2.3.1 Financial analysts and market anomalies 
The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) states that when markets are efficient, stock 
prices “fully reflect all publicly available information”. This means that investors will 
“pounce” on any new information that may have a bearing on stock prices, swiftly 
driving share prices up or down. According to the EMH, stock prices are unbiased 
estimates of fundamental value. This implies that financial analysts are unable to earn 
returns sufficient to compensate for their costs and still earn an economic profit. Rapid 
price movements due to new information cause randomness in successive price changes.  
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The EMH is based on the assumption that investors are rational and consider all 
available information in their decision-making processes. But if the market is efficient, 
what role then do analysts play and how are they compensated? Research shows that too 
often investors (analysts) are irrational (e.g., Shefrin and Statman, 1995; Barber and 
Odean, 2001 and DeBondt and Thaler, 1985). Also, there are some securities that do not 
reflect all public information (weakly efficient) implying that investors may be able to 
make use of this inefficiency to earn abnormal profits (e.g., Keim, 1983). 
  
There are evident inefficiencies (anomalies) that appear to contradict the EMH, both at 
the market-wide and individual security level. These anomalies suggest that the 
principles of rational behaviour underlying the efficient market hypothesis are not 
entirely correct. This implies that I need to look at models of human behaviour as well 
to understand such anomalies.  
 
At the market-wide level Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) show that trading strategies that 
buy past winners and sell past losers realise significant abnormal returns (stocks exhibit 
a momentum property). Lo and MacKinlay (1988) find positive serial correlation for a 
diversified portfolio of shares. Fama and French (1988) confirm excess volatility claims 
by showing that returns tend to be negatively autocorrelated over horizons of three to 
five years. Campbell and Shiller (1988) show that the earnings yield can help predict 
share prices. DeBondt and Thaler (1985) find evidence of long-term stock price 
overreaction and negative serial correlation for individual stocks. 
 
Different studies have also documented firm specific anomalies. Banz (1981) and 
Reinganum (1982) show that small companies earn higher rates of return than large 
companies stocks. Keim (1983) finds that abnormal returns from February to December 
inclusive tend to be similar but small firms experience a positive January effect while 
large firms experience a negative January effect. Fama and French (1992); Lakonishok 
et al., (1994) and Loughran (1997) find that the book-to- market ratio can predict returns 
on securities. 
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There are different explanations put forward for these anomalies. Conrad and Kaul 
(1993) suggest that the anomalies are due to statistical measurement errors. Fama and 
French (1996) argue that the observed difference between returns on value and growth 
portfolios mirror a compensation for bearing risk. Fama (1998) further documents that 
long-term return anomalies are sensitive to methodology and the overreaction and 
underreaction that are observed in the financial markets are evidence that anomalies 
from the standpoint of the EMH are just “chance results”. Jagannathan and Wang 
(1996) document that when human capital and the business cycle are included in the 
CAPM, firm size and book-to-market anomalies drop out. 
 
Other studies attribute the anomalies to psychological errors made by analysts. DeBondt 
and Thaler (1985) find that stocks that have been losers over a period of two to five 
years go on to subsequently yield higher rates of return than the corresponding prior 
winner stocks. They attribute the long-term return reversal to investor overreaction. 
DeBondt and Thaler (1990) argue that analysts have a tendency to overreact and form 
expectations that are too extreme. Abarbanell and Bernard (1992) and Klein (1990) 
indicate that analysts’ forecasts appear to underreact to information in past quarterly 
earnings and past quarterly returns, which may imply that analysts are responsible for 
anomalies via their forecast errors. Eastwood and Nutt (1999) demonstrate that in fact 
analysts underreact to negative earnings news but overreact to positive news and 
therefore appear systematically optimistic. Tamura (2002)  interprets his results as 
evidence that financial analysts systematically underreact to publicly available 
information and fail to make rational forecasts. In the latest study, Pinsker (2005) 
investigates the effect of Reg FD. Using laboratory experiments, he argues that Reg FD 
requires firms to disclose information sequentially to the market as opposed to multiple 
material events pre Reg FD. He shows that sequential disclosure increases volatility and 
variation in stock price beliefs among investors which is in line with the explanation 
that investors overreact to sequential information. He concludes that Reg FD may not 
achieve its intended goals. 
 
Although Fama (1998) posits that the overreaction and underreaction that are observed 
in the financial markets are just “chance results”, Barberis et al., (1998) provide a 
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psychological model which tries to reconcile the overreaction and underreaction 
evidence from the financial markets. Other studies such as those of Daniel et al., (1998) 
and Wang (2001) formulate other psychological models. 
 
2.3.2 Analysts and cognitive biases 
The apparent errors made by analysts can best be explained by behavioural finance 
concepts which seek to use psychology to explain the decision-making process of the 
investor. Olsen (1998) asserts that behavioural finance does not try to define “rational” 
behaviour or label decision-making as faulty; but it seeks to predict systematic financial 
markets implications of psychological decision processes. Behavioural finance is based, 
inter alia, on the work of Tversky and Kahneman (1974) who show that when people 
are faced with complicated judgements or decisions, they simplify the task by relying 
on heuristics and general rules of thumb. In many cases, these short cuts yield very 
close approximations to the “optimal” answers suggested by normative theories. The 
advantage of heuristics is that they reduce the time and effort required to make 
reasonably good judgements and decisions. Although there are various cognitive biases 
documented in the psychological literature, the two salient biases recognised in the 
literature as key in explaining the “irrational” behaviour of market participants are 
overconfidence and representativeness. I concentrate on their potential impact in 
explaining analyst behaviour in this study. 
 
2.3.2.1 Overconfidence  
Overconfidence is defined as overestimating what one can do compared to what 
objective circumstances would warrant. The more difficult the decision task, and the 
more complex it is, the more successful we expect ourselves to be. Overconfidence may 
explain why investment analysts believe they have superior investment abilities and yet 
their stock recommendations have limited investment value. Various authors have noted 
that the overconfidence of investors, including analysts, plays a major role in the 
anomalies observed in financial markets. Odean (1998a) looks at the buying and selling 
activities of individual investors at a discount brokerage. On average the stocks that 
individuals buy subsequently underperform those they sell even when liquidity 
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demands, risk management and tax consequences are taken into consideration. He 
suggests that this behaviour of selling winners too soon is motivated by overconfidence.  
 
Barber and Odean (2001) assert that rational investors trade only if the expected gains 
exceed transaction costs. But overconfident investors overestimate the precision of their 
information and thereby the expected gain of trading. They also observe that since men 
are more confident than women are, men will trade more and perform worse than 
women. Odean (1998b) concludes that overconfidence is costly to society and that 
overconfident traders do not share risk optimally. Overconfidence increases trading 
volume and market depth but decreases the expected utility of overconfident traders. 
Gervais and Odean (2001) describe both the process by which traders learn about their 
abilities and how a bias in this learning can create overconfident traders. They conclude 
that in assessing his ability, the trader takes too much credit for his success and as a 
result becomes overconfident. Massey and Thaler (2005) analyse the decision-making 
of National Football League teams during the annual player draft. They conclude that 
the task of picking players is an extremely difficult one and it is extremely difficult to 
avoid overconfidence in this task. The more information teams acquire about players, 
the more overconfident they will feel about their ability to make fine distinctions, the 
“illusion of knowledge”.  
 
2.3.2.2 Representativeness  
The representativeness heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) involves making 
judgements based on stereotypes rather than on the underlying characteristics of the 
decision task. People tend to try and categorise events as typical of a representative of a 
well-known class and then in making probability estimates that overstress the 
importance of such a categorisation, disregard evidence about the underlying 
probabilities. One consequence of this heuristic is for people to see patterns in data that 
is truly random and draw conclusions based on very little information. Shefrin and 
Statman (1995) indicate that investors believe that good stocks are stocks of good 
companies, which is not necessarily true. This is rooted in the representative bias, which 
supports the idea that winners will always be winners and losers will always be losers. 
Solt and Statman (1989) actually observe that, in effect, stocks of good companies tend 
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to be outperformed by stocks of bad companies. This is because investors attach higher 
expected returns to stocks that have experienced previous higher sales growth. DeBondt 
and Thaler (1985) argue that because investors rely on the representative heuristic they 
could become overly optimistic about past winners and overly pessimistic about past 
losers. This bias could cause prices to deviate from their fundamental level.  
 
Although very interesting methodologies have been used in various studies to document 
investors’ overconfidence and representativeness bias, none has linked the words, 
particularly the tone of language that analysts use to justify their recommendations to 
their psychological biases. Because it is difficult to directly measure psychological 
drivers of analyst judgements, various studies have attempted to understand their 
psychological behaviour by using their stock recommendations, earnings forecast and 
other numerical information they produce. Little, if any, attempt has been made to link 
analysts’ textual data, found in the reports that they prepare to justify their stock 
recommendation, to the potential psychological biases to which they might be prone. 
 
To summarise this section, analyst psychological biases such as overconfidence and 
representativeness may explain some of the anomalies observed in the financial 
markets. Overconfidence bias arises if an analyst overestimates what he/she can do 
compared to his/her abilities while the representativeness bias arises when an analyst 
unconsciously relies on stereotypes in making decisions on the stocks that he/she 
follows. 
 
2.4 Conceptual framework 
The aim of this section is to integrate the two strands of literature from section 2.2 and 
section 2.3 above to build a conceptual framework which identifies those factors 
potentially influencing financial analysts’ stock recommendations.  
 
Box 1 of the framework shows that the niche of my research is analysts’ stock 
recommendations. My initial proposition is that analyst’s stock recommendations,  
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Figure 2-1   The conceptual framework identifying the factors influencing analysts’ stock 
recommendations 
 
 
Analysts’ recommendation drivers                                                       Market dimensions 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                                                                                
                                                                                                                                    
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                           
                       (6) 
 
                                                              Underlying research theme  
 
 
 
which are the integral output from analysts’ work, lack market impact (box 2). Market 
impact is defined in this study as the unexpected performance after a stock 
recommendation is changed from one category to another. For instance, if a 
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return contrary to the expected positive return, then that new buy recommendation is 
assumed to lack market impact. Similarly, if a new sell recommendation accrues 
positive or minimal abnormal returns, not the expected negative return, over the twelve 
months period after the recommendation is changed, this sell signal is assumed to lack 
market impact. 
 
The logic following my proposition is to ask why do analyst stock recommendations 
perform contrary to the expectations (box 3). The established lack of market impact of 
analyst recommendations could be due to the following alternative hypotheses, the 
market is efficient (box 4) or that analysts are “biased” and therefore “inefficient” (box 
5). I reject efficient market theory (box 4), because I assume that in theory, if analysts 
do their job properly using all relevant information, including the insider information 
which they used to have privilege of, then their recommendations would have 
measurable market impact. Until very recently, much of the information analysts used 
was gathered from companies themselves through company visits, analysts’ meetings, 
results announcements and other means (Barker, 1998). 
 
The key Efficient Market Hypotheses (EMH) focuses on the market reaction to new 
price sensitive information. Therefore, I propose in this thesis that the lack of market 
reaction to most analysts’ recommendations is consistent with an alternative explanation 
(box 5) that their recommendations have little market value/information content as a 
result of the manner in which judgements and recommendations are made and the 
factors driving these (box 6). 
 
My conceptual framework categorises these ‘driving factors’ into overconfidence bias 
and representativeness bias and further shows analyst following as a control factor (box 
6). Overconfidence bias is measured by Diction variable optimism and certainty. 
Representativeness bias is measured by Diction variable activity.1 Other factors that 
serve as measures of representativeness bias are, previous price performance of the 
stock (momentum), firm size, book-to-market, and target prices. The relationships 
                                                 
1 Refer to chapter 4, section 4.4 for information on how the content analysis using Diction software is 
conducted. 
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between the brokerage firms and companies (investment-relations) and number of 
analysts following the firm are used as control variables. (See chapter 3 for a complete 
description of these factors).  
 
2.5 Summary, research gaps and research questions 
The stock recommendations issued by financial analysts are an issue of concern to both 
investors and policy-makers alike. This chapter reviews evidence on (1) the type of data 
that analysts use to form an opinion about the future value of the firm on which they are 
commenting, (2) whether their stock recommendations have economic value, (3) 
analysts conflicts’ of interest and the regulations put into place to curb these, and (4) the 
role of analysts in the documented market anomalies as well as the cognitive biases that 
analysts may resort to in order to cope with the complexity of their tasks. Based on this 
evidence, I am able to identify the gaps in the extant literature and where the current 
study can be able to make significant contribution. 
 
The gaps in the literature are identified as follows: First, an important gap in the extant 
finance literature resides with the type of information that analysts use to justify their 
recommendations. For example, Rogers and Grant (1997) assert that financial reports 
provide 52% of the information cited by analysts and 48% is external to the financial 
reporting process. In effect, this strand of literature alludes to the fact that the 
information that analysts actually use differs from their justification for their 
recommendations. In this study, I attempt to investigate where the information that is 
not explained by firms’ financial reports comes from.  
 
Second, various studies show that these recommendations have negligible effect on the 
market. Barber et al., (2001) document that trading on security analysts’ 
recommendations would not yield the investor positive abnormal returns. They build 
hypothetical portfolios containing the most favourable consensus stock 
recommendations on each day. They find that these portfolios do earn above average 
returns but only before taking into account transaction costs and risk. After accounting 
for these, investors do not earn better than average returns. Womack (1996) and Ryan 
and Taffler (2005), on the other hand, find that stocks following new “buy” 
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recommendations continue to go up for four to six weeks after the new stock 
recommendation was made while “sell” recommendations drift lower for six more 
months. Their results suggest that the average level of recommendation has little 
investment value but changes in levels are valuable although for a limited time. Ryan 
and Taffler (2005) find that only new “sells” and recommendations for smaller less 
followed stocks have investment value. However, these studies do not attempt to 
explain what could be the reasons for the general lack of impact of stock 
recommendations on the market. 
 
Third, studies that document the psychological biases that analysts might be prone to 
investigate how stocks react to their recommendations (see Barberis et al., 1998; Daniel 
et al., 1998 and DeBondt and Thaler, 1985) but fail to trace directly the existence of 
judgemental bias in the way that analysts prepare their reports. My empirical findings 
should be able to explain better what the actual role of analysts in the financial market 
was and is. 
 
Having identified these research gaps, my research question is framed as follows: 
What factors influence analysts at the time that they gather, process and interpret 
information on stocks so that they eventually issue stock recommendations that lack 
market impact? 
 
• Is it conceivable that analysts make errors in their recommendations 
because their decisions are highly influenced by psychological bias? 
 
• Is it plausible that the analysts’ role in corporate finance and other 
activities is driving their recommendations, given that Michaely and 
Womack (1999) and Dugar and Nathan (1995) suggest that analysts 
employed by brokerage firms who also have underwriting relationships 
with the company they follow have the economic incentives to issue 
more favourable recommendations?  
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• Is it possible that the characteristics of stocks as outlined by Stickel 
(2000) and Jegadeesh et al., (2004), and not the quantitative information 
from companies’ reports, are the sole determinants of the type of 
recommendations that analysts issue? 
 
• Studies, such as those of Brav and Lehavy (2003) document that target 
prices have market impact both conditional and unconditional to the 
presence of stock recommendations. However, it is not quite clear what 
the role of target prices that are issued concurrent with stock 
recommendations is. Is it possible that stock recommendations drive 
stock recommendations and that target prices that are issued concurrent 
with stock recommendations are only meant to peddle analysts’ 
optimistic recommendations as suggested by Asquith et al., (2005)? 
 
 
To address these research questions, in chapter 7 I evaluate the performance of stocks 
that are awarded new buy and new sell recommendations and then select the stocks that 
perform contrary to the expectations. The testable hypotheses about the reasons for 
these stocks’ lack of market impact are developed in the next chapter (Chapter 3) and 
tested in Chapter 8.  
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Chapter 3 Hypotheses development and variables 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter concluded by providing the conceptual model used in this study 
together with the research gaps and research questions from the literature. The purpose 
of this chapter is to develop testable hypotheses derived from the conceptual framework 
in Figure 1 section 2.4 and from the extant literature in order to address the gaps 
identified in the literature and to answer the research questions specified in chapter 2.  
Because the essence of this research is to assess the impact of psychological biases on 
nonconforming analysts’ recommendations, the hypotheses to be tested are mainly 
about psychological biases. Thus, my first null hypothesis relates to overconfidence bias 
while the next five null hypotheses relate mainly to representativeness bias. My last null 
hypothesis test for the effect of existing corporate relationships between investment 
banks and firms on the type of stock recommendations that analysts issue. I also state 
my control variable and how it is derived from the literature. 
 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 describes the hypotheses to be tested 
and associated proxy variables. Section 3.3 provides the rationale for a control variable 
used and how this control variable is derived from the literature. Section 3.4 concludes 
the chapter. 
 
3.2 Hypothesis development and variables 
3.2.1 Do overconfidence and representativeness biases influence analysts’ decisions 
about the stock recommendations they issue? 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) postulate that when people are faced with complicated 
judgements or decisions, they simplify the task by relying on heuristics or general rules 
of thumb. The advantage of heuristics/cues is that they reduce the time and effort 
required to make reasonably good judgements and decisions. Because of the complex 
nature of analysts’ work, I postulate they are likely to be prone to cognitive biases, in 
particular, they are prone to overconfidence and representativeness biases. 
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Cognitive biases are very difficult to measure outside the abstracted situation of a 
psychological laboratory. However, in this research, analysts’ cognitive thinking is 
inferred, inter alia, from the tone of language they use when they prepare their research 
reports. When analysts change a stock recommendation from one category to another, 
they normally prepare research reports. Most research reports contain a new or a 
reiterated stock rating as well as other information pertaining to the company, such as 
target price, earnings forecast, segment data, affiliation, valuation models (Asquith et 
al., 2005) and industry data. But, most importantly, there is textual information 
providing the analysts’ justification for the type of stock rating granted. It is the tone of 
language that analysts use to justify their recommendation that helps us to infer their 
thinking at the time that they prepare their reports.  
 
The overconfidence bias in the tone of language that analysts use is measured by 
Diction variables OPTIMISM and CERTAINTY.  OPTIMISM is defined in Diction as 
language endorsing some person, group, concept or event or highlighting their positive 
entailment while CERTAINTY is defined as language indicating resoluteness, 
inflexibility, completeness and a tendency to speak ex cathedra. If analysts’ 
overconfidence bias (as measured by OPTIMISM and CERTAINTY) influences the 
decision they make about stocks, then I expect it to have a positive (negative) 
significant impact on the buy (sell) recommendations which lack impact. The null 
hypotheses 1 is therefore established as follows: 
H10:  The tone of the language used by investment analysts in their research reports  
to justify their stock ratings is not optimistic independent of whether the stock  
recommendation is buy or sell. 
 
The representativeness bias in the language used by analysts when preparing their 
research reports is measured by Diction variable ACTIVITY.  ACTIVITY is defined in 
Diction as language featuring movement, change, and the implementation of ideas and 
the avoidance of inertia. Fogarty and Rogers (2005) conclude that analysts’ decisions 
about firms’ stock tend to be influenced by their knowledge of corporate plans, 
merger/acquisition talk or any suggestion of proffered change in corporate direction. 
The second null hypothesis is therefore stated as follows: 
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H20: The tone of the language used by the investment analysts in their research 
reports to justify the stock ratings is not positively biased towards the level of       
activity (or change) taking place within the company 
 
A complete overview of the methodology used to measure these cognitive biases is 
shown in chapter 4, section 4.5. 
 
3.2.2 Does the previous price performance influence the type of rating financial 
analysts award to the stocks they follow? 
A consistent increase in the stock price from one reporting period to another is an 
indication of momentum in stock price. Momentum is a well known phenomenon in 
finance. For example, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) show that past winners outperform 
past losers over the 3-12 months’ time horizon, thus exhibiting the property of 
momentum. On the other hand Jegadeesh et al., (2004) show that analysts prefer 
“glamour” stocks which, among others, exhibit high price momentum. 
 
Stickel (2000) posits that Wall Street darlings are stocks with, among other 
characteristics, recent positive EPS momentum and surprise, and recent positive relative 
price momentum. Analysts have incentives to give buy recommendations to stocks with 
these financial characteristics because they follow from documented momentum pricing 
anomalies and because they are actionable ideas that generate trading commissions. I take 
previous price momentum as another measure of representativeness bias in that analysts 
assume that the previous price performance of the stock represents future performance of 
the stock. The null hypothesis 3 is therefore established as follows: 
 
H30: The coefficient of price momentum is negative (positive) and insignificant in 
predicting that analysts will issue a buy (sell) recommendation which does not perform 
as expected. 
 
A variable called PRICE_MOM is used to capture the effect of price momentum on the 
explanation of buy/sell recommendations. Because a stock’s past performance may have 
a direct influence on the type of stock recommendation that an analyst issues, it is 
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expected that the coefficient of PRICE_MOM will be positive for buy recommendations 
and negative for sell recommendations. That is, firms that receive buy recommendations 
are those that have consistently performed well in the recent past (positive sign), while 
sell recommendations are given to stocks that have not performed well over the 
previous period (negative sign) 
 
3.2.3 Does firm size influence the type of rating financial analysts award to the 
stocks they follow? 
The relationship between firm size and stock returns is well documented in the finance 
literature (e.g., Banz, 1981; Reinganum, 1982; Keim, 1983). Fama and French (1992) 
identify firm size as one of the factors that have a significant relation to stock returns. 
Stickel (1995) documents the firm size effect for buy and sell recommendations by 
finding that smaller firms have a larger reaction to Value Line rank changes.  
 
I consider firm size as another form of representativeness bias in that analysts assume 
that the size of the firm in terms of its market capitalisation is representative of its future 
performance, i.e., the larger the firm the better its going to perform in the future. The 
null hypothesis 4 is therefore established as follows: 
 
H40: The size of the firm does not have any significant impact on the type of stock 
recommendation that analysts issue on the stock. 
 
A variable FIRM_SIZE is used to pick up the effect of firm size in the determination of 
buy and sell recommendations. My conjecture is that large firms are less likely to 
receive sell recommendations than small firms. As in Mikhail et al., (2004), the size of 
the firm is measured using the natural logarithm of the market value of equity for the 
firm at the end of the financial year preceding the recommendation revision. The 
coefficient on FIRM_SIZE is expected to be positive for buy recommendations and 
negative for sell recommendations. Thus, large firms will have a positive influence on 
the stock recommendation. 
 
49 
3.2.4 Does book-to-market influence the type of rating that financial analysts award 
to the stocks they follow? 
The book-to-market effect, together with the explanation for the effect, is well 
documented in the literature. Fama and French (1992) find that book-to-market has a 
significant relation to stock returns. Fama and French (1993 and 1996) interpret the 
return to book-to-market as compensation for state dependent risk related to relative 
financial distress. However, Skinner and Sloan (1999) argue that the distress factor 
results from mispricing. 
 
Most buy recommendations are made by analysts who tend to favour “growth” 
compared to “value” stocks. This is because “growth” stocks exhibit greater past sales 
growth and are expected to grow their earnings faster in the future. Financial 
characteristics of preferred stocks include higher valuation multiples, more positive 
accounting accruals, investing a greater proportion of total assets in capital expenditure, 
recent positive relative price momentum and recent positive EPS forecast revisions 
(Jegadeesh et al., 2001). Based on this literature, I expect that stocks which have low 
book-to-market ratios (growth stocks) are more likely to receive buy recommendations 
than stocks with high book-to-market (value stocks). Book-to-market is yet another 
form of representativeness bias because the development stage of the firm is regarded as 
representative of the stock’s future performance by analysts. The null hypothesis 5 is 
therefore established as follows: 
 
H50: The firm’s book-to-market does not have any significant impact on the type of 
stock recommendation that analysts issue on the stock. 
 
A variable BTOM is used to capture the effect of book-to-market on the nonconforming 
stock recommendations. It is measured as book value per share divided by market value 
of equity. Book value per share is calculated as total assets minus total liabilities 
deflated by common shares outstanding at the end of the firm’s previous fiscal year. 
Market value of equity is calculated by multiplying firms’ market value by the total 
number of shares in issue (Mikhail et al., 2004). All accounting variables are obtained 
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from Compustat. The coefficient of BTOM is expected to be positive for buy 
recommendations and negative for sell recommendations. 
 
3.2.5 Does target price influence the type of rating financial analysts award to the 
stocks they follow? 
Buy and sell recommendations that are changed from one category to another are often 
issued together with other information such as target prices. Bradshaw (2002) points out 
that target prices serve to justify the recommendation in the analyst report. However, 
target prices are not always issued to justify recommendations, but as an independent 
means of informing investors about stock value. Brav and Lehavy (2003) show that 
target prices are perceived as being more informative signals regarding a firm’s value, 
whether issued with or without stock recommendations.  
 
Some researchers have doubted whether target prices provide any information over and 
above information in stock recommendations (Michaely and Womack, 2003). However, 
Brav and Lehavy (2003) document a significant market reaction to a change in target 
prices, both unconditionally and conditional on contemporaneously issued stock 
recommendation and earnings forecast revisions. Their results suggest that price targets 
have information content beyond what is contained in stock recommendations. As such, 
stock recommendations should not be looked at in isolation by investors but should be 
used together with target prices. Analysts associate target price direction as being 
indicative of what the stock recommendation direction should be, which means that 
target price is considered to be representative of the type of stock recommendation 
analysts will issue. The null hypothesis 6 is therefore established as follows: 
 
H60: Target price is not significantly important in predicting whether analysts will 
issue stock recommendations that lack market impact 
 
A variable called target price change (TGTPRCE_CHNG) is constructed to measure the 
effect of target prices on the determination of buy and sell recommendations. As in 
Asquith et al., (2005), this variable is the percentage change in the analyst’s projected 
target price for firm j computed as the new target price divided by the old target price 
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minus 1.  Current and previous target prices are obtained from the respective analyst 
research reports. In cases where the previous target prices are not available in the 
current reports, such data is obtained from the First Call database. It is anticipated that 
the coefficient on (TGTPRCE_CHNG) will be positive for buy recommendations and 
negative for sell recommendations.  
 
It needs be mentioned that although target price is considered a representativeness bias 
in this study, it is actually difficult to know what its role is. It either derives from the 
stock recommendation, or the stock recommendation follows the target price intuitively 
set by the analyst, or they are jointly determined. For that reason, although I argue that 
target price proxies for analyst representativeness bias, it is actually not clear whether 
target price measures representativeness bias or whether it is a control variable. 
 
3.2.6 Does the existing relationship between the investment bank and the company 
being researched influence the type of recommendation that analysts issue on 
a stock? 
Analyst compensation or corporate finance relationships between investment banks and 
their firm clients have been a cause for concern in the recent past. This is because 
analysts were found to make “buy” and “strong buy” recommendations for stocks which 
were not necessarily undervalued, but because their investment bank employers could 
earn significant fees on corporate finance transactions. Analysts would also be rewarded 
for their part in promoting these deals via additional compensation (Financial Times, 
April 10, 2002).  The null hypothesis 7 is therefore formulated as follows: 
 
H70:  An analyst issues buy recommendation on the stock if there is an existing 
relationship between investment banks and their firm clients, and a sell if such a 
relationship does not exist. 
 
A variable called INVEST_RELATE is constructed to measure the relationship between 
the company being researched and the investment firm which employs the analyst. This 
variable takes the value of 0 if no relationship exists between the firm and the brokerage 
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house, 1 if the brokerage house is an underwriter2 of the firm or has current holdings3 in 
the firm, and 2 if the brokerage firm is both an underwriter and has a current holding. 
Information about the relationships between companies and brokerage houses is found 
in the disclosure section of analysts’ research reports. The coefficient of 
INVEST_RELATE is expected to be positive for buys and negative for sells. That is, 
firms which have some form of relationship with the investment bank are more likely to 
receive buy recommendations while firms with no such relationship are more likely to 
receive sell recommendations, ceteris paribus. 
 
3.3 Control variable 
A control variable is used to ensure that the test of the relation between recommendation 
type and regressors are not confounded by analyst following. 
 
3.3.1 Analyst following 
Analyst following is perceived to be essential for the valuation of the firm. Bhushan 
(1989) and Hussain (2000) observe that the number of analysts following a stock is 
positively related to the number of institutions holding the firm’s shares, the percentage 
of the firm held by institutions, firm return variability, and firm size. For example, large 
firms are found to have a larger analyst following than small firms. O’Brien and 
Bhushan (1990) and Hussain (2000) note that analyst following is higher for industries 
with regulated disclosures and with a higher number of firms. Lang and Lundhom 
(1996) document a positive association between analyst following and analyst forecast 
accuracy.  
 
Alford and Berger (1999) model analyst following, forecast accuracy and trading 
volume as simultaneous determinants of firms’ information environments. They find 
that analyst following is positively associated with accuracy and trading volume and 
higher for regulated industries. Characteristics of the analysts’ job play a role in 
                                                 
2 Underwriter means that the investment bank acts as an underwriter by providing advice to the issuing 
firm, by distributing securities, by sharing the risk of issue and by stabilising the aftermarket. 
3 Current holding means one of the management team owns shares in the company being researched or 
does some work for the company.  
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inducing coverage. For instance, analysts face start-up costs (McNichols and O'Brien, 
1997) such as learning about the firm’s products (Mikhail et al., 1997). 
 
The variable ANALY_FOLL is the total number of analysts following the firm from 
IBES.  It is postulated that there is some indirect relationship between the number of 
analysts following the firm and the recommendation issued i.e., the larger the firm (in 
terms of size) the greater the analyst following. Large firms are postulated to have an 
influence on the type of recommendation issued. Therefore the coefficient of 
ANA_FOLL is expected to be positive for buy recommendations and negative for sell 
recommendations. 
 
3.4 Summary 
In this chapter I develop testable hypotheses in an attempt to fill the gaps and to answer 
the research questions that I have identified in the literature in chapter 2. I also discuss 
how relevant variables will be measured. I first derive the hypotheses that test whether 
overconfidence and representativeness biases (H10 and H20), as measured by the tone of 
language that analysts use in their research reports, have a significant impact on the type 
of recommendation that analyst issues.  I also derive hypotheses that test whether stock 
characteristics (i.e., previous price momentum, firm size and book-to-market) influence 
analysts to issue either new buy or new sell recommendations. Then, I develop 
hypotheses to test the role of other information issued with stock recommendation (i.e., 
target price) in influencing analyst’s stock rating decisions. Subsequently, I derive 
hypothesis about the type of recommendation that analyst issues when there is/is not a 
relationship between the investment bank he/she is working for and the firm being 
researched. Finally, I provide a variable (ANALY_FOLL) that needs to be controlled 
for in order to ensure that the tests of the relation between the type of recommendation 
and other predictors are not confounded.  
 
All hypotheses about research reports characteristics, stock characteristics and target 
prices are viewed as measures of representativeness bias. It is assumed that financial 
analysts take the corporate change, the stock’s previous price momentum, the size of the 
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firm, book-to-market and the stock’s target price as representative of what type of 
recommendation they have to issue on stocks they follow. 
 
The next chapter provides a detailed description of the methodology employed to test 
the hypothesis developed in current chapter. 
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Chapter 4 Methodological approach 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the research approach and methodologies employed in different 
stages of my thesis to test the hypotheses laid in the previous chapter. First, I describe 
the methodology employed to evaluate stock recommendations and target price 
performance in order to ascertain whether stocks performed according to expectations. 
Second, I detail the methodology used to select new buy and new sell recommendations 
that are associated with subsequent stock performance in an opposite direction to the 
one expected. Third, I describe a content analysis methodology used to measure report-
based overconfidence and representativeness bias in order to test hypotheses H10 and 
H20 and finally, I describe the data analysis method used. 
 
The chapter is organised as follows: section 4.2 describes the methodology used to 
evaluate performance of stock recommendations and target prices. Section 4.3 discusses 
the method used to select nonconforming stock recommendations. Section 4.4 describes 
the content analysis method used to test null hypotheses 1 and 2. Section 4.5 discusses 
the data analysis method used, and section 4.6 concludes the chapter. 
 
4.2 Method used to evaluate stock recommendations and target price performance  
The crux of this research is to establish the factors associated with analysts’ stock 
recommendations that lack market impact. For instance, why do some buy 
recommendations underperform the respective benchmarks, or why do some sell 
recommendations outperform the respective benchmark after the recommendations are 
changed from previous categories to the new buy (sell) category? In order to determine 
whether stocks lack market impact, I first need to evaluate their performance against 
some appropriate benchmark. In this case, stocks’ performance is evaluated against a 
reference portfolio benchmark over a period of 12 months following the stock 
recommendation change. 
 
The purpose of this section is to discuss the methodology used evaluate analysts’ 
recommendations and target prices’ performance after the stock recommendation is 
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changed from the previous category to a new buy (sell) category, and after target prices 
are increased (decreased). In “theory”, stocks that receive a buy rating should 
outperform the relevant benchmark, while new sell rated stocks would be expected to 
underperform.  Similarly, stocks whose target prices increase should outperform the 
appropriate benchmark, while the ones whose target prices decrease are expected to 
underperform. Once stock performance is evaluated, the stocks  that perform contrary to 
the expectation 12 months after the recommendations are changed from their previous 
categories are selected and then analysed further to determine whether there are some 
factors underlying and influencing them to perform inconsistently with analyst 
expectations.  
 
Brav and Lehavy (2003) and Asquith et al., (2005) document a significant market 
reaction to a change in target prices, both unconditionally and conditional on 
contemporaneously issued stock recommendations.  However, the role of target prices 
that are issued concurrently with stock recommendations is not clear. Target prices are 
studied together with stock recommendations in this research in order to establish the 
role of target prices in relation to stock recommendations.  
 
The sample period of this study spans the bull and the bear markets as well as the 
implementation of Rule NASD 2711. With this in mind, I also assess the performance 
of both stock recommendations and target prices during the bull and the bear markets, 
and before and after the implementation of Rule NASD 2711. 
 
There are two main reasons for observing analysts’ stock recommendations and target 
price performance over a period of 12 months after changes in stock recommendations 
and target prices. One, analysts predict future stock performance over a period of at 
least 12 months when they make or change their recommendations. For example, all of 
the top brokerage firms define a buy recommendation as an expectation that the stocks’ 
total return will exceed the industry average (or stocks covered by the analyst) by a 
certain percentage over a minimum of 12 months depending on the perceived risk (see 
Appendix 1). Two, the 12 months event period after the recommendation is intended to 
mitigate the delay in recommendation assimilation documented by Stickel (1995), 
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Womack (1996), and Ryan and Taffler (2005). Three, Cliff (2004) shows that 
recommendations have long lives, so it is proper to concentrate on annual results. Other 
studies such as Michaely and Womack (1999) observe performance of stock 
recommendations over a period of one year as well. 
 
4.2.1 Event study methodology 
Event study methodology is used in this study to examine the reaction of investors to 
changes in financial analysts’ stock recommendations and target prices. The 
methodology is based on the assumption that capital markets are sufficiently efficient to 
evaluate the impact of new information (events) on expected future profits of firms. 
Normally, event studies are divided into short-horizon and long-horizon. A short-
horizon event study examines stock performance within a short window surrounding the 
corporate event e.g., one day or a month. Long-horizon studies, on the other hand, 
measure the effect of the event over the long-term e.g., three years. The relevant event 
date in this study is defined as the date when the stock recommendation is changed from 
its current category to new buy or sell categories. 
 
There are pros and cons depending on which of the above time periods is a better 
measure of performance. An advantage of short-horizon studies is that because daily 
expected returns are close to zero, the expected return benchmark model does not have a 
large effect on inferences made about abnormal returns. Use of a short-horizon return 
window also assumes that any lag in the response of prices to an event is short- lived. 
However, some studies argue that stock prices adjust slowly to information, so it may 
be worth examining returns over longer horizons to obtain a full picture of the 
announcement effect (Fama, 1998). A disadvantage of a long horizon is that abnormal 
returns are very sensitive to the choice of benchmark (Kothari and Warner, 1997; 
Barber and Lyon, 1997). However, they also indicate that problems associated with long 
horizons occur over 3-5 year horizons. The problems associated with long- horizons are 
unlikely to pose a problem in this study as I restrict the analysis to a one year horizon. 
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4.2.2 Return generating methodology 
The reference portfolio method with the event firm matched on the basis of industry, 
size and book-to-market (BE/ME) is used as my benchmark approach. Intuitively, 
matching primarily by industry is appropriate compared with an economy-wide 
benchmark because analysts often study firms in the context of their industry and 
specialise in particular industries. Most analysts even prepare a full industry analysis 
before they conduct specific company analysis in their research reports. And, to a great 
extent, the final decisions they make on the individual stocks they follow are influenced 
by what is happening to the respective industry at large. For example, Boni and 
Womack (2004) find that analysts take strong cues from recent industry returns in 
revising the ratings of the stocks they follow. Appendix 1 shows how the top ten 
brokerage firms in this study define their recommendation categories. Most of them 
relate expected future stock performance to the respective forecast industry average 
performance. Industry comparison is used extensively in accounting as a method of 
analysing firms’ financial statements (Palepu, Healy and Bernard, 2000). It is also 
widely used by finance academics (Womack, 1996; Boni and Womack, 2004).  
 
Concurrent control for size and book-to-market are expected to capture the cross-
sectional variation in average monthly returns. These measures are good proxies for 
common risk factors (Fama and French 1992, 1993) inherent in different industries. 
Although previous studies (e.g., Carhart, 1997) have established that momentum is also 
an important factor in explaining stocks’ abnormal returns, it is not controlled for in my 
expected return generating model. This is because the resulting reference portfolios 
would contain too few cases when momentum is controlled for together with industry, 
size and book-to-market. 
 
4.2.3 Constructing benchmark portfolio returns 
To form industry reference portfolios, stock industry codes are obtained from the CRSP 
database. These codes are then used to classify all stocks from NYSE, AMEX and 
NASDAQ (only firms that have data in the CRSP stock return file) into industry deciles 
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in the manner of Fama and French in their 12 industry portfolios classification process.4 
However, in my case, I use 10 industry portfolios because finance and utilities 
industries are excluded. Within each industry decile, firms are ranked into thirds based 
on size, and are then broken down further into groups of three based on their book-to-
market ratio. A total of 90 reference portfolios grouped by industry, size and book-to-
market are formed. Thus, the stocks in portfolio 1 are stocks in industry 1 and are in the 
largest size group and within the highest third of the book-to-market ratios.5  Portfolios 
are formed in June of each year, starting in June 1991, and monthly returns are 
calculated for the portfolios for the next 12 months after the portfolio formation date. 
For each benchmark portfolio, its equally-weighted portfolio return is calculated as an 
arithmetic return of all securities in a particular industry, size and book-to-market 
portfolio in the year of portfolio formation.  
 
Size is measured by market capitalisation calculated as month-end closing price 
multiplied by the number of shares outstanding. Size data is obtained from CRSP. Book 
value is defined as the COMPUSTAT book value of stockholders’ equity (COMPUSTAT 
item 60). A six-month lag is considered for book-to-market in order to allow for delay 
in the publication of annual financial statements (Barber and Lyon, 1997). Thus, the 
book-to-market ratio for December 31, 2000 is the book value from July 1, 2001 to June 
30, 2002 divided by the market value on December 31, 2000.  
 
4.2.4 Calculating abnormal returns 
For each sample firm, its abnormal return is computed by deducting the portfolio return 
from the actual firm return as follows: 
 
  ARit = Rit –E (Rpt)               (4-1) 
 
                                                 
4 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html. Excluding financials and 
utilities in Fama–French 12-industry portfolios classification leaves 10 industries. These 10 industries are 
used in the first level of classification. 
 
5 For a robustness, I also reversed the criteria and sorted by industry, book-to-market and size. All my 
results remained the same. 
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Where ARit is the abnormal return on security i for period t, Rit is the realised return on 
security i for period t and E (Rpt) is the expected return for the particular reference 
portfolio benchmark for period t.  Because analysts make stock recommendations and 
predict target prices over the next 12 months (see Appendix 1), the buy-and-hold 
abnormal return (BHAR) is calculated as the difference between a firm’s buy-and-hold 
return (Rit) and the buy-and-hold return on the reference portfolio E (Rpt) over the 
period commencing with the beginning of the month following the recommendation or 
target price change and ending 12 months later. The BHAR is given as follows: 
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Some stocks are delisted between the time the change in stock recommendation and 
target price occurs and before the end of the 12 month period. For all stocks that have 
missing returns after their stock recommendations or target prices are changed, the 
return on the corresponding reference portfolio is deemed to be its realised return. Thus, 
for all these stocks the abnormal return subsequent to delisting is zero. The assumption 
is that once the stock is delisted, investors will roll their remaining investment in the 
delisted firm into the reference portfolio (Barber and Lyon, 1997). 
         
The buy-and-hold-abnormal return (BHAR) metric is used in preference to cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) in this study because it accurately represents investors’ long 
term experience (Barber and Lyon, 1997). The benefit of using BHARs is further 
demonstrated by Ikenberry et al., (1995) who show that CARs should be regarded as 
descriptive in nature because they do not represent a realistic strategy, while BHARs 
represent a more feasible strategy.  The problems associated with BHARs mentioned by 
Fama (1998) are more pronounced in long-term studies (i.e., more than one year) and 
are, therefore, unlikely to pose a problem in this study.  
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4.2.5 Multiple stock recommendations and target prices 
Both stock recommendations and target prices are characterised by multiple 
observations for the same firm. Multiple observations arise when a change in stock 
recommendation or target price by one analyst is followed by other analysts who change 
their views on that stock as well. This behaviour of analysts is often described as 
herding.  In most cases herding analysts will make the same change in their 
recommendations or target prices as did the first analyst. For example, analyst A 
changes a recommendation on stock X to a buy in May, and before the end of May, 
analyst B changes the recommendation on the same stock to a buy, and so do analysts C 
and D in June and July respectively. This means that stock X may have had several 
recommendations of the same type within a period of few months from the first new 
buy recommendation. It is believed that too many recommendations on the same stock 
within a short time period may create a confounding effect when determining stock 
performance. The resulting cross-sectional dependence from the multiple observations 
may also lead to overestimation of the significance of the results (Mikhail et al., 2004).  
 
Different studies deal with the issue of multiple recommendations differently. For 
example, Stickel (1995) drops from the analysis all changed stock recommendations 
which change again within six months. Ho and Harris (1998) exclude all clusters of 
reports on a company when multiple reports on a company occurred within a three-
week period. Mikhail et al., (2004) use three different approaches in dealing with this 
problem. These methods are: one, they use only observations for firms that have no 
other recommendation revisions occurring during the return accumulation period. Two, 
they combine individual revisions for the same firm in estimating the variance-
covariance matrix and compute the t-statistics using the Huber-White estimator. Three, 
they use Fama and Macbeth (1973) methodology with Newey and West standard errors. 
With this method, dependence arising from multiple observations for the same firm is 
eliminated during the same month. In the same spirit, to mitigate this cross-sectional 
dependence arising from multiple observations, and consistent with Stickel (1995), all 
recommendations and target prices of the same type that are changed within a period of 
six months of the first change (either made by the same broker who made the first 
change or a different broker) are dropped from the analysis.  
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4.3 Method for selecting nonconforming stocks 
In the preceding section, I have discussed the method used to evaluate performance of 
stocks over a 12 month period. In this section, I discuss the method used to select stocks 
that have not performed as expected by the analyst, i.e., new buy (sell) 
recommendations that underperform (outperform) the reference portfolio benchmark 
over  the 12 month period after stock recommendations are changed. 
 
In theory, a ‘buy’ recommendation is issued when a stock is perceived to be 
undervalued. Conversely, a ‘sell’ recommendation is issued when a stock is believed to 
be overvalued, while a stock awarded ‘hold’ is believed to be fairly priced. The 
definitions of stock recommendations by the top ten brokerage firms follow this same 
idea but go even further in specifying the actual percentages by which the stocks that 
are classified to each of the three categories are expected to outperform/underperform 
the respective industry averages. Generally, according to brokerage firms, a buy (sell) 
recommendation is expected to outperform (underperform) the industry benchmark by 
at least 10% or higher, depending on risk.  Appendix 1 provides detailed information on 
how different brokerage firms define the recommendations’ ratings.  
 
The selection of nonconforming stock recommendations in my thesis is thus based on 
how the stock ratings are defined by the brokerage firms. Therefore, based on the 
brokerage firms’ definitions of stock ratings, in this research a buy recommendation is 
deemed to be performing contrary to analysts’ expectations if the subsequent 
performance over the following 12 month period is at least 10% lower than that of the 
respective benchmark. Conversely, a sell recommendation is not conforming to 
analysts’ expectations if the subsequent performance exceeds that of the benchmark by 
at least 10% over the next 12 months.  
 
The cut-off of 10% is subsequently increased to 20%. Thus, only new buy (sell) 
recommendations that have underperformed (outperformed) by 20% are considered 
nonconforming. The reasons for increasing the cut-off point to 20% are as follows:  
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a) The gist of this study is to investigate the factors influencing analysts’ decisions 
to issue stock recommendations that lack market impact. Increasing the cut-off 
point to 20% means looking at extreme cases. I believe that analysing extreme 
cases provides us with a clean test of what factors influence analysts’ decisions 
on stock recommendations. 
 
b) The sample for nonconforming stocks is much larger than I expected, this is the 
case particularly for new buy recommendations. Increasing the cut-off point to 
20% reduces the sample to a reasonable size as I have to manually collect data 
for other variables such as compensation and target prices for my main analysis. 
 
4.4 Content analysis method used to garner data for overconfidence and 
representativeness biases in analysts’ research reports 
The data for null hypotheses 1 and 2 in chapter 3 is collected using computerised 
content analysis. The content analysis software used is called Diction. Diction is a 
package that examines a text for its verbal tone across five variables namely: optimism, 
certainty, activity, realism and commonality. Diction analysis has a theoretical basis in 
what is referred to as a systematic approach to language study. The focus of the 
systematic approach is how linguistic structures are exploited in narrative construction. 
This focus on strategic narrative construction, what might be termed persuasive and 
rhetorical narralogy, renders the use of Diction particularly attractive (Sydserff and 
Weetman, 2002). Diction is particularly appealing in this research because the language 
that analysts use to justify their stock rating is thought to be at best rhetorical. 
 
The use of Diction is well established in the applied linguistics literature  (e.g., Hart, 
2001). Its validity and reliability as a computerised content program has been widely 
attested to (e.g., Morris 1994). Diction has been mostly used in accounting applications 
but less so in finance.  Ober et al., (1999) limit their study to Diction’s “certainty” 
variable only and find no significant difference in the use of certainty in the narratives 
of “poor performers” when compared to “good performers”. Sydserff and Weetman 
(2002) use Diction across its five main variables in their study of impression 
management in accounting narratives. Although the results from tests of differentiation 
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between “good performers” and “poor performers” are mixed, they argue that managers 
of “poor performers” will use impression management to make their narratives resemble 
as closely as possible the verbal tone of “good performers”. The paper advocates that 
the use of Diction merits further exploration in accounting studies.  Fogarty and Rogers 
(2005) use Diction in conjunction with other content analysis software to study financial 
analysts’ reports and conclude that analysts’ reports are characterised by bias, skew and 
lack of science. This study builds on Fogarty and Rogers (2005) by applying Diction to 
analysts’ reports, but with the specific intention of measuring analysts’ psychological 
biases. 
 
Diction software is chosen because: (a) it uses a series of dictionaries to search a 
passage for semantic features and allows the researcher to create additional custom 
dictionaries for particular research needs; (b) it is objective in that the researcher cannot 
impose his/her own meaning to the text, and (c) it processes information swiftly and 
therefore facilitates the researcher in deriving the meaning in a particular text. Sydserff 
and Weetman (2002) further show that it is simple to use, it is automated, yet it 
possesses a considerable degree of sophistication. The Diction dictionaries have been 
constructed by experts in linguistics. In addition, with a total word corpus of 10,000, 
Diction is considerably more comprehensive than existing form-oriented word-based 
approaches to content analysis. Its automated nature, both for coding and quantification 
renders it attractive as a research instrument (Sydserff and Weetman, 2002).  
 
Diction makes a modest, statistical accommodation for homographs, words spelled the 
same but having different meanings (for example, “lead” – a quality of command or a 
metal found in nature). Benign homographs are ignored, but confounding homographs 
are weighted differentially (Hart, 2001). This statistical accommodation for homographs 
strengthens the content validity of the analysis (Ober et al., 1999). To help the user keep 
in mind the possible danger of quantifying language behaviour, Diction reproduces the 
text being analysed, alongside its statistical results for convenient checking (Hart, 
2001). Thus the user is able to analyse language quantitatively and qualitatively, thereby 
increasing the reliability and validity of the findings (Ober et al., 1999). 
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4.4.1 Actual analysis of reports 
In order to carry out the textual analyses using Diction, analysts’ research reports are 
stripped of their header information, tables and graphs, leaving only the actual written 
narrative used to justify the stock rating. Each of the recommendation justifications is 
then saved into a text only document and converted into a Diction input file to allow the 
software to construct a single verbal narrative for it. Using a series of words drawn from 
its internal dictionaries, Diction classifies the use of particular words into five master 
variables which the program assumes best capture the major tonal features of the text: 
certainty, optimism, activity, realism and commonality.  
 
Only three Diction variables are used in this study, and these are: optimism, certainty 
and activity, because they serve as good proxies for my two key cognitive biases of 
interest well documented in the behavioural finance literature: namely overconfidence 
and representativeness (see section 1.5).  Diction variables optimism and certainty are 
used to serve as proxies for overconfidence. Optimism is defined in Diction as language 
endorsing some person, group, concept or event, or highlighting their positive 
entailments. Certainty is defined in Diction as language indicating resoluteness, 
inflexibility, and completeness and a tendency to speak ex cathedra.  
 
Diction variable activity is used to serve as a proxy for representativeness. In Diction, 
activity is defined as language featuring movement, change, and the implementation of 
ideas and the avoidance of inertia. Generally activity implies that a high degree of 
activity within a company, such as mergers and acquisitions and change of 
management, may be seen as having a positive impact on the future performance of the 
stock and may be used by analysts to justify the stock rating they make. 
Representativeness refers to judgements based on stereotypes (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1974). I argue that analysts use the events happening within the company as stereotypes 
that help them decide on the company’s stock recommendation. Rogers and Fogarty 
(2005) show that analysts are possibly predisposed towards managerial plans and 
corporate change, and tend to be positive about what management plans to do. 
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4.5 Data analysis method 
The null hypotheses state that overconfidence bias (as measured by OPTIMISM and 
CERTAINTY), representativeness bias (as measured by ACTIVITY, PRICE_MOM, 
FIRM_SIZE, BTOM and TGTPRCE_CHNG) and corporate relationships (as measured 
by INVEST_RELATE) do not have any significant impact on the nonconforming stock 
recommendations that analysts issue. These hypotheses are tested by cross sectional 
binary logistic regression. This model describes a linear relationship between the logit 
dependent variable, which is a log of odds, and a set of predictors.   
 
The dependent variable is RATING. RATING equals 1 if analysts issue new buy 
recommendations which underperform their respective benchmarks by at least -20% and 
0 if new sells are issued that outperform their respective benchmarks by at least +20%. 
The maximum likelihood estimation is used to estimate the model parameters {β }. 
 
4.6 Summary 
In this chapter I describe the methodologies employed to test the hypotheses stated in 
chapter 3. Firstly, I discuss the event study methodology procedures followed to 
evaluate stock recommendations and target price performance. Secondly, I describe the 
methodology employed to select stock recommendations that are performing contrary to 
expectations. Thirdly, I discuss the content analysis methodology used to collect data 
for measuring overconfidence and representativeness biases as measured by the tone of 
language used by financial analysts in their research reports and I conclude with a brief 
discussion of the data analysis method used in this study.  
 
In the next chapter, I discuss the methodology and results obtained from my pilot study. 
The pilot study is a simplified process aimed only at testing the efficacy of the content 
analysis methodology used to garner data for textual proxies of overconfidence and 
representativeness biases.  
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Chapter 5 Pilot study 
5.1 Introduction 
My main study is aimed at investigating factors associated with analysts’ issue of 
“nonconforming” new buy (sell) recommendations. I argue that analysts issue stock 
recommendations which do not perform as expected because in the process of 
gathering, analysing and interpreting data about stocks they follow, they tend to be 
influenced by certain factors, and in particular they are influenced by the cognitive 
biases. Studies such as those of DeBondt and Thaler (1990) document analysts’ 
cognitive biases and show that analysts have a tendency to overreact and form 
expectations that are too high. Eastwood and Nutt (1999) demonstrate that analysts 
underreact to negative earnings news but overreact to positive news and therefore 
appear systematically optimistic. Most studies investigating analysts’ cognitive biases 
concentrate on stock price reaction to analysts’ stock recommendations but fail to trace 
the psychological biases to the way the analysts prepare their research reports, i.e., they 
do not  examine analysts’ textual data.  
 
Fogarty and Rogers (2005) suggest that academic research should not concentrate on the 
direction of the analysts’ bottom lines (i.e., stock recommendations and earnings 
forecasts) but should conduct textual analysis as well. In their study, they examine 
financial analysts’ textual data and conclude that analyst output is characterised by three 
elements: influence, skew and lack of science. Influence refers to the fact that analysts’ 
decisions are influenced extensively by the information they obtain from management; 
skew refers to how the existence of corporate plans, merger/acquisition talk or any 
suggested change in direction by the company influences analysts; and lack of science 
refers to the fact that analysts believe that past performance predicts future performance. 
From their argument, it appears I could understand the models of human behaviour by 
examining their textual data not just numerical data. 
 
In the previous chapter, I described methodologies employed at different stages of my 
research. The current chapter aims at testing whether the content analysis methodology 
and Diction variables can serve as good proxies for analysts’ overconfidence and 
representativeness biases. Analysts’ psychological biases are integral in this research. 
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The textual data examined in this pilot study is the tone of language that analysts use in 
the reports that they prepare to justify their recommendations.  
 
I carry out a pilot study only on my content analysis method because it is a relatively 
new approach in the context in which I am using it. Content analysis, using Diction 
software has been carried out on analysts’ research reports before (e.g., Fogarty and 
Rogers, 2005). However, their study was not in the context of using Diction variables to 
serve as proxies for specific psychological biases. It is therefore, necessary to make sure 
that my content analysis methodology will work in my main study. On the other hand, 
other methodologies, such as the event-study methodology, are well established in the 
finance literature and thus, do not need to be piloted. 
 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 presents the objectives of the pilot 
study. Section 5.3 presents pilot data. Section 5.4 discusses the methodology used in the 
pilot to test the relationship between new buy (sell) recommendations. Section 5.5 
outlines pilot results while section 5.6 discusses and summarises the pilot results. 
 
5.2 Objective of the pilot study 
My pilot study textual analysis is conducted on the research reports that analysts prepare 
to justify their stock recommendations. The aims of this pilot study are twofold. First, it 
assesses whether Diction software variables can be used as proxies for analysts’ 
cognitive biases, in particular, overconfidence and representativeness. Second, it 
determines whether there is any relationship between the five Diction master variables 
and the type of recommendations that analysts issue. The relationship between the type 
of stock recommendation and Diction variables is established through the use of the 
logistic regression method. The main reason to seek to infer analysts’ cognitive biases 
from their textual data is because it is difficult to measure analysts’ thinking and the 
way they make decisions outside the psychological laboratory. I believe, however, that I 
can understand relevant aspects of the analysts’ psyche from what they write. 
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5.3 Pilot data 
The data for this study is drawn from analysts’ stock recommendations made by the ten 
US brokerage houses which are ranked among the top ten global investment banks in 
the Institutional Investor Survey (Institutional Investor, Dec 2001). Analysts’ research 
reports which they prepare to justify the change in the recommendations they issue form 
my dataset. These reports are downloaded from the Investext Plus database which 
provides reports and forecasts prepared by top Wall Street and international brokerage 
firms. Only stock recommendations for US-based companies are looked into and only 
the changes in stock recommendations (not reiterations) are analysed. 
 
Stock recommendation changes are identified by a detailed search of the terms 
“upgrades and downgrades” in Investext Plus. However, only changes made between 
September, 1999 and November, 2002 are considered in the pilot. A total of 109 stock 
recommendations are downloaded from the database, of which 11 are eliminated from 
the sample because the change in stock recommendation is from “buy to “strong buy” 
and vice versa, in which case it is assumed that such stock recommendation changes do 
not comprise a change in a rating category. One company is eliminated because it is a 
UK-based company. The remaining total sample consists of 97 stock recommendations 
changes comprising 47 new buy and 50 new sell recommendations. All these stock 
recommendation research reports show the date and time that the recommendation was 
made, the name and ticker symbol of the company, brokerage firm and analyst 
producing the comment, and the text of the comment.  Where there are multiple 
recommendations relating to the same firm only one recommendation is randomly 
selected. Compared to other sources of brokerage information, such as Institutional 
Brokers' Estimate System (IBES), Investext plus relies on coding of the written reports 
that are released by the brokerage firms, which may produce two specific inclusion 
errors. First, not all comments made by brokerage analysts become disseminated in 
written reports; second, the reports are often dated some time after the “morning 
comments” that they reflect (Womack, 1996). However, this does not pose a problem in 
my main study because IBES data is used. 
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Only changes in recommendation are looked into, partly because they would be among 
the most prominent news items in a typical day and the most likely to be conveyed 
immediately to important institutional investors (Womack, 1996), but mainly because 
changes in recommendations are found to have more information content than 
reiterations (e.g., Francis and Soffer, 1997). For purposes of this pilot, effort was made 
to ensure that the proportion of buy recommendations was almost equal to the sell 
recommendations. However, in reality new buys far exceed new sells (Womack, 1996; 
Ho and Harris, 1998; Stickel, 1995 and Ryan and Taffler, 2005). As a result my sample 
is biased in favour of new sell recommendations. 
 
There are a few notable differences between the data used in the pilot study and the data 
in my main study: 
a) The pilot is a simplified version of the main study in that I do not select buy 
(sell) recommendations that have underperformed (outperformed) any 
benchmark, but just the recommendations that changed from previous categories 
to buy or sell categories. This is because at the time that the pilot study was 
carried out, I did not have data for my main study, specifically the IBES 
database, from which to obtain a complete set of analysts’ stock 
recommendations and the CRSP database for the stock returns data. 
 
b) The period for the pilot does not cover the same period as the main study. Thus, 
the pilot covers between September, 1999 and November, 2002 while the main 
study covers the period between January, 1997 and December, 2003. 
 
c) In the pilot, I used all five Diction variables, namely Certainty, Optimism, 
Activity, Realism and Commonality (see Appendix 2 for a comprehensive 
definition of these variables). However, in the main study, only the first three 
variables (Certainty, Optimism, Activity) that are found to be significant in 
predicting the type of recommendation that the analyst is likely to issue in the 
pilot study are used. A closer look at these variables also reveals that they can 
also serve as good proxies for analysts’ psychological biases. For instance, 
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certainty and optimism serve as good proxies for overconfidence while activity 
serves as a good proxy for the representativeness bias.  
 
d) In order to identify stocks that received a change in recommendation in the pilot 
study I used a word search of the terms “upgrades and downgrades” whereas in 
the main study I tracked the movement of stock recommendations for all 
companies in IBES for the period between January, 1997 and December, 2003. 
The method used in the main study, not surprisingly, results in a larger dataset 
than the one used in the pilot. 
 
5.4 Methodology for testing the relationship between new buy (sell) 
recommendations and Diction scores 
The methodology used to obtain data for Diction variables which serve as proxies for 
analysts’ psychological biases is as described in chapter 4, section 4.4. 
 
The binary logistic regression model is used to test the relationship between new buy 
(sell) recommendations and Diction variables. The dependent variable is RATING. 
RATING is 1 if an analyst issues a new buy recommendation and 0 otherwise. The 
independent variables are Diction’s scores which are Certainty, Optimism, Activity, 
Realism and Commonality. The maximum likelihood estimation is used to estimate the 
model parameters. The logistic model is specified as follows: 
   RATING = LOGIT (π ) = LOG 



−π
π
1
  
                                                 = α  + β 1 OPTIMISMj,t +β 2  CERTAINTYj,t + β 3 ACTIVITYj,t       
          +β 4REALISMj,t+ β 5COMMONALITYj,t   
                                                                                                                                                                                     (5-1)                 
5.5 Pilot Results 
Table 5-1 shows that a test of the full model and with five predictors is statistically 
reliable, Chi-square = 23.991, p < 0.0005, indicating that the predictors as a set reliably 
distinguish between buy and sell stock recommendations. Optimism, Certainty and 
Activity in the tone of language used in analysts’ research reports that they draw to 
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justify their recommendations are individually reliable in predicting analysts’ stock 
recommendations. The parameter estimates for this variables are -0.491, -0.119 and  
-0.148 respectively. Optimism is significant at 0.1% level, Certainty at 10% level and 
Activity at 5% level.  Overall, the model shows that, for example, the less certain 
analysts are, the more likely their recommendation will be a “sell”, and the more 
optimistic, the more likely their recommendation will be a “buy”.  On the other hand, 
the greater the level of activity/change within the company such as change of  
management or a firm’s eminent merger and acquisition, the more likely their 
recommendations will be “buy”. Realism and Commonality are non-significant. 
 
Table 5-1  Determinants of new buy/sell recommendation using Diction five master variables 
This table presents the logit regression on five Diction master variables. The dependent variable is the 
stock rating. For each variable, the coefficient estimate, Wald chi-square and significance level are 
presented in columns 3-5 respectively 
 
Variable Predicted sign 
for sells 
Coefficient 
estimate 
Wald chi-square Significance level 
Certainty - -0.119 3.118          0.077* 
Optimism - -0.491 11.727 0.001**** 
Activity - -0.148 4.972           0.026** 
Realism +                0.072 0.742        0.389 
Commonality -   0.002 0.001        0.980 
Constant  33.765 9.934        0.002 
Cox and Nell R2 
Nagelkerke R2 
N: Buys 
     Sells 
                            = 
 
                           = 
                            = 
                            = 
22% 
 
29% 
                  47 
                  50 
 
 
   ****,***, **, and * denote significance at 0.1% 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively 
 
In summary, the results from the relationship between stock recommendation and 
psychological biases as measured by Diction scores can be interpreted as demonstrating 
that new buy (sell) recommendations are associated with a higher (lower) degree of 
optimism and certainty together with an increased (decreased) level of activity. On the 
basis of this pilot, there appears to be a potential relationship between Diction scores 
(Optimism, Certainty and Activity) and the associated stock recommendations made by 
analysts. Thus, psychological biases as measured by Optimism, Certainty and Activity 
are associated with the buy and sell recommendations which financial analysts issue.  
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5.6 Discussion and summary of pilot results  
There are various judgemental biases documented in the behavioural finance literature. 
These documented biases are measured mainly by the way the market responds to 
analysts’ stock recommendations and earnings forecasts. One of the reasons why the 
cognitive biases are measured in this way may be because it is difficult to measure 
analysts’ psychological biases outside laboratory experiments. To circumvent this 
problem, I try to measure analyst bias by analysing the tone of language that they use in 
their research reports. I believe that I can understand analysts’ psyche through what they 
write. This approach is attested to by other studies including Fogarty and Rogers (2005). 
 
For that reason, in this pilot study, I use a content analysis method, using Diction 
variables (Certainty, Optimism and Activity) to proxy for the most important 
psychological biases, namely overconfidence and representativeness. Optimism and 
certainty serve as proxies for overconfidence in analysts’ stock recommendations while 
activity serves as a proxy for the representativeness heuristic.  
 
Overconfidence is defined as overestimating what one can do compared to what 
objective circumstances would warrant. The results may be interpreted as indicating that 
analysts believe they have superior investment abilities and tend to overestimate the 
likely performance of the stocks they follow. Various studies such as Odean (1998b) 
and Barber and Odean (2001) have attested to investors’ overconfidence bias. 
  
Representativeness refers to judgements based on stereotypes (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1974). The results show that the high level of activity (activity is defined in Diction as 
the language featuring movement, change and the implementation of ideas and the 
avoidance of inertia) within the company is believed to be good for the stock and vice 
versa. In other words, activity is seen as representative of future stock performance.  
Fogarty and Rogers (2005) confirm that financial analysts make positive 
recommendations about stocks if they are aware of the company’s broad range of future 
plans for change including mergers and acquisitions and they tend not to be critical 
enough about prospective merger activity. 
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In summary, the two cognitive biases (overconfidence and representativeness) appear to 
be associated with analysts’ decisions. These biases may lead analysts to be overly 
optimistic when analysing likely future stock performance. Analysts might then 
exaggerate the likely returns to be derived from investing in particular stocks and ignore 
the potential pitfalls.  
 
In this chapter, I have established the critical link in my research in terms of how to 
proxy analysts’ overconfidence and representativeness biases using Diction variables. 
The next chapter describes my main study samples of new stock recommendations and 
new target prices.  
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Chapter 6 Data, data sources, sample selection and sample description 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous two chapters discuss the methodologies used at different stages of my 
research and a test, in a pilot study, of whether the content analysis method I use to 
proxy for analysts’ psychological biases is efficient. The main purpose of this chapter is 
to provide a broad description of how I collected my samples of new buy and new sell 
recommendations and my samples of increased and decreased target price stocks. 
Although I do not focus on new hold recommendations in my empirical analysis, the 
data for new hold stock recommendations and their description are included in this 
chapter in order to provide a complete and clear view on US analyst stock 
recommendations. 
 
The essence of this study is to investigate the factors associated with financial analysts’ 
stock recommendations that lack market impact. Therefore, I need a sample of new buy 
and new sell recommendations so that I can evaluate their performance and determine if 
they do/do not lack market impact. Parallel to the analysis of stock recommendations, I 
also evaluate the performance of analysts’ target prices. Analysing target prices 
concurrent with stock recommendations is compelling in this study, partly because both 
are important analysts’ outputs and analysts use both together or in isolation when they 
give advice about the likely future performance of stocks. However, importantly, Brav 
and Lehavy (2003) argue that in recent years financial analysts have been increasingly 
disclosing target prices in their equity reports, suggesting that target prices have become 
more important to investors in their investment decision-making processes, although 
they do not make clear what the role of stock recommendations that are issued 
concurrent with stock recommendations is. 
 
The chapter is organised as follows: section 6.2 describes my new stock 
recommendation and new target price data sources, section 6.3 describes the sample 
selection process for both new stock recommendations and new target prices, and 
section 6.4 provides a sample description of both new stock recommendations and new 
target prices, and section 6.5 concludes the chapter with a discussion and a summary. 
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6.2  Data source 
This section provides information about my stock recommendation and target price 
samples as well as a general description of their data sources.  
 
6.2.1 Analysts’ stock recommendations data source 
The source of analysts’ stock recommendations used in this research is the Institutional 
Brokers’ Estimate System (IBES). IBES keeps two stock recommendation databases 
namely, a detailed history recommendation database and a summary recommendation 
history database. The detailed history recommendation file provides a database record 
for each recommendation change made by different analysts/brokerage firms. Attributes 
of this file include names of analysts and brokerage houses issuing the report, previous 
and current recommendation, date of change in recommendation and company name 
(using ticker number). The summary history recommendation file gives monthly 
snapshots of each company followed by brokerage firms subscribing to IBES. The 
summary history database provides information regarding the average consensus rating 
level, the standard deviation of stock ratings and the number of analysts downgrading or 
upgrading their opinion in a month. My sample of buy and sell recommendations is 
from the IBES detailed recommendation file.  
 
The initial stock recommendation sample I compile covers the period from January 1, 
1997 through to December 31, 2003. My final sample consists of stock 
recommendations issued by the top ten US brokerage firms as identified in the 
December 2001 issue of the Institutional Investor survey. The Institutional Investor 
annually ranks research departments and security analysts of major US brokerage firms 
mainly according to the polls of institutional investors (Womack, 1996). 
 
Different brokerage firms use different  stock rating systems e.g., “buy”, “accumulate”, 
“attractive”, “outperform”, “neutral”, “neutral weight”, “market perform”, “peer 
perform”, “reduce”, “underperform”, “sell”. However, upon receiving these ratings 
IBES recodes the recommendation ratings into five categories “strong buy”, “buy”, 
“hold”, “underperform” and “sell”. The IBES classification is further reclassified in this 
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research into the most simple and commonly used stock rating systems consisting of 
just “buy”, “hold” and “sell” in order to allow for easy and intuitive interpretations of 
quantitative results. This reclassification is also consistent with rule NASD 2711 which 
requires brokers to partition their recommendations into just these three categories for 
disclosure purposes regardless of the actual rating system they used. 
 
Only changes in recommendations and not reiterations are included in the sample 
because changes in recommendations are found to have more information content than 
reiterations (e.g., Francis and Soffer, 1997). Changes in stock recommendation are 
defined as the current recommendation minus the previous recommendation. The 
changes examined are new buy recommendations from sell and hold, and new sell 
recommendations from buy and hold.  
 
6.2.2 Analysts’ target prices  
My target price data are provided by First Call. First Call provides database records of 
each target price issued by different brokerage firms. Typical information contained in 
the target price database include companies’ symbol (equivalent to ticker number), 
brokerage firm issuing the target price, current and previous target prices as well as the 
date on which the target price is issued and changed. As with stock recommendations I 
include only target price changes (not reiterations). Target prices are regarded as 
changed if they have either increased or decreased from their previous levels. Unlike 
stock recommendations, target prices have only two rating levels, i.e., it is either that the 
analysts’ target price is higher than it was previously (increased) or lower than it was 
previously (decreased). 
 
6.3 Sample selection process 
This section looks at the process of selecting samples of analysts’ stock 
recommendations from the population of stock recommendations available in the IBES 
database and target prices from the population of analysts’ target prices available in the 
First Call database. 
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6.3.1 Stock recommendations 
Table 6-1 shows that the January 2004 IBES database contains a total of 363,158 
observations. Observations represent the issuance of stock recommendations by a 
particular brokerage firm for a specific company between the years 1985 through to 
December 2003. Eliminating the recommendations not issued by top-ten brokerage 
firms, reiterations, utilities and financials firms leaves a total of 16,198 changes in 
recommendations. Each stock with changes in recommendation must have its market 
price information available in the Chicago Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database 
at least at the time that the change in recommendation is made. About 2,029 changes in 
recommendations for some US firms or non-US firms (overseas firms listed on 
NYSE/NASDAQ/AMEX) are eliminated from the sample because there is no stock data 
on them in the CRSP database. The final sample consists of 14,169 changes in 
recommendations 
 
Table 6-1  Sample selection process – stock recommendations 
Procedure Number of observations 
Total recommendations available in IBES database by January 
2004 
363,158 
        Less recommendations made by other brokers 252,062 
Recommendations by the top-ten brokers 111,096 
       Less recommendations issued before Jan 1, 1997 and        
        after Dec 31, 2003 
 30,886 
Recommendations issued between Jan 1, 1997   
        and Dec 31, 2003       
80, 210 
       Eliminating reiterations by the same analyst or other      
        Analyst 
60,046 
 20,164 
       Excluding utilities and financials6   3,966 
 Total excluding utilities and financials 16,198 
       Eliminate US and non-US stocks with no data in CRSP   2,029 
Total recommendation changes 14,169 
                                                 
6 Financial and utility services are excluded from the analysis because of the unique nature of their 
enterprises. 
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6.3.2 Target prices 
Table 6-2 shows that the April 2004 First Call database had a total of 565,466 target 
prices that were issued by the top ten brokerage firms between January 1, 1997 and 
December 31, 2003. Eliminating reiterated target prices, stocks of US and non-US 
(overseas firms listed on NYSE/NASDAQ/AMEX) firms without stock data in the 
CRSP database as well as financials and utilities sector firms results in a final change in 
target price sample of 57,466 cases. 
 
 
Table 6-2  Sample selection process – target prices 
Procedure Number of observations 
Total target prices available in First Call database by April 
2004 
1,696,312 
        Less target prices issued by non-top ten  brokers  1,129475 
Target prices issued by the top-ten brokers   566,837 
        Less target prices issued before Jan 1, 1997 and after    
         Dec 31, 2003 
         1,371 7 
Recommendations issued between Jan 1, 1997   
         and Dec 31, 2003       
  565,466 
        Less reiteration of previous target prices    487,473       
           77,993 
        Less US and  non-US stocks with no data in the    
         CRSP  database 
     6,776 
    71,217 
         Excluding utilities and financials    13,751 
Total target price changes    57,466 
 
6.4 Sample description 
This section provides a description of both the initial stock recommendation and target 
price samples. Although new buys and new sell recommendations are the two main 
categories of interest in this research, this section also describes a sample of new hold 
                                                 
7 The First Call database commenced around the beginning of 1997. This may explain why I have too 
few target price forecasts cases issued outside the sample period in the database. 
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recommendations so that I can have a full understanding of all categories of analyst 
stock recommendations.  
 
6.4.1 Description of analysts’ stock recommendations  
Table 6-3 Panel A provides information about the duration (in calendar days) of the 
stock recommendation in a previous category before it is changed to a new category by 
the same broker. This information is important because it provides a rough idea about 
the frequency of stock recommendation revisions. Not surprisingly, on average, 
recommendations spend the shortest average period of time (in days) in the sell category 
before they are upgraded to either hold (mean number of days = 159) or buy (mean 
number of days = 180) respectively. On the other hand, it takes longest for a buy 
recommendation to be downgraded to sell category (mean number of days = 402) or 
hold category (mean number of days = 371). 
 
Panel B of Table 6-3 provides the time in months that stock recommendations are 
outstanding in their previous categories before they are changed into the new category 
by the same brokerage firm that issued the previous stock rating. This Panel 
complements Panel A by giving the exact length of time (in months) and the proportion 
of recommendations that are outstanding in the previous category before a change is 
made.  Approximately 70% of new buy, new hold and new sell recommendations 
respectively are moved from their previous categories within a period of 12 months. 
This information provides one justification for examining the future returns (in chapter 
7) over at least a 12 months’ holding period centred on the report publication date. 
 
Table 6-4 Panel A presents the yearly distribution of stock recommendations (both in 
total and by recommendation category), yearly ratio of new buy to new sell, and yearly 
average rating based on the following: buy (1), hold (2) and sell (3). The aim of this 
table is to assess the rating distribution and the patterns of new buys and new sells over 
my sample period. Consistent with Barber et al., (2004) this panel shows that the 
dramatic change in the distribution of stock recommendations is more conspicuous in 
2002 where there are 23% buys, 51% holds and 26% sells. During the first half of 2000  
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Table 6-3   Calendar days between changes of recommendation from the previous recommendation 
to the new category and distribution of time (in months) that recommendations spent in the 
previous category before they are changed to a new category 
 
Panel A provides statistics regarding the number of calendar days that the recommendation is outstanding 
in the previous category before it is changed to a new recommendation category by the same broker who 
issued the previous recommendation. The first column shows different recommendation change 
categories, column 2 shows the mean number of days in each category, columns 3 to 5 report the 1st 
quartile, median and 3rd quartile for the number of days respectively. Panel B shows the amount of time in 
months that recommendations spent in the previous category before they are changed to a new category. 
Column one shows the period spent in a category in months, columns 2-4 show the proportion of new 
buy, new hold and new sell recommendations in their respective categories respectively.  
 
Panel A: Number of calendar days between changes of recommendation from the previous   
recommendation to a new category 
Recommendation 
category 
Mean 1st Quartile Median 3rd Quartile 
New buy from hold 273 84 189 378 
New buy from sell 180 48 32 317 
New hold from buy  371 89 244 535 
New hold from sell 159 49 117 234 
New sell from buy 402 62 226 580 
New sell from hold 315 86 217 438 
 
Panel B: Distribution of time (in months) that recommendations spent in the previous category before 
they are changed to a new category 
New buys  
N = 2799 
New holds  
N = 3501 
New sells  
N = 1331 
 
 
Period Monthly % 
change 
Cum 
% 
Monthly % 
change 
Cum % Monthly % 
change 
Cum % 
1 month 9% 9% 13% 13% 14% 14% 
2 months       10% 19%  8% 21%   6% 20% 
3 months 9% 28%  7% 28%   7% 27% 
4 months 8% 36%  6% 34%   6% 33% 
5 months 7% 43%  6% 40%   7% 40% 
6 months 6% 49%  5% 45%   5% 45% 
7 months 5% 54%  5% 50%   4% 49% 
8 months 5% 59%  4% 54%   5% 54% 
9 months 4% 63%  4% 58%   4% 58% 
10 months 4% 67%  4% 62%   5% 63% 
11 months 4% 71%  3% 65%   3% 66% 
12 months 3% 74%  3% 68%   2% 68% 
Over 12 months      26% 100%       32%  100%         32%      100% 
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Table 6-4  Distribution of recommendation, ratio of buy to sell and average rating per year over the 
sample period and rating distribution from previous studies. 
 
This table reports the yearly distribution of new stock recommendations. Column 1 shows the sample 
year, column 2 the total number of changes in recommendations in a particular year, columns 3-5 present 
the total number and proportion of new buy/hold/sell recommendations respectively, column 6 presents 
the ratio of buy to sell  and column 7 reports the mean rating. Panel B provides the examples of stock 
recommendation distribution in the previous studies. Columns 1-3 show authors of previous studies, prior 
studies sample periods and rating distribution respectively. 
 
Panel A: Distribution of recommendations, ratio of buy to sell and mean rating across years 
Total 
Recommenda-
tions 
 
Buys 
 
Holds 
 
Sells 
 
Year  
Total % Total % Total % Total % 
 
Ratio of 
buy: sell 
 
Mean 
rating8 
1997     433 100%    159  37% 263 60%     11 3% 14.5:1 1.65 
1998   1105 100%    450  41% 613 55%     42 4% 10.7:1 1.63 
1999   1440 100%    772  54% 633 44%     35 2% 22.0:1 1.48 
2000      672 100%    346  51% 319 47%    7 2% 49.4:1 1.49 
2000     898 100%    280  31% 599 67%     19 2% 14.7:1 1.70 
2001   2129 100%    809  38% 1240 58%     80 4% 10.1:1 1.66 
2002   4274 100%   966  23% 2189 51% 1119  26% 0.8:1 2.03 
2003   3218 100%   1106  34% 1517 47% 595 19% 1.8:1 1.84 
Overall 14169 100% 4888  34% 7373 52% 1908 19% 2.6:1 1.80 
Panel B: An example of stock recommendation descriptive statistics from prior studies 
 
Rating percentage 
 
Prior studies 
 
Sample period 
% buys % holds % sells 
Stickel (1995) 1988 -1991 55% 33% 12% 
Womack (1996) 1989 -1991 77% - 23% 
Barber et al., (2001) 1985 – 1996 47% 47.2% 5.7% 
Barber et al., (2003) Jan 1996 - Dec 2001 67% 29% 3% 
Chen et al., (2003) Oct 1993 - Jan 2003 59.63% 37.82% 2.55% 
Asquith et al., (2005) 1997 – 1999 70.80% 28.7% 0.5% 
 
                                                 
8 The stock recommendations are classified as follows: 1=Buy, 2=Hold, 3=sell 
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Figure 6-1 Yearly distribution of buys, holds and sells between January 1997 and December 2003 
 
 
the ratio of buys to sells reached the highest level of 49.4:1 but plunged to 0.8:1 in 
2002. Figure 6-1 above provides a clear picture of the distribution of recommendations 
over time between January 1, 1997 and December 31, 2003. The average rating also 
reached its all time low (2.03 which is hold) in 2002. While the apparent decline in 
2002 may be attributed to other factors such as the economic conditions and the 
collapse of market prices of that time, it may also be largely due to the implementation 
of NASD 2711 and Rule 4729 (Barber et al., 2004; Madureira, 2004) which were 
effected around the same time (on the July 9, 2002). In general terms, these rules are 
meant to pressure those brokerage firms who were persistently issuing a relatively high 
percentage of buy recommendations to adopt a more balanced rating system.  
 
Panel B of Table 6-4 presents the proportion of new buy, new hold and new sell 
recommendations in the previous studies. The aim of this table is to show the proportion 
of stock recommendation in some of the previous studies and to make a comparison of 
their findings with the findings in my sample. Overall, the ratio of buy to sell (2.6:1) 
observed in this study is more balanced compared to the findings in the previous 
                                                 
9 Refer to Barber et al., (2003) for more information about these rules. 
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studies. Thus, brokerage firms are now issuing more sell recommendations than before. 
Again, this may be interpreted as an indication that the recent regulations (i.e., NASD 
2711 and Rule 472) have been effective. Madureira (2004) points out that this may also 
be a result of the adoption of new rating systems by eight of the big ten brokerage 
houses. 
 
The matrix of changes in recommendation for the whole sample period is shown by 
Table 6-5. About 35% of the recommendations are new buys, 52% are new holds while 
13% are new sells. A very large proportion of new buy (sell) recommendations are 
previously from the hold category.  
 
Table 6-5   The transition matrix of changes in recommendations 
This table presents the transition matrix of changes in recommendation for my entire sample period, 
January, 1997 to December, 2003.  Old rating is the rating of the stock before it is moved to the new 
rating category. The transition percentages are shown in brackets. 
 
New rating Old 
Rating Buy Hold Sell Total Total % 
Buy - 6508 
(46%) 
278 
(2%) 
6786 
(48%) 
48% 
Hold 4739 
(34%) 
- 1630 
(11%) 
6369 
(45%) 
45% 
Sell 149 
(1%) 
865 
(6%) 
- 1014 
(7%) 
7% 
Total 4888 
 
7373 
 
1908 
 
14169 - 
Total % (35%) (52%) (13%)  100% 
Ratio of buy to sell = 2.6:1 
 
 
Over my sample period, analysts are more likely to downgrade stocks than upgrade 
them (59% versus 41%). About 77% of downgrades are from buy to hold, 19% are  
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Table 6-6   Total number of firms and financial analysts available in IBES 
This table presents total number of firms covered and total number of analysts available in IBES. Column 
1 shows the sample year; column 2 shows the number of firms covered overtime, columns 3-6 show 
mean, 1st quartile, median, and 3rd quartile of the number of analysts issuing recommendations 
respectively.  
 
No of analysts 
issuing recommendations a 
 
Year 
 
Number of firms 
covered Mean 1st Quartile Median 3rd Quartile 
Jan - Dec 1997 296 6.3 3.0 5.0 8.0 
Jan - Dec 1998 626 7.0 2.0 6.0 9.0 
Jan - Dec 1999 733 8.0 4.0 7.0 11.0 
Jan – Jun 2000 449 4.5 2.0 4.0 6.0 
Jan - Dec 2000 542 5.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 
Jan - Dec 2001 894 7.8 3.0 6.0 10.0 
Jan - Dec 2002 1292 9.5 4.0 8.0 13.0 
Jan - Dec 2003 1032 9.4 4.0 8.0 13.0 
Overall 2068 21.5 12.0 18.0 29.0 
a 
These are analysts issuing recommendations on the sample firms each year. This include top ten brokerage firms used in this     
   study 
 
from hold to sell while only 4% are from buy to sell. On the other hand 82% of 
upgrades are from hold to buy, 15% are from sell to hold while 3% are from sell to buy. 
This pattern indicates that movement in stock recommendation is very rarely from one 
extreme category to another, i.e., from buy to sell and vice versa. Thus, movement in 
recommendations is almost always through the hold category. 
 
Table 6-6 reports the total number of firms covered and the average number of all 
brokerage houses issuing recommendations in IBES including the top ten brokerage 
firms used in this study. The aim of this table is to provide a pattern of analysts’ 
coverage and number of firms covered over time. Both firms covered and average 
brokerage firms increased over the years but as in Barber et al., (2003) they both 
dropped in 2001, i.e., number of firms is 894 and mean (median) number of analysts is 
8 (6).  Overall, there is a median of 18 brokerage firms including the top 10 used in this 
study following a total of 2,068 firms in the IBES database. 
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6.4.2 Description of analysts’ target price and sample firms 
Table 6-7 Panel A provides the time in months that the target prices are outstanding 
before new price forecasts are issued by the same brokerage firms that issued the 
previous target price. This information gives us an idea of how frequently analysts 
change their target prices compared with the frequency with which they change their 
stock recommendations. The results show that, as with stock recommendations, a large 
percentage of target prices (91% of increased target prices and 87% of decreased target 
prices) are changed within 12 months.  
 
As expected, Panel B shows that the average number of days that the target prices 
remain unchanged before being increased is shorter (mean number of calendar days = 
127, approximately 4 months) than the number of days that the target prices are reduced 
(mean number of calendar days = 168, slightly over 5 months).  
 
Table 6-8 shows the yearly distribution of target prices in total/percentage and by 
category (increase/decrease) and the ratio of increase to decrease in target prices. The 
total number of target prices declined over time and reached the lowest level in 2000 
(target price total = 5029), however, in the subsequent years, the total number of target 
prices increased and more than doubled by the end of 2003.  Figure 6-2 provides a 
clearer picture of the distribution of increased and decreased target prices over time. 
 
Overall, there are more target prices in the increase (56%) category than in the decrease 
(44%) category. The percentage of target prices that are increased reached its highest 
level in the first half of 2000 and thereafter showed a steady decline until reaching an all 
time low in 2002 where the ratio of increase to decrease falls to 0.53:1. The table shows 
that 31% of target prices are in the decrease category in the first half of 2000 but rise to 
65% in 2002.  The total number of firms covered is highest in 2000 making a total of 
1,813 but drops in 2001 before recovering in 2002 and 2003. However, I did not 
ascertain how many of the existing firms are new for each year and overall. 
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Table 6-7  Distribution of time (in months) target prices spent in the previous category before they 
are changed to a new category and calendar days between changes of target prices from the 
previous category to the new category 
 
Panel A shows the mean, 1st quartile, median and 3rd quartile number of calendar days that the target price 
is outstanding before it is changed to a new target price value by the same broker who issued the previous 
target price value. The first column shows target price level, column 2 shows the mean number of days in 
each target price level, columns 3-5 report the 1st quartile, median and 3rd quartile number of days 
respectively. Panel B shows the amount of time in months that target prices spent in the previous category 
before they are changed to a new category. Column 1 shows the period spent in months, columns 2-4 
show the proportion and cumulative proportions of increased and decreased target prices in each month.  
 
Panel A: The overall number of calendar days that target prices are in their previous category before they 
are changes to a new value 
Target price  Mean 1st Quartile Median 3rd Quartile 
Increase 127 14 55 124 
Decrease 168 21 73 182 
Panel B: Distribution of time (in months) that target prices spent in the previous category before they are 
changed to a new category 
Increased  target prices 
N = 26,297 
Decreased  target prices 
N = 21,104 
Period 
Monthly % 
change 
Cum % Monthly % 
change 
Cum %
1 month 38% 38% 32% 32%
2 months 13% 51% 13% 45%
3 months 13% 64% 12% 57%
4 months 10% 74% 9% 66%
5 months 4% 78% 5% 71%
6 months 3% 81% 4% 75%
7 months 3% 84% 4% 79%
8 months 2% 86% 2% 81%
9 months 1% 87% 2% 83%
10 months 2% 89% 2% 85%
11 months         0.8%       89.8% 1% 86%
12 months         0.8%       90.6% 1% 87%
Over 12 months 9%        100%        13%           100%
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Table 6-8  Distribution of target prices, ratio of increase to decrease, average number of firms 
covered and total number of analysts issuing target prices for the sample firms. 
 
This table reports the yearly and overall distribution of target prices. Column 1 shows the sample year, 
column 2 shows the total number of target prices for each year and columns 3-4 show the total number 
and percentage of increase and decrease in target prices over the years respectively. Column 5 shows the 
ratio of increase to decrease while column 6 shows the number of firms covered each year. 
 
 
Year 
Target price 
total 
 
Increase 
 
Decrease 
Ratio of 
increase: 
decrease 
No. of firms 
covered 
Jan – Dec 1997 12,334 
(100%) 
8,477 
(69%) 
3,857 
(31%) 
2.2:1 1,708 
Jan – Dec 1998 7,338 
(100%) 
3,875 
(53%) 
3,464 
(47%) 
1.1:1 1,401 
Jan – Dec 1999 5,845 
(100%) 
3,716 
(64%) 
2,129 
(36%) 
1.7:1 1,350 
Jan – June 2000 2,727 
(100%) 
1,873 
(69%) 
854 
(31%) 
2.1:1 925 
Jul – Dec 2000 2,302 
(100%) 
1,266 
(55%) 
1,036 
(45%) 
1.2:1 888 
Jan – Dec 2001 5,373 
(100%) 
2,602 
(48%) 
2,771 
(52%) 
0.9:1 1,276 
Jan – Dec 2002 10,248 
(100%) 
3,582 
(35%) 
6,666 
(65%) 
0.5:1 1,559 
Jan – Dec 2003 11,298 
(100%) 
6,684 
(59%) 
4,614 
(41%) 
1.4:1 1,579 
Overall 57,466 
(100%) 
32,075 
(56%) 
25,391 
(44%) 
1.2:1 2943 
 
 
Figure 6-2  Yearly distribution of increased and decreased target prices between January 1997 and 
December 2003 
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Table 6-9  Distribution of brokerage firms over the sample period 
This table reports the distribution of brokerage firms that issued target prices in the First Call over the 
sample period. Column 1 shows the sample years and columns 2-5 shows mean, 1st quartile, median and 
3rd quartile respectively for the number of brokerage firms issuing target prices over the sample period. 
 
Number of brokerage firms issuing target prices  
Year mean 1st Quartile Median 3rd Quartile 
Jan – Dec 1997 3.8 1.0 3.0 5.0 
Jan – Dec 1998 4.3 1.0 3.0 6.0 
Jan – Dec 1999 5.0 1.0 3.0 6.0 
Jan – Jun 2000 4.4 1.0 3.0 6.0 
Jul – Dec 2000 4.3 1.0 3.5 6.0 
Jan – Dec 2001 5.4 2.0 4.0 7.0 
Jan – Dec 2002 4.2 1.0 2.0 5.0 
Jan – Dec 2003 6.2 1.0 2.0 4.0 
Overall 7.4 2.0 4.0 10.0 
 
Table 6.9 shows the distribution of brokerage firms over my sample period. Overall, the 
mean (median) number of brokerage firms available in First Call (including the top 10) 
and issuing target prices on the sample firms is 7.4 (4.0) with the 1st and 3rd quartile 
values of 4.0 and 10.0 respectively. 
 
6.5 Discussion and summary 
Financial analysts’ stock recommendations and target prices are important outputs from 
their work. Financial analysts use both outputs concurrently or separately when they 
give investment advice to investors. In most cases financial analysts use target prices to 
justify the stock recommendations they make (Bradshaw, 2002). In this chapter both 
outputs are described separately. The fact that there is a strong linkage between the two 
makes it worthwhile to study them together. Univariate analysis of stock 
recommendations and target prices over the same sample period, i.e., January 1, 1997 to 
December 31, 2003 provides both striking similarities and differences between the two. 
 
The common qualities between financial analysts’ stock recommendations and target 
prices include: first, a large sample of both is changed from the previous stock 
recommendation category and target price level respectively to the current category or 
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level within a period of 12 months. This confirms that financial analysts make 
predictions about stock performance and stock price over a period of 12 months.  
 
Second, both have a ‘preferred’ rating level and ‘less preferred’ rating level. A 
‘preferred’ rating level is a buy for stock recommendations and increased target price 
for target prices. Interestingly, for both stock recommendations and target prices, stocks 
reside in the ‘less preferred’ categories for the shortest period of time compared to the 
time spent in the ‘preferred’ categories. This can be interpreted to indicate that financial 
analysts are reluctant to keep stocks in the poor rating category for long because of the 
costs to them associated with a poor rating of firms.  
 
Third, not surprisingly, the overall percentage of stocks in the ‘preferred’ categories 
outweigh those in the ‘less preferred’ categories, i.e., 34% is in the buy category 
compared to 19% in the sell category, and 56% target prices are  increases compared to 
44% decreases.  
 
Last, both stock recommendations and target prices behave in a similar fashion, 
suggesting that factors which affect one have an impact on another as well. For 
example, throughout the sample period, increases in target prices outrun decreases but 
in the second half of 2000 the number of decreases escalates until they outweigh the 
number of increases in 2002. A similar pattern is observed with changes in stock 
recommendations. The ratio of new buys to new sells declined in the second half of 
2000 and reached a ratio of buy to sell of 0.8:1 in 2002 from 49.4:1 in the first half of 
2000. The evident relationship in the samples of stock recommendations and target 
prices makes it worthwhile to study both together. 
 
The noteworthy differences between my samples of stock recommendations and target 
prices are, first, despite the same sample period and the same sample selection process 
for both, the final sample for target prices is far larger than the sample of stock 
recommendations. One reason for this may be that target prices are changed much more 
frequently than stock recommendations, as a result more changes in target prices are 
observed. For example, 38% and 32% of increases and decreases in target prices 
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respectively are changed from their previous categories within one month while only 
9%, 13% and 14% of new buy, new hold and new sell stock recommendations 
respectively are changed within a month.  
 
Second, the total number of changes in recommendations increased throughout the 
years and more than doubled between 2001 and 2002 before dropping by approximately 
75% in 2003. In comparison, the total number of target prices decreased over time in the 
first half of the sample period, reached the lowest level in 2000 and increased again in 
the subsequent years.  
 
Third, there are some reversals observed in both target prices and stock 
recommendations patterns at some point in the sample period. For example, throughout 
the sample years, the increases in target price outweigh decreases but in 2000 there is a 
reversal that reached a peak in 2002 where decreases in target prices are 65% and 
increases 35%. With regard to stock recommendations, the reversal happens in the 
second half of 2000 and reaches a peak in 2002 when new buy recommendations 
declined to the low of 23% and new sell recommendations increased to an all-time high 
of 26%. These changes in patterns may be influenced by different factors such as 
economic conditions but very likely these results from the implementation of new rules 
and regulations (e.g., NASD 2711) relating to analysts’ work.  However, we need to 
note that movement of both stock recommendations and target prices is in the same 
direction although from different base levels. 
 
In summary, this chapter describes my data, data selection process and samples of both 
stock recommendations and target prices, and concludes by highlighting the similarities 
and differences that I observe in the two samples of stock recommendations and price 
forecasts. It is worth noting that the substantial number of stock recommendations and 
target prices in my sample from IBES and First Call respectively demonstrates that both 
are important financial analysts’ outputs which investors use in their investment 
decision-making processes.  
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The next chapter provides the results of stock recommendation and target price 
performance 12 months after a change is effected. The aim of the performance 
evaluation process is to identify the sub-samples of stock recommendations that have 
not performed as expected for further analysis in chapter 8.  
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Chapter 7 Stock recommendation and target price performance and selection of 
nonconforming stocks 
7.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter I have described my sample of new stock recommendations and 
new target prices. In this chapter, I determine the performance of stock 
recommendations and target prices 12 months after analysts change them from their 
previous categories to new buy (sell) and increased (decreased) target price categories. 
The idea behind this performance evaluation process is to select stocks which perform 
contrary to expectation 12 months after the recommendations are changed. 
Subsequently, these stocks (underperforming new buys and outperforming new sells) 
are analysed further to determine whether there are any underlying factors influencing 
them to perform inconsistently.  In “theory”, stocks that receive a buy rating should 
outperform the relevant benchmark, while new sell rated stocks would be expected to 
underperform.  Similarly, stocks whose target prices increase should outperform the 
appropriate benchmark, while the ones whose target prices decrease are expected to 
underperform.  
 
Brav and Lehavy (2003) and Asquith et al., (2005) document a significant market 
reaction to a change in target prices, both unconditionally and conditional on 
contemporaneously issued stock recommendations.  However, the role of target prices 
that are issued concurrent with stock recommendations is not clear. To explore this 
issue, target prices are studied together with stock recommendations in this research. 
Specifically, target prices are included in the logistic regression analysis in chapter 8 to 
test the null hypothesis that target prices do not influence the type of rating financial 
analysts award to the stocks they follow (H50). 
 
As mentioned in section 4.2.5, to mitigate the cross-sectional dependence arising from 
multiple observations, all recommendations and target prices of the same type that are 
changed within a period of six months of the first change are dropped from the analysis. 
The final samples of new stock recommendations and new target prices are shown in 
table 7-1: 
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Table 7-1  The final sample of new recommendations and target prices for the period Jan 1997 to 
Dec 2002 before and after eliminating multiple recommendations 
 
Sample Before eliminating multiple 
recommendations 
After eliminating multiple 
recommendations 
New buy 3265 2232 
New sell 1129 684 
Increased target price  21,124 4,825 
Decreased target  price 17,336 4,956 
 
The chapter is organised as follows: section 7.2 discusses the subsequent market 
reaction to stock recommendation changes for the sample period, during the bull and the 
bear markets and before and after the implementation of NASD 2711, section 7.3 
discusses the market reaction to change in target price for the sample period, during the 
bull and the bear markets and before and after the implementation of NASD 2711, and 
section 7.4 shows the sub-sample of stock recommendations that have performed as 
expected, and those that have performed contrary to expectation over the 12 month 
period. Section 7.5 summarises and concludes the chapter. 
 
7.2 Subsequent market reaction to changes in stock recommendations 
In this section, I present the abnormal return performance of new stock 
recommendations my sample period, during the bull and the bear markets and before 
and after the implementation of NASD 2711. The event date is defined as the date when 
the recommendation is changed to a new buy and sell categories. The abnormal returns 
are calculated from the end of the month that the change is made.  
 
7.2.1 Performance of stock recommendations during the sample period 
Table 7-2 summarises the abnormal return performance attributable to new buy and new 
sell recommendations. Panel A shows that the BHAR for the new buy recommendations 
are driven mainly by the returns in month 0 and there is no post-recommendation drift. 
Thus, the mean BHAR in the month that the recommendation is changed is +5.67%  
(t = 13.63) and does not change significantly in the subsequent months. In month 12, the 
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Table 7-2  Performance of new buy and sell recommendations 
This table provides the buy-and-hold (BHAR) event returns for new buy and new sell recommendations. Column 1 
provides the performance period, columns 2-5 provide the mean, median, t-statistics and sign test of the BHAR for 
the samples of buy and sell recommendations. Column 6 provides the number of firms existing over the 12 month 
horizon. 
Panel A: performance of new buy recommendations 
Period BHAR  
Mean (%) 
BHAR 
Median (%) 
t-statistics Sign test 
 M-statistic10 
Live firms 
Month 0 5.67 3.53 13.53**** 262**** 2232 
Month 1 5.81 3.37 10.70**** 176**** 2225 
Month 2 5.45 2.42 8.33**** 104**** 2213 
Month 3 5.08 1.60 6.67**** 58**** 2202 
Month 4 4.70 0.68 5.37****    24 2188 
Month 5 4.39 0.42 6.74****    16 2182 
Month 6 4.51 -0.71 4.55****   -20 2174 
Month 7 4.27 -1.62 3.78****   -54 2159 
Month 8 4.12 -2.98 3.21**** -88**** 2153 
Month 9 5.47 -3.77 3.53**** -98**** 2144 
Month 10 5.61 -5.28 3.16**** -125**** 2132 
Month 11 6.10 -5.39        2.95*** -122**** 2123 
Month 12 7.94 -4.97 3.74**** -104**** 2109 
Panel B: performance of new sell recommendations 
Period BHAR  
Mean (%) 
BHAR 
Median (%) 
t-statistics Sign test 
 M-statistic 
Live firms 
Month 0 -5.59 -4.34 -6.80**** -93**** 1067 
Month 1 -7.20 -5.80 -7.70**** -105**** 1063 
Month 2 -7.60 -8.11 -5.90**** -96**** 1056 
Month 3 -8.13 -8.31 -5.69**** -97**** 1050 
Month 4 -8.82 -8.57 -6.27**** -103**** 1043 
Month 5 -9.99 -10.80 -6.50**** -111**** 1039 
Month 6 -10.66 -11.39 -7.56**** -101**** 1032 
Month 7 -11.75 -13.16 -7.31**** -101**** 1022 
Month 8 -11.30 -15.90 -5.60**** -110**** 1019 
Month 9 -11.99 -16.25 -5.31**** -119**** 1012 
Month 10 -12.29 -18.15 -4.60**** -128**** 1003 
Month 11 -10.96 -19.60        -3.70**** -128**** 996 
Month 12 -13.61 -19.86        -4.65**** 135**** 988 
****,***, **, and * denote significance at 0.1% 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively 
                                                 
10 The statistic M is defined to be M= (N+-N-)/2 where N+ is the number of values that are greater than 
Mu0 and N- is the number of values that are less than Mu0.  Values equal to Mu0 are discarded.  Under 
the hypothesis that the population median is equal to Mu0, the sign test calculates the p-value for M using 
a binomial distribution. The test is based on the null hypothesis that the population median equals Mu0. 
The default value in SAS for Mu0 is 0.  
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mean abnormal return is 7.94% while the median is -4.97%. A total of 123 firms are 
delisted over the 12 month period of my performance evaluation. 
 
The fact that I find that the market reaction to new buys is only significant in month 0 
corroborates the findings of Stickel (1995), Womack (1996), Barber et al., (2001) and 
Ryan and Taffler (2005), that the value of new buy recommendations is short-lived and 
lasts only for one month. 
 
Table 7-2 Panel B provides evidence of continuing negative market reaction for up to 12 
months after stock recommendations are changed to the sell category. The mean BHAR 
in the recommendation month is -5.59% (t = 6.80) and increases to -13.61% (t = -4.65) 
by month 12.  The median BHAR is significantly negative over the 12 month period. A 
total of 79 companies are delisted over the period of performance evaluation. 
 
The performance of new sell recommendations observed here is again consistent with 
the findings of Stickel (1995), Womack (1996), Barber et al., (2001) and Ryan and 
Taffler (2005), that the market reaction to negative recommendations lasts for longer (in 
my sample over 12 months) and is incomplete, although in their studies they observe 
performance over a 6 month period, whereas I assess performance over a 12 month 
period. The post-recommendation drift in the BHAR for new sell recommendation lends 
support to the idea that investors are slow in adjusting their expectations for future stock 
performance upon receiving new information, a behaviour which prior research 
proposes to explain market underreactions (e.g., Barberis et al., 1998). 
 
7.2.2 Differential market reaction of stock recommendations during the bull and the 
bear markets 
Table 7-3 shows the abnormal return performance of new buy and new sell 
recommendations during the bull (January 1, 1997 to March 10, 2000) and the bear 
(March 11, 2000 to December 31, 2002) markets. The bull and the bear markets’ cut off 
dates are adapted from Barber et al., (2004), (see section 9.4). Both Panel A and Panel B 
show that in general, new buy recommendations outperform the benchmark regardless  
 
 97
Table 7-3  Performance of new buy recommendations during the bull and the bear markets 
 
This table provides the buy-and-hold (BHAR) event returns for new buy recommendations during the bull market 
(January 1, 1997 to March 10, 2000) and the bear market (March 11, 2000 to December 31, 2002). Column 1 
provides the performance period, columns 2-5 provide the mean, median, t-statistics and sign test of the BHAR for 
the samples of buy recommendations. Column 6 provides the number of firms existing over the 12 month horizon. 
 
Panel A: performance of new buy recommendations during the bull market 
Period BHAR  
Mean (%) 
BHAR 
Median (%) 
t-statistics Sign test 
 M-statistic 
Live firms 
Month 0 5.54 2.94 8.72**** 95.5**** 947 
Month 1 5.82 3.14 7.10**** 65.5**** 943 
Month 2 5.68 2.34 5.36****          37.5** 936 
Month 3 6.05 1.26 4.56****  18.5 930 
Month 4 5.56 0.31 3.70****    5.0 925 
Month 5 5.03 -1.05 3.20****   -7.5 922 
Month 6 5.43 -2.44 3.09****   -26.5* 915 
Month 7 5.49 -2.89 2.63****     -36.5** 905 
Month 8                 5.82 -4.59     2.51*        -54.5**** 902 
Month 9                7.59 -6.39 2.77**** -62.5**** 896 
Month 10  8.78 -6.92 2.81**** -63.5**** 887 
Month 11 9.61 -6.58         2.77****          -56.5**** 880 
Month 12 15.21 -5.52 3.77****    -34.5** 872 
Panel B: performance of new buy recommendations during the bear market 
Period BHAR  
Mean ( %) 
BHAR 
Median ( %) 
t-statistics Sign test 
 M-statistic 
Live firms 
Month 0 5.77 3.82 10.34**** 166.5**** 1285 
Month 1 5.80 3.61 8.00**** 110.5**** 1282 
Month 2 5.28 2.51 6.39**** 66.5**** 1277 
Month 3 4.37 1.75 4.90****          39.5** 1272 
Month 4 4.07 1.00 3.91**** 18.5 1263 
Month 5 3.92 0.81 3.56**** 23.5 1260 
Month 6 3.82 0.40 3.37****   6.5 1259 
Month 7 3.36 -0.86 2.78****        -17.5 1254 
Month 8      2.88 -1.92      2.00**        -33.5* 1251 
Month 9    3.91 -2.03     2.18*    -35.5** 1248 
Month 10 3.27 -4.59   1.58 -61.5**** 1245 
Month 11 3.53 -4.41   1.40 -65.5**** 1243 
Month 12 2.59 -4.67    1.18 -69.5**** 1237 
****,***, **, and * denote significance at 0.1% 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively 
 
 
 98
Table 7-4  Performance of new sell recommendations during the bull and the bear markets 
 
This table provides the buy-and-hold (BHAR) event returns for new sell recommendations during the bull market 
(January 1, 1997 to March 10, 2000) and the bear market (March 11, 2000 to December 31, 2002). Column 1 
provides the performance period, columns 2-5 provide the mean, median, t-statistics and sign test of the BHAR for 
the samples of sell recommendations. Column 6 provides the number of firms existing over the 12 month horizon. 
 
Panel A: performance of new sell recommendations during the bull market 
Period BHAR  
Mean (%) 
BHAR 
Median (%) 
t-statistics Sign test 
 M-statistic 
Live firms 
Month 0 -8.30 -6.70 -3.64**** -14.5**** 67 
Month 1 -10.15 -10.09 -3.38**** -13.5**** 65 
Month 2 -14.30 -12.90 -3.87****        -13.5**** 63 
Month 3 -12.89 -7.79 -2.87****        -11.5**** 62 
Month 4 -15.22 -9.23 -3.47****       -10.5**** 62 
Month 5 -16.86 -12.55 -3.66****       -12.5**** 62 
Month 6 -15.28 -12.49 -3.25****       -11.5**** 60 
Month 7 -19.07 -20.84 -3.80****       -11.5**** 59 
Month 8      -20.37 -22.55 -3.60****       -11.5**** 57 
Month 9 -20.35 -24.22 -3.46****       -11.5**** 56 
Month 10 -22.73 -26.97 -3.55****       -11.5**** 56 
Month 11 -23.07 -25.17        -3.44****       -15.5**** 54 
Month 12 -23.53 -29.66 -3.15****       -14.5**** 53 
Panel B: performance of new sell recommendations during the bear market 
Period BHAR  
Mean (%) 
BHAR 
Median (%) 
t-statistics Sign test 
 M-statistic 
Live firms 
Month 0 -5.30 -4.32 -6.04**** -78.5**** 617 
Month 1 -6.88 -5.56 -6.99**** -91.5**** 614 
Month 2 -6.87 -7.56 -5.03**** -82.5**** 613 
Month 3 -7.61 -8.32 -5.05****        -85.5**** 609 
Month 4 -8.12 -8.56 -5.48****        -92.5**** 605 
Month 5 -9.22 -9.64 -6.23****        -98.5**** 601 
Month 6 -10.16 -11.24 -6.87****        -89.5**** 598 
Month 7 -10.95 -12.42 -6.46****        -89.5**** 596 
Month 8            -10.31 -15.00 -4.79****        -98.5**** 589 
Month 9      -11.08 -16.00 -4.58****     -107.5**** 583 
Month 10      -11.15 -17.92 -3.88**** -116.5**** 578 
Month 11        -9.66 -17.93       - 3.02**** -112.5**** 574 
Month 12        -12.53 -19.29        -3.99****  -120.5**** 572 
****,***, **, and * denote significance at 0.1% 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively 
 
 99
of the market conditions. However, the market reaction is more significant in month 0 
and not on thesubsequent months. The noticeable difference between the two time 
periods is that, during the bull market, the 12 month mean BHAR for new buy 
recommendations is 15.21% (t = 3.77) whereas during the bear market, the equivalent 
period mean BHAR is a non-significant 2.59%. 
 
Table 7-4 Panels A and B show that during the bull and the bear markets, sell 
recommendations generally underperform the benchmark as expected and during both 
periods the performance of  sells exhibit post-recommendation drift which is more 
prevalent during the bull market than during the bear market. Thus, the during bull 
market, the 12 months mean BHAR is -23.53% (t = -3.44) which exceeds the 12 months 
mean BHAR during the bear market by 11 points. 
 
7.2.3 Market reaction of stock recommendations before and after the 
implementation of NASD 2711 
Table 7-5 Panels A and B present the performance of new buy recommendations before 
(January 1, 1997 to August 31, 2002) and after (September 1, 2002 to December 31, 
2002) the implementation of NASD 2711 respectively. Month 0 mean BHAR for new 
buy recommendations is higher after the implementation of NASD 2711 than before, 
i.e., 6.94% vs. 5.60%. However, the 12 month BHARs are significantly positive (mean 
BHAR = 7.89%, t = 3.97) pre-NASD 2711 and positive but not significant post NASD 
2711.  
 
Table 7-6 Panels A and B show the market reaction to new sell recommendations pre 
and post NASD 2711. In month 0, the negative market reaction to new sell 
recommendations is higher by 4.13 points (7.37% vs. -3.24%) before than after the 
implementation of NASD 2711.  The mean BHAR over the 12 months period, however, 
does not appear to be significantly different between the two time periods.  Thus, the 12 
month abnormal return is -13.25% before the implementation of NASD 2711 and -
14.07% after the implementation of NASD 2711. 
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Table 7-5  Performance of new buy recommendations before and after the implementation of 
NASD 2711 
 
This table provides the buy-and-hold (BHAR) event returns for new buy recommendations before (January 1, 1997 to 
August 31, 2002) and after (September 1, 2002 to December 31, 2002). Column 1 provides the performance period, 
columns 2-5 provide the mean, median, t-statistics and sign test of the BHAR for the samples of buy 
recommendations. Column 6 provides the number of firms existing over the 12 month horizon. 
 
Panel A: performance of new buy recommendations before NASD 2711 
Period BHAR  
Mean (%) 
BHAR 
Median (%) 
t-statistics Sign test 
 M-statistic 
Live firms 
Month 0 5.60 3.59 13.19**** 247**** 2110 
Month 1          5.77 3.36 10.46****           163**** 2103 
Month 2          5.44 2.59 8.19****           101**** 2091 
Month 3          4.99 1.66 6.46****             59** 2080 
Month 4          4.53 0.86 5.24****     29 2066 
Month 5          4.33 0.54 4.69****      21 2060 
Month 6          4.57 -0.71 4.53****     -18 2052 
Month 7          4.51 -1.28 3.90****      -42* 2038 
Month 8          4.19 -2.72 3.35****           -73**** 2032 
Month 9          5.44 -3.23 3.81****           -79**** 2023 
Month 10          5.41 -4.91 3.41****         -105**** 2011 
Month 11          5.57 -4.89         3.20****           -103**** 2002 
Month 12          7.89 -4.59 3.97****          -84**** 1990 
Panel B: performance of new buy recommendations after NASD 2711 
Period BHAR  
Mean (%) 
BHAR 
Median (%) 
t-statistics Sign test 
 M-statistic 
Live firms 
Month 0 6.94 2.61 3.10**** 15**** 122 
Month 1       6.43 3.98      2.32**         13** 122 
Month 2   5.53 1.31  1.65               3 122 
Month 3    6.66 -0.16          1.68              -1 122 
Month 4    7.79 -0.80 1.35      -5 122 
Month 5    5.47 -1.47 1.01      -5 122 
Month 6    3.49 -0.89 0.71      -2 122 
Month 7    0.00 -6.30 0.11    -12 121 
Month 8    2.97 -8.56 0.31     -15 121 
Month 9    6.12 -10.27 0.43     -19 121 
Month 10     8.96 -13.83 0.51     -20 121 
Month 11   15.36 -11.15         0.66     -19 121 
Month 12      8.80 -12.48         0.48      -20 119 
****,***, **, and * denote significance at 0.1% 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively 
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Table 7-6 Performance of new sell recommendations before and after the implementation of NASD 
2711 
 
This table provides the buy-and-hold (BHAR) event returns for new sell recommendations before (January 1, 1997 to 
August 31, 2002) and after (September 1, 2002 to December 31, 2002). Column 1 provides the performance period, 
columns 2-5 provides the mean, median, t-statistics and sign test of the BHAR for the samples of sell 
recommendations. Column 6 provides the number of firms existing over the 12 month horizon. 
 
Panel A: performance of new sell recommendations before NASD 2711 
Period BHAR  
Mean (%) 
BHAR 
Median (%) 
t-statistics Sign test 
 M-statistic 
Live firms 
Month 0 -7.37 -5.34 -6.23**** -67**** 390 
Month 1        -9.25 -6.59 -7.17****           -65**** 385 
Month 2      -10.06 -9.25 -5.60****           -58**** 383 
Month 3        -9.13 -8.67 -4.16****           -63**** 379 
Month 4        -9.83 -8.48 -4.87****           -60**** 376 
Month 5      -11.07 -9.60 -5.58****          -59**** 373 
Month 6      -11.17 -10.22 -6.15****          -53**** 368 
Month 7      -12.17 -12.22 -6.61****          -56**** 366 
Month 8      -12.85 -13.05 -6.15****          -59**** 358 
Month 9      -12.33 -14.21 -5.20****          -56**** 354 
Month 10      -13.20 -16.53 -5.00****          -66**** 350 
Month 11     -12.34 -14.36  -4.41****          -68**** 345 
Month 12     -13.25 -17.70  -4.22****          -70**** 344 
Panel B: performance of new sell recommendations after NASD 2711 
Period BHAR  
Mean (%) 
BHAR 
Median (%) 
t-statistics Sign test 
 M-statistic 
Live firms 
Month 0 -3.24 -2.36 -2.99**** -26**** 294 
Month 1        -4.49 -4.64 -3.37****           -40**** 294 
Month 2        -4.33 -6.53 -2.41****           -38**** 293 
Month 3       -6.79 -7.56 -4.26****           -34**** 292 
Month 4      -7.48 -8.97 -3.97****          -43**** 291 
Month 5     -8.50 -10.55 -4.34****         -52**** 290 
Month 6   -10.01 -14.06 -4.47****         -48**** 290 
Month 7   -11.20 -14.89 -3.95****        -45**** 289 
Month 8    -9.24 -18.13 -2.43****        -51**** 288 
Month 9 -11.54 -19.20 -2.74****        -63**** 285 
Month 10 -11.08 -20.80 -2.15****          -62**** 284 
Month 11 -9.14   -23.87        -1.62****         -60**** 283 
Month 12   -14.07 -25.85 -2.61****         -65**** 281 
****,***, **, and * denote significance at 0.1% 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively 
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7.3 Subsequent market reaction to changes in target price  
In this section, I present the abnormal return performance of changed target prices for 
the sample period, during the bull and the bear markets and before and after the 
implementation of NASD 2711. The event date is defined as the date when the target 
price is either increased or decreased. The abnormal returns are calculated from the end 
of the month in which the change is made.  
 
7.3.1 Performance of target prices over the sample period 
Table 7-7 Panel A provides performance information of stocks with increased target 
prices. The average BHAR for stocks with increased target prices is +6.30% (t = 18.74) 
in the month that the target price is changed. However, in the subsequent 12 months, the 
mean abnormal return drops to +3.72% (t = 3.10). From month 5 to month 12, the 
median is negative, suggesting that the positive impact of the increased target prices 
lasts only for a short time for most stocks.  
 
Table 7-7 Panel B shows the performance of stocks with reduced target prices. In the 
month that the target price is decreased, the stocks underperform the benchmark by 
-5.12% (t = -19.10). The underperformance continues (increases) over the following 
months, reaching a mean of -12.50% (t = -12.99) by month 12.  As with sell 
recommendations, the results suggest that the price reaction to unfavourable news takes 
much longer to be fully assimilated by the market. 
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Table 7-7  Performance of stocks with increased and decreased target price 
 
This table provides the buy-and-hold (BHAR) event returns for stocks with increased and decreased target prices. 
Column 1 provides the performance period, columns 2-5 provide the mean, median, t-statistics and sign test of the 
BHAR for the samples of buy and sell recommendations. Column 6 provides the number of firms existing over the 12 
month horizon. 
 
Panel A: Performance of stocks with increased target prices 
Period BHAR  
Mean (%) 
BHAR 
Median (%) 
t-statistics Sign test 
 M-statistic 
Live firms 
Month 0 6.30 3.90 18.74**** 636**** 4825 
Month 1 6.18 3.55 16.48**** 418**** 4808 
Month 2 5.62 2.54 12.45**** 242**** 4791 
Month 3 5.33 1.48 9.87**** 120**** 4777 
Month 4 4.77 0.33 8.03****   34 4746 
Month 5 4.79 -0.01 7.55****    -7 4729 
Month 6 5.37 -0.75 7.53****   -56 4699 
Month 7 5.24 -0.16 6.34****       -97** 4666 
Month 8 4.62 -2.59 5.37**** -156**** 4639 
Month 9 4.38 -2.50 4.78**** -142**** 4616 
Month 10 4.21 -3.32 4.15**** -167**** 4590 
Month 11 3.79 -4.99 3.41**** -204**** 4558 
Month 12 3.72 -5.47 3.10**** -243**** 4525 
Panel A: performance of stocks with decreased target prices 
Period BHAR  
Mean ( %) 
BHAR 
Median ( %) 
t-statistics Sign test 
 M-statistic 
Live firms 
Month 0 -5.12 -3.94 -19.10**** -603**** 4956 
Month 1 -5.79 -5.22 -17.31**** -564**** 4951 
Month 2 -6.45 -6.63 -16.50**** -590**** 4915 
Month 3 -7.14 -7.27 -16.25**** -595**** 4900 
Month 4 -7.96 -8.34 -16.69**** -627**** 4881 
Month 5 -8.73 -9.44 -16.40**** -638**** 4848 
Month 6 -9.17 -9.68 -16.12**** -643**** 4830 
Month 7 -9.90 -11.43 -16.45**** -677**** 4797 
Month 8 -10.82 -12.63 -16.33**** -734**** 4746 
Month 9 -11.05 -13.89 -15.00**** -709**** 4718 
Month 10 -11.45 -15.02 -13.44**** -742**** 4687 
Month 11 -12.43 -16.08 -14.13**** -757**** 4643 
Month 12 -12.50 -16.73 -12.99**** -784**** 4616 
****,***, **, and * denote significance at 0.1% 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively 
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7.3.2 Differential performance of stocks with increased and decreased target prices 
during the bull and the bear markets  
Table 7-8 Panels A and B present performance of stocks during the bull and the bear 
markets respectively.  The market reaction to increased target prices is higher in month 
0 of the bear market than in month 0 of the bull market by 0.74 points. However, over 
the 12 month period of the bear market, the stocks with increased target price accrue a 
non-significant negative mean abnormal return of -0.78% whereas, over the same period 
the bull market mean BHAR is 7.01% (t = 3.89). 
 
Table 7-9 Panels A and B show that market reaction to a decrease in target price is, 
overall, relatively similar during both the bull and the bear markets, although 
underperformance is generally higher during the bear market than during the bull 
market. Thus, in month 0, the bear market mean BHAR is -5.81% compared to -4.46% 
during the bull market while the 12 month  abnormal return is -14.79% during the bear 
market compared to -10.32% during the bull market. 
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Table 7-8   Performance of increased target prices during the bull and the bear markets 
 
This table provides the buy-and-hold (BHAR) event returns for increased target prices during the bull market 
(January 1, 1997 to March 10, 2000) and the bear market (March 11, 2000 to December 31, 2002). Column 1 
provides the performance period, columns 2-5 provide the mean, median, t-statistics and sign test of the BHAR for 
the samples of stocks with increased target prices. Column 6 provides the number of firms existing over the 12 month 
horizon. 
 
Panel A: performance of stocks with increased target prices during the bull market 
Period BHAR  
Mean (%) 
BHAR 
Median (%) 
t-statistics Sign test 
 M-statistic 
Live firms 
Month 0 5.99 3.52 12.56**** 353**** 2832 
Month 1 5.71 3.05 11.85**** 227**** 2823 
Month 2 5.80 2.63 9.58**** 145**** 2815 
Month 3 5.84 1.19 7.71**** 56**** 2806 
Month 4 5.83 0.00 6.85****      0 2785 
Month 5 6.18 -0.27 6.81****  -14 2772 
Month 6 7.06 -0.94 6.87****  -40 2755 
Month 7 7.34 -1.56        5.97****      -57** 2727 
Month 8 6.94 -2.41          5.53****          -80**** 2706 
Month 9 6.39 -2.31 4.83****           -69**** 2691 
Month 10 6.79 -2.43 4.59**** -71**** 2670 
Month 11 6.82 -4.13 4.10****           -87**** 2651 
Month 12 7.01 -5.16 3.89****         -116**** 2627 
Panel B: performance of stocks with increased target prices during the bear market 
Period BHAR  
Mean (%) 
BHAR 
Median (%) 
t-statistics Sign test 
 M-statistic 
Live firms 
Month 0 6.73 4.55 14.95**** 283**** 1993 
Month 1 6.84 4.34 11.48**** 191**** 1985 
Month 2 5.37 2.48 7.96**** 97**** 1976 
Month 3 4.60 1.87 6.21**** 65**** 1971 
Month 4 3.27 0.90 4.21****    34 1961 
Month 5 2.82 0.21 3.38****       7 1957 
Month 6 2.96 -0.35 3.23****    -17 1944 
Month 7 2.28 -1.74 2.33****      -41* 1939 
Month 8 1.33 -2.89 1.25           -75**** 1933 
Month 9 1.53 -2.64 1.30           -74**** 1925 
Month 10 0.56 -4.33 0.44           -97**** 1920 
Month 11 -0.30 -5.72 -0.23 -117**** 1907 
Month 12 -0.78 -6.10 -0.57 -128**** 1898 
****,***, **, and * denote significance at 0.1% 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively 
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Table 7-9   Performance of decreased target prices during the bull and the bear markets 
This table provides the buy-and-hold (BHAR) event returns for decreased target prices during bull market (January 1, 
1997 to March 10, 2000) and bear market (March 11, 2000 to December 31, 2002). Column 1 provides the 
performance period, columns 2-5 provide the mean, median, t-statistics and sign test of the BHAR for the samples of 
stocks with decreased target prices. Column 6 provides the number of firms existing over the 12 month horizon. 
 
Panel A: performance of stocks with decreased target prices during the bull market 
Period BHAR  
Mean (%) 
BHAR 
Median (%) 
t-statistics Sign test 
 M-statistic 
Live firms 
Month 0 -4.46 -3.78 -12.88**** -312**** 2541 
Month 1 -4.89 -4.42 -11.11**** -250**** 2535 
Month 2 -5.31 -5.47 -9.94**** -255**** 2520 
Month 3 -6.32 -6.61 -10.34**** -283**** 2509 
Month 4 -7.09 -7.85 -10.45****         -290**** 2496 
Month 5 -8.27 -9.08 -10.44****         -312**** 2479 
Month 6 -8.73 -9.80 -10.34****         -320**** 2469 
Month 7 -9.76 -11.27      -10.85****         -330**** 2452 
Month 8 -10.69 -13.20      -10.62****         -364**** 2420 
Month 9 -10.00 -13.90 -8.70****         -328**** 2401 
Month 10 -9.69 -14.85 -6.95**** -329**** 2385 
Month 11 -10.68 -16.32 -7.48****         -338**** 2362 
Month 12 -10.32 -16.36 -6.71****         -352**** 2345 
Panel B: performance of stocks with decreased target price during the bear market 
Period BHAR  
Mean (%) 
BHAR 
Median (%) 
t-statistics Sign test 
 M-statistic 
Live firms 
Month 0 -5.81 -4.21 -14.11**** -292**** 2415 
Month 1 -6.73 -6.12 -13.31**** -315**** 2406 
Month 2 -7.66 -7.71 -13.38**** -336**** 2395 
Month 3 -8.01 -8.37 -12.67**** -313**** 2391 
Month 4 -8.88 -9.28 -13.27****         -337**** 2385 
Month 5 -9.20 -9.75 -13.04****         -327**** 2369 
Month 6 -9.64 -9.37 -12.73****        -3.23**** 2361 
Month 7 -10.05 -11.58 -12.65****         -347**** 2345 
Month 8 -10.96 -11.75      -12.85****         -371**** 2326 
Month 9 -12.15 -13.88      -13.40****         -371**** 2317 
Month 10 -13.29 -15.14      -14.05****         -414**** 2302 
Month 11 -14.28 -15.85     -14.24**** -420**** 2281 
Month 12 -14.79 -17.06     -13.09**** -433**** 2271 
****,***, **, and * denote significance at 0.1% 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively 
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7.3.3 Performance of stocks with increased and decreased target prices before and 
after the implementation of NASD 2711 
Table 7-10 shows the performance of stocks with increased target prices before and 
after the implementation of NASD 2711.  Panel A shows that there is a significant 
market reaction to increased target prices in month 0 (mean BHAR = 6.25% t = 17.89) 
and over the 12 month period (mean BHAR = 4.25%, t = 3.46) before the 
implementation of NASD 2711. On the other hand, after the implementation of NASD 
2711, stocks with increased target prices realise significant market reaction in month 0 
(mean BHAR = 6.89%, t = 5.69) but over the 12 month period the mean BHAR is 
negative (mean  BHAR= -3.82%, t = 0.76) albeit not significant. 
 
Table 7-11 shows the performance of stocks with decreased target prices before and 
after the implementation of NASD 2711. Overall, there is not a significant difference in 
the performance of stocks with decreased target prices before and after the 
implementation of NASD 2711. It is, however, noted that the market reaction to 
decreased target prices is higher by 2.96 points in month 0 before the implementation of 
NASD 2711, but over the 12 month period the underperformance is relatively higher 
(mean BHAR = -13.89%, t = -2.64) after the implementation of NASD 2711 than before 
the implementation of NASD 2711 (mean BHAR = -12.45%, t = -12.84). 
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Table 7-10  Performance of increased target prices before and after the implementation of NASD 
This table provides the buy-and-hold (BHAR) event returns for stocks with increased target prices before (January 1, 
1997 to August 31, 2002) and after (September 1, 2002 to December 31, 2002). Column 1 provides the performance 
period, columns 2-5 provide the mean, median, t-statistics and sign test of the BHAR for the samples of stocks with 
increased target price. Column 6 provides the number of firms existing over the 12 month horizon. 
 
Panel A: performance of stocks with increased target prices before the implementation of NASD 2711 
Period BHAR  
Mean (%) 
BHAR 
Median (%) 
t-statistics Sign test 
 M-statistic 
Live firms 
Month 0 6.25 3.88 17.89**** 589**** 4497 
Month 1 6.20 3.75 16.26**** 411**** 4480 
Month 2 5.80 2.88 12.43****           235**** 4464 
Month 3 5.52 1.66 9.81****           126**** 4452 
Month 4 4.90 0.31 7.91**** 30 4423 
Month 5 5.02 0.02 7.57****   3 4407 
Month 6 5.72 -0.06 7.74**** 42 4379 
Month 7 5.56 -1.30 6.50****     -70** 4348 
Month 8 4.90 -2.32          5.56****        -121**** 4321 
Month 9 4.66 -2.08 5.02****        -103**** 4299 
Month 10 4.60 -2.67 4.49**** -125**** 4274 
Month 11 4.24 -4.28          3.73****         -163**** 4243 
Month 12 4.25 -4.80 3.46**** -202**** 4212 
Panel B: performance of stocks with increased target price after the implementation of NASD 2711 
Period BHAR  
Mean (%) 
BHAR 
Median (%) 
t-statistics Sign test 
 M-statistic 
Live firms 
Month 0 6.89 4.58 5.69**** 47**** 328 
Month 1 5.83 0.69 3.33****      7 328 
Month 2 3.12 1.16    1.76*      7 327 
Month 3 2.66 -0.90 1.42             -6 325 
Month 4 2.93 0.083 1.45     4 323 
Month 5 1.73 -1.56 0.81   -10 322 
Month 6 0.51 -3.01 0.19  -15 320 
Month 7 0.87 -6.55 0.27           -27**** 318 
Month 8 0.81 -7.41 0.21           -30**** 318 
Month 9 0.07 -11.51 0.16           -39**** 317 
Month 10 -1.10 -11.76 -0.22           -42**** 316 
Month 11 -2.65 -12.27 -0.53 -42**** 315 
Month 12 -3.82 -15.76 -0.76 -43**** 313 
****,***, **, and * denote significance at 0.1% 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively 
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Table 7-11  Performance of decreased target prices before and after the implementation of NASD  
 
This table provides the buy-and-hold (BHAR) event returns for stocks with decreased target prices before (January 1, 
1997 to August 31, 2002) and after (September 1, 2002 to December 31, 2002). Column 1 provides the performance 
period, columns 2-5 provide the mean, median, t-statistics and sign test of the BHAR for the samples of stocks with 
decreased target price. Column 6 provides the number of firms existing over the 12 month horizon. 
 
Panel A: performance of stocks with decreased target prices before the implementation of NASD 2711 
Period BHAR  
Mean (%) 
BHAR 
Median (%) 
t-statistics Sign test 
 M-statistic 
Live firms 
Month 0 -5.29 -4.00 -19.09**** -585**** 4672 
Month 1 -5.93 -5.33 -17.28**** -5.31**** 4657 
Month 2 -6.60 -6.64 -16.51****         -554**** 4631 
Month 3 -7.29 -7.35 -16.03****         -558**** 4619 
Month 4 -8.02 -8.36 -16.22****        -584**** 4601 
Month 5 -8.79 -9.57 -15.90****        -5.95**** 4568 
Month 6 -9.21 -9.72 -15.61****         -600**** 4550 
Month 7 -9.98 -11.41 -16.17****         -632**** 4518 
Month 8 -10.92 -12.44      -16.25****         -676**** 4469 
Month 9 -11.03 -13.79 -14.78**** -638**** 4445 
Month 10 -11.41 -14.68 -13.12**** -687**** 4416 
Month 11 -12.37 -15.76      -13.81**** -703**** 4375 
Month 12 -12.45 -16.36 -12.84**** -732**** 4348 
Panel B: performance of stocks with decreased target price after the implementation of NASD 2711 
Period BHAR  
Mean (%) 
BHAR 
Median (%) 
t-statistics Sign test 
 M-statistic 
Live firms 
Month 0 -2.33 -2.99   -2.22**       -18** 284 
Month 1 -3.35 -4.54   -2.30**           -33**** 284 
Month 2 -4.04 -6.56        -2.21**           -36**** 284 
Month 3 -4.79 -5.79        -2.78****           -37**** 281 
Month 4 -6.95 -8.04        -3.95****           -43**** 280 
Month 5 -7.75 -8.10        -4.15****           -43**** 280 
Month 6 -8.65 -8.77        -4.12****           -44**** 280 
Month 7 -8.63 -11.73        -3.21****           -44**** 279 
Month 8 -9.33 -14.00        -2.73****           -58**** 277 
Month 9 -11.42 -16.90        -2.98****           -62**** 273 
Month 10 -12.53 -18.80        -3.09****           -57**** 271 
Month 11 -14.01 -20.05         -3.24****           -55**** 268 
Month 12 -13.89 -22.04         -2.64****           -53**** 268 
****,***, **, and * denote significance at 0.1% 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively 
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7.4 Stocks performing contrary (according) to expectation 
The methodology employed for selecting nonconforming stocks is described in section 
4.3. In this section I identify the stocks that have/have not performed as expected. In 
theory, a ‘buy’ recommendation is issued when a stock is perceived to be undervalued. 
Conversely, a ‘sell’ recommendation is issued when a stock is believed to be 
overvalued, while a stock awarded ‘hold’ is believed to be fairly priced. The definitions 
of stock recommendations by the top ten brokerage firms follow this same idea but go 
even further in specifying the actual percentages by which the stocks that are classified 
to each of the three categories are expected to outperform/underperform the respective 
industry averages. Generally, according to brokerage firms, a buy (sell) 
recommendation is expected to outperform (underperform) the industry benchmark by 
at least 10% or higher depending on risk.  Appendix 1 provides detailed information on 
how different brokerage firms define the recommendations’ ratings.  
 
The selection of nonconforming stock recommendations in my thesis is thus based on 
how the stock ratings are defined by the brokerage firms. Therefore, based on the 
brokerage firms’ definitions of stock ratings, in this research a buy recommendation is 
deemed to be performing contrary to analysts’ expectations if the subsequent 
performance over the following 12 month period is at least 10% lower than that of the 
respective benchmark. Conversely, a sell recommendation is not conforming to 
analysts’ expectations if the subsequent performance exceeds that of the benchmark by 
at least 10% over the next 12 months.  In the actual analysis, however, I increase the 
cut-off percentage to at least 20% so that only extreme cases of non-conformance are 
analysed, i.e., only buys (sells) that underperform (outperform) the industry by at least -
20% (+20%) are considered. The cut-of point is increased to 20% for the following 
reasons: 
 
i. It provides me with a much cleaner test because if the analyst recommendation 
is associated with stock returns in line with the analyst output, then it is difficult 
to distinguish between bias and valid judgement. Investigating extreme cases of 
stocks with nonconforming subsequent stock returns is an attempt to remove 
analysts’ correct judgemental processes.  
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ii. Analysts may be biased even if the stock performance is in line with what is 
expected. However, I believe that potential bias may be much more directly 
measurable when the outturn is demonstrably wrong to a significant extent, i.e., 
at least 20% below or above what is expected.  
 
iii. Increasing the cut-off also makes the number of cases I have to work with more 
manageable, more so because I have to manually collect the data for some 
variables such as corporate relationships and target price for each stock 
recommendation that is found to be nonconforming. Therefore, focussing on 
extreme nonconforming situations is viewed as being a better way of testing my 
research hypotheses than using, for example, a random sample of all new buy 
and new sell cases. 
 
Table 7-12 Panel A shows that 62% of all new buy recommendations earn positive 
returns on the month that the recommendation is changed. However, 12 months after the 
stocks are awarded a buy recommendation, 45% still earn a cumulative positive return, 
while 55% accrue a negative return. The interesting question is what percentage of these 
stocks actually attains at least a minimum of 10% benchmark outperformance stipulated 
by the brokerage firms in their definition of buy recommendations?   
 
Panel A shows that on average, only 36% of stocks that receive a new buy status 
outperform the benchmark by at least 10% over the 12 month period, while 64% do not.  
Of the 1,220 stocks that underperform the benchmark, about 34% underperform the 
benchmark by -20% or more (last column) by the 12th month. These are the stocks that 
are of most interest in this research. The main purpose is to establish why they are 
awarded a buy recommendation and yet perform poorly and contrary to expectation. 
 
Table 7-12 Panel B indicates that in the month of the recommendation change 63% of 
the stocks receiving sell ratings earn negative cumulative returns, while 37% earn 
positive returns. By the 12th month after the recommendation is changed, 70% of these  
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Table 7-12   Distribution of new buys/sells performance over time and selection of nonconforming 
stock recommendations 
 
This table shows how stocks which received new buy/sell recommendations performed over the 12 month period 
after the recommendations are changed. Column 1 gives the period after the change is made.  Column 2 shows the 
number of firms whose performance is in the expected direction. Column 3 shows the number of firms whose 
performance is in an unanticipated direction. Column 4 shows the number and percentage of buy/sell 
recommendations yielding returns of at least 10 -15% as per brokerage firms’ definition of recommendations. 
Column 5 shows the number  and percentage of recommendations with abnormal returns in the extreme opposite to 
the expectation i.e., below/above 10% and 20%. 
 
Panel A: Performance of new buy recommendations over time 
N = 2232 
Expected 
outperformance 
Unexpected 
Underperformance 
BHAR > = 10% BHAR = < -10 % BHAR = <-20 % 
Month No. of firms 
with positive 
return 
(BHAR > = 0) 
No. of firms 
with 
negative return 
(BHAR < 0) N % n % n % 
0 1378 854 535 32.89 354 15.86 121 5.42 
1 1292 940 604 36.65 495 22.17 221 9.90 
2 1220 1012 662 37.05 575 25.76 321 14.38 
3 1174 1058 655 35.71 659 29.52 383 17.15 
4 1139 1092 662 36.78 726 32.52 446 19.98 
5 1135 1097 669 36.42 832 37.27 558 25.00 
6 1096 1136 689 36.38 843 37.76 550 24.64 
7 1062 1170 697 36.34 881 39.47 591 26.47 
8 1028 1204 697 35.89 914 40.94 643 28.80 
9 1018 1214 697 35.75 922 41.30 658 29.48 
10 991 1241 695 34.86 963 43.14 696 31.18 
11 994 1238 701 35.08 973 43.59 749 33.55 
12 991 1220 698 34.68 996 44.62 759 34.00 
Panel B: Performance of new sell recommendations over time 
N = 684 
Expected 
underperformance 
Unexpected 
Outperformance 
BHAR < = -10 % BHAR > +10 % BHAR >+20 % 
Month No. of firms 
with 
negative return 
(BHAR < 0) 
No of firms 
with positive 
return 
(BHAR > = 
0) 
         
N 
               %         n            %        n                %   
0 435 249 225 32.89 93 13.59 44 6.43 
1 447 237 286 41.81 129 18.85 68 9.94 
2 438 246 312 45.61 131 19.15 75 10.96 
3 439 245 317 46.35 139 20.32 83 12.13 
4 445 239 331 48.39 151 22.07 87 12.71 
5 440 244 349 51.02 171 25.00 130 19.00 
6 443 241 368 53.80 160 23.39 108 15.78 
7 443 241 373 54.53 159 23.24 102 14.91 
8 452 232 375 54.82 147 21.49 103 15.05 
9 461 223 388 56.73 145 21.19 102 14.91 
10 470 214 391 57.16 141 20.61 109 15.93 
11 470 214 393 57.46 153 22.36 120 17.54 
12 477 207 401 58.63 150 21.92 111 16.22 
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stocks earn negative returns. About 59% of the stocks with a sell rating underperform 
the benchmark by at least 10%, which is the minimum percentage underperformance 
required by the brokerage firms to define a sell recommendation. Only 16% of these 
stocks outperform the benchmark by an extreme +20%. 
 
In general terms, according to the expected underperformance/outperformance column 
in table 7-12, new sell recommendations perform more closely to analyst expectations 
than their new buy counterparts 12 months after the change in recommendation. This is 
further substantiated by the fact that the percentage of sell stocks outperforming by an 
extreme 20% is far lower than the equivalent percentage of underperformance by new 
buys. 
 
7.4.1 Discussion and summary 
There are two assumptions made in the performance evaluation analysis. Firstly, it is 
assumed that investors respond quickly and rationally to the information conveyed by 
analysts about changes in stock recommendations and target prices. However, this 
information takes a long time (i.e., possibly one year) to be fully assimilated by the 
market in the case of bad news (new sell recommendations and target price falls). 
Secondly, analysts recommend ‘buy’ for a stock when they feel the stock is underpriced 
by the market place (Stickel, 1995) and the investor would expect the market return to 
be above normal for that particular stock. Conversely, for the ‘sell’ recommendations it 
is expected that the investor will earn below the normal rate of return.  
 
The empirical evidence from the analysis of changes in stock recommendations (table 7-
1) suggests that during the month in which the stock recommendations are changed to a 
new buy or new sell category, there is a significant market reaction. These findings are 
consistent with the interpretation that overall, investors find analysts’ changes in stock 
recommendations (e.g. Stickel, 1995; Womack, 1996; Ho and Harris, 1998; Barber et 
al., 2001 and Ryan and Taffler, 2005) particularly useful and have investment value. In 
the same manner, the significant market reaction to changes in target prices (table 7-7) 
supports the findings of Brav and Lehavy (2003) that capital market participants 
perceive analyst price targets as valuable. The magnitude of outperformance is higher 
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for increased target prices than for new buy recommendations in month 0 but over the 
12 month period, the new buy recommendations accrue higher cumulative return 
(7.94% vs. 3.72%) than increased target prices. On the other hand, the extent of 
underreaction is higher for new sells than for decreased target prices in month 0 and 
over the 12 month period. 
 
The stock market reacts significantly and positively to new buy recommendations and 
increased target prices only in the month that the recommendations or target prices are 
changed.  Conversely, the market reacts significantly and negatively to the stocks that 
receive sell ratings and to the ones with decreased target prices, both in the month that 
the change is effected and in the subsequent months up to month 12. The market 
reaction to new sell and decreased target prices exhibits a post recommendation stock 
price drift which lasts for up to 12 months subsequent to the recommendation change. 
As is shown by the extant literature (e.g., Ryan and Taffler, 2005) the price reaction to 
new sell recommendations is greater than to new buy recommendations. On the other 
hand, there is no drift associated with new buy recommendations. 
 
New buy recommendations outperform the benchmark regardless of the market 
condition. However, the 12 month abnormal returns are significantly higher during the 
bull market than during the bear market. On the other hand, sell recommendations 
generally underperform the benchmark as expected and during both the bull and the 
bear markets and the performance of sells exhibit post-recommendations drift which is 
more prevalent during bull market than during bear market. New buy recommendations 
accrue a higher return over the 12 month period prior to the implementation of NASD 
2711 and not after. The abnormal returns earned by stock awarded new sell status are 
not significantly different before or after the implementation of NASD 2711. 
 
The 12 month outperformance of stocks with increased target price is higher during the 
bull market than during the bear market. On the other hand the 12 month return for 
decreased target price is higher during the bear market. The 12 month abnormal return 
is significantly positive prior to the implementation of NASD 2711, and negative and 
not significant after the implementation. There is no significant change in the overall 
 115
market reaction of the market to decreased target prices either before or after the 
implementation of NASD 2711. 
 
Generally, the reaction of the market to changes in stock recommendations and target 
prices is as expected, i.e., overall new buy recommendations and stocks with increased 
target prices outperform the benchmark (in the short-term), whereas sell 
recommendations and decreased target prices underperform the benchmark. However, 
in each one of these groups, there are some stocks which perform in an extreme 
opposite direction to the one expected.  
 
Results show that 62% (1378) of the new buy stocks in my sample outperform the 
benchmark in the month that the recommendation is changed. By the 12th month, only 
44% (991) have outperformed the benchmark over the 12 month period, while 56% 
(1,220) actually underperform the benchmark. These results show that, in general, 
positive returns from a change of recommendation to a new buy are short-lived and last 
only for a few months. Of the 56% that underperform, 34% (759) underperformed the 
benchmark by at least -20 % by the 12th month.  
 
Conversely, 64% (435) of new sell recommendations underperform the benchmark in 
the month of the recommendation change, and that percentage increases to 70% over the 
12 month period, indicating that stocks which receive a sell recommendation continue 
to underperform over the following 12 month period. Only 16% (111) of new sell stocks 
outperform the benchmark by at least +20% by month 12. 
 
This research study aims to assess the reasons why stocks that are awarded buy (sell) 
ratings underperform (outperform) the relevant benchmark over the 12 month period 
following the recommendation change. In this chapter, I find that a large percentage of 
new buy recommendations do not perform as expected, while relatively few sell 
recommendations outperform. Barber et al., (2004) posit that at least part of the 
underperformance of investment bank buy recommendations is due to a reluctance by 
analysts to downgrade stocks whose prospects dimmed during the bear market of 2000-
2002. This study goes further in seeking to establish which other factors explain this 
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degree of underperformance in buy recommendations and outperformance in sell 
recommendations. Chapter 8 explores the factors that are associated with analysts’ 
nonconforming stock recommendations using binary logistic regression analysis. 
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Chapter 8 Experimental design and empirical results 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter seeks to establish the factors that play a major role in influencing analysts 
to issue buy/sell recommendations which lack market impact, i.e., buys (sells) that 
underperform (outperform) the benchmark. Only new buys/sells 
underperforming/outperforming the benchmark by extreme values of 20% and above 
are analysed. Section 7.4 provides justification for using extreme values only. 
 
This chapter also sets out to predict the odds/probability of analysts issuing 
nonconforming buy (sell) recommendations using a specified set of predictors. Given 
the recent findings (e.g., Brav and Lehavy, 2003) that target prices have significant 
information content, in a further analysis, I test whether the factors that impact on the 
stock ratings differ from those that affect target prices. Knowing whether the two are 
influenced by the same factors is important because it will enable investors to work with 
both signals appropriately.  
 
The chapter is organised as follows: Section 8.2 presents the characteristics of 
nonconforming new buy (sell) recommendations.  Section 8.3 discusses factors which 
differentiate between nonconforming new buy and new sell recommendations. Section 
8.4 discusses the important determinants of analyst target prices and section 8.5 
summarises and discusses the chapter. 
 
8.2 Characteristics of the nonconforming buy and sell recommendations 
Of the 1,220 new buy stocks that underperformed their respective benchmark, 34% 
(759) actually underperformed the benchmark by at least -20% by the 12th month. 
However, only 261 (34%) of these stocks have an accompanying research report 
available. On the other hand, about 207 (30%) new sell stocks outperformed their 
respective benchmark 12 months after the recommendations were downgraded to a sell 
rating. Of those, about 111 (16%) outperformed the benchmark by at least +20%. 
Research reports are available for only 10% of these sell recommendations and are 
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spread throughout the sample period. All available research reports are obtained from 
the Investext plus database.  
 
OPTIMISM, CERTAINTY and ACTIVITY which serve as proxies for psychological 
biases (overconfidence and representativeness biases) are calculated from the research 
reports written by analysts to justify their recommendations. These textual variables are 
included in the analysis because in their recent study, Fogarty and Rogers (2005) argue 
that we can understand analysts and their work better if we do not just analyse the 
numerical values in their reports, but we also analyse the textual data in their reports. In 
their study, they conclude that analysts’ stock recommendations are characterised by 
bias, skew and lack of science. 
 
TGTPRCE_CHNG, a variable which measures the percentage change in the analyst 
projected target price and INVEST_RELATE, a variable measuring the relationship 
between brokerage houses and firms are also obtained from the same research reports 
that provide scores for OPTIMISM, CERTAINTY and ACTIVITY. If 
TGTPRCE_CHNG information is missing from the research reports, such information 
is obtained from First Call database. PRICE_MOM, FIRM_SIZE and BTOM values are 
calculated from data obtained from the Centre for Security Prices (CRSP) database and 
Compustat while ANALY_FOLL is taken from IBES. 
 
Table 8-1 shows statistics for the main variables used in this part of the analysis. Results 
show that firms that are awarded new sell recommendations have smaller market 
capitalisation (mean FIRM_SIZE = $3,195 million) compared to their new buy 
counterparts (mean FIRM_SIZE = $11,816 million) with the mean difference of 94%, 
significant at 0.01% level. The new sell stocks generally have not performed well in the 
past (mean PRICE_MOM = -0.014) compared with new buys (mean PRICE_MOM = 
0.018) and the mean difference between the two is 3.3%, significant at 0.01%. Not 
surprisingly, the target price for these new sell stocks is predicted to fall significantly 
(mean TGTPRCE_CHNG = -0.140). These stocks also have higher book-to-market 
(mean BTOM = 0.995) and as such may be classified as value stocks whereas new buys 
stocks have low book-to-market (mean BTOM = 0.368) and may be classified as 
glamour stocks.  The mean number of analysts following the new sell stock (mean 
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ANALY_FOLL = 24) is lower than the number following new buy stocks (mean 
ANALY_FOLL = 29). The mean difference for analysts following nonconforming new 
buy recommendations and nonconforming new sell recommendations is significant at 
0.01% level. As expected the language used by investment analysts to justify their 
research reports is significantly more optimistic for new buys than is the case for new 
sells. However, there is no significant difference in the language indicating 
CERTAINTY and ACTIVITY between the nonconforming new buy and new sell 
recommendations. The mean for corporate relationships (INVEST_RELATE) is higher 
for new buys than it is for new sells (0.95 compared to 0.73) and the mean difference is 
significant at 5% level. 
 
The kurtosis for variables ACTIVITY, FIRM_SIZE and TGTPRCE_CHNG for 
nonconforming new buy recommendations are severely peaked compared to their 
nonconforming new sell recommendations equivalents. These same variables are also 
highly positively skewed (except ACTIVITY which is negatively skewed) compared 
their nonconforming new sell counterparts. 
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a Variable definitions 
OPTIMISMj,t           =  is a content analysis ( Diction score) variable indicating endorsement of 
some person,  group, concept or event or highlighting their positive 
entailments as captured in the language used  by the analyst when changing 
firm j’s stock rating. This variable serves as a proxy for analyst 
overconfidence; 
  
CERTAINTYj,t        =  is a content analysis ( Diction score) variable indicating resoluteness, 
inflexibility and completeness in the language used by an analyst when 
changing firm j’s stock rating. This variable serves as a proxy for analyst 
overconfidence; 
 
ACTIVITYj,t            = is the content analysis (Diction score) variable indicating movement, change 
and the implementation of ideas and the avoidance of inertia as captured in 
the language used by an analyst when changing firm j’s stock rating. This 
variable serves as proxy for analysts’ representativeness bias; 
 
PRICE_MOM j,t-1     = is firm j’s  one year actual percentage change in stock price over year t 
computed as stock price at time t/stock price at time t-1  * 100; 
 
FIRM_SIZE (log)j,t-1= is firm size, measured using the natural logarithm of the market value of 
equity for firm j at the end of the year preceding the change of 
recommendation in million dollars; 
 
FIRM_SIZE (raw)j,t-   1 = is firm size in million dollars, measured as a the market value of equity for 
firm j at the end of the year preceding the change of recommendation; 
 
 
BTOM j,t-1                           = is firm j’s book value per share divided by market value of equity at the end 
of the year preceding the change in recommendation in million dollars; 
 
ANALY_FOLL j,t-1     = is the number of analysts following (for all brokerage firms available on 
IBES) the firm in the calendar year that firm j’s recommendation changed; 
 
INVEST_RELATE j,t = is a variable that takes a value of 0 if there is no relationship between the 
analyst’s brokerage firm and the firm, 1 if the brokerage is an underwriter of 
the firm or has current holdings in the firm, and 2 if the brokerage is both an 
underwriter and has current holdings. 
 
TGTPRCE_CHNG j,t   = is the percentage change in the analyst projected target price for firm j 
computed as [(price target at time t / price target at time t – 1 – 1] 
 
 
8.3 Factors which differentiate between nonconforming new buy and new sell 
recommendations 
In chapter 3, I stated seven null hypotheses. In general terms, all these hypotheses are 
testing whether overconfidence (as measured by Diction scores OPTIMISM and 
CERTAINTY) and representativeness bias (as measured by ACTIVITY, 
PRICE_MOM, FIRM_SIZE, BTOM, and TGTPRCE_CHNG) and corporate 
relationship between investment banks and firms have any impact on the type of 
nonconforming stock recommendation that analysts issue.  
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To determine the factors that differentiate between the nonconforming new buy and 
new sell recommendations, I fit a logistic regression model using the maximum 
likelihood estimation to estimate the model parameters (β ). In this model, the 
dependent variable is RATING and the independent variables are CERTAINTY, 
ACTIVITY, PRICE_MOM, FIRM_SIZE, BTOM, TGTPRCE_CHNG 
INVEST_RELATE while ANALY_FOLL is a control variable. RATING is defined 
as the nonconforming buy or sell stock rating awarded by an analyst for firm j on the 
date of the recommendation change. RATING equals 1 if analysts issue new buy 
recommendations which underperform their respective reference portfolio 
benchmarks by at least -20% and 0 if new sells are issued that outperform their 
respective reference portfolio benchmark by at least +20%. The model is specified in 
equation 8-1 as follows: 
 RATING = LOGIT (π ) = LOG 



−π
π
1
  
                                          = α  + β 1 OPTIMISMj,t +β 2  CERTAINTYj,t + β 3 ACTIVITYj,t       
                              +β 4PRICE_MOMj,t-1+ β 5FIRM_SIZE j,t-1  + β 6BTOM j,t-1 
                                                 + β 6 TGTPRCE_CHNG j,t-1 +β 7 ANALY_FOLL j,t  
                                                        + β 8 INVEST_RELATE j,t                        
                                                                                                                                                                                     (8-1)                 
 
Table 8-2 presents the Pearson’s correlation matrix for the model variables. Pearson 
correlations between OPTIMISM and CERTAINTY as well as between OPTIMISM 
and FIRM_SIZE are positive and highly significant.  PRICE_MOM has a negative 
and highly significant relationship with BTOM and a positive and a significant 
relationship with TGTPRCE_CHNG. FIRM_SIZE has a negative and significant 
relationship with BTOM and a positive and significant relationship with 
ANALY_FOLL. BTOM has a negative and significant relationship with 
ANALY_FOLL and TGTPRCE_CHNG while the correlation between 
ANALY_FOLL and TGTPRCE_CHNG is positive and significant. 
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8.3.1 Logistic regression model 1 fitting RATING against model variables and 
control variable  
The primary empirical question of this study is whether psychological biases 
(overconfidence bias and representativeness biases) play a major role in influencing 
analysts to issue stock recommendations which perform contradictory to expectations in 
addition to corporate relationships. Table 8.3 reports the logistic regression model 
results. OPTIMISM is positive and significant (p<0.10, chi-square = 2.75) in explaining 
the type of stock rating analysts issue. This finding is inconsistent with null hypothesis 
H10 that the tone of language used by analysts in the research reports they prepare to 
justify their stock ratings is not optimistic. The significance of OPTIMISM suggests that 
analysts’ overconfidence makes them issue stock ratings which eventually perform 
contradictory to expectations. The odds ratio of 1.264 indicates that the odds will 
increase (greater chance of buy recommendations which significantly underperform the 
respective benchmark) by a factor of 1.264 for every unit increase in OPTIMISM if all 
other variables are held constant. 
 
Below is an example of a statement extracted from the research report with the highest 
OPTIMISM score. Interestingly, in this illustration, the analyst’s optimism seems to be 
heightened by the fact that an analyst has talked to the firm’s CEO. Fogarty and Rogers 
(2005) equate analysts’ dependence on the information from the CEO to lack of science 
on the part of analysts: 
 
…….. We recently met with Chairman and CEO, A.F. Petrocelli to discuss his long-
term strategy for Prime.  We think a strategy is beginning to crystallize.  We believe 
Mr. Petrocelli plans to streamline Prime, ultimately shedding both Homegate and 
Wellesley if it can be done at reasonable values.  We believe the sale of the full-service 
division is the first step in that direction, Homegate and Wellesley could take a while.  
Prime is also in the process of marketing its Frenchman’s Reef property in Saint 
Thomas with the goal of selling the property this year.  The end game, in our view, 
would be a pure-play on AmeriSuites with paired down real estate holdings and a 
smaller balance sheet.  Based on our discussions with Mr. Petrocelli, he remains 
committed to growing AmeriSuites. Management plans to carefully invest in very 
selective new development and focus most of its capital spending on seeding the 
AmeriSuites franchise system.  Ongoing investment in AmeriSuites makes sense, in 
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our view, because it is a proven product from a real estate standpoint and because 
further unit growth should continue to boost the value of the brand.  In our opinion, Mr. 
Petrocelli is not necessarily committed to selling the whole company if the right offer 
does not come along.  We view "the right" offer as being somewhere in the vicinity of 
our 12-month price target of $15 per share.  Prime has a book value of just under $12 
per share.  We think management is committed to doing the right thing for 
shareholders.  Mr. Petrocelli now owns approximately 1 million shares of Prime 
Hospitality stock (Deutsche Bank, January 15, 1999). 
 
The parameter estimate for price momentum (PRICE_MOM) is positive and significant 
at p<0.001. This indicates that the probability that analysts will issue a buy 
recommendation that underperforms the benchmark is higher for the stocks that have 
performed relatively well in the past. This is because analysts prefer stocks that exhibit 
good previous performance (Stickel, 2000; Jegadeesh et al., 2004).  This finding is 
inconsistent with null hypothesis H20 that the coefficient of price momentum is negative 
and insignificant in predicting the type of stock recommendation that analyst issues. The 
fact that analysts use stocks’ past performance as being representative of stocks’ future 
performance is indicative of analysts’ representativeness bias. 
 
The parameter estimates for FIRM_SIZE is positive and significant at p<0.05, 
suggesting that the larger the firm the more the likelihood that analysts will issue a 
nonconforming buy recommendation on the stock, either because analysts associate size 
of the firm with good performance or because there are other benefits that analysts 
derive when they issue buy ratings on large market capitalisation stocks. The size effect 
is well documented in the literature in terms of explaining abnormal returns. But these 
results show that size is also essential in explaining the analysts’ nonconforming buy 
and sell recommendations. The odds ratio shows that an increase in the size of the firm 
by one unit increases the probability of analyst issuing a nonconforming new buy 
recommendation by a factor of 2.  This finding is inconsistent with null hypothesis H40 
that the size of the firm does not have any significant impact on the type of stock 
recommendation that analysts issue on the stock. This finding therefore supports the 
idea that analysts see FIRM_SIZE as representative (representativeness bias) of stocks’ 
future performance.  
 
 127
Table 8-3  Determinants of new buy/sell recommendations using all model variables and control 
variables 
  
This table presents the logit regression on all model and control variables. The logit regression is as shown in Eq.(8-
1). The dependent variable is the stock rating. For each variable included in Eq.(8-1) the predicted sign, coefficient 
estimate, Wald Chi-square and odds ratio (EXP (B)) are presented in columns 2-5 respectively. R-Square, likelihood 
ratio and number of observations the regression is provided below the variables.  
 
Independent 
variable 
Predicted 
sign for buys 
Parameter 
Estimates 
Wald 
Chi-square 
EXP (B) 
Intercept ? -3.112     0.388 - 
OPTIMISM + 0.107           2.758* 1.114 
CERTAINTY + -0.053     0.534 0.948 
ACTIVITY - -0.015     0.179 0.985 
PRICE_MOM + 12.217     13.50**** >999.999 
FIRM_SIZE + 0.331     3.867** 1.938 
BTOM - -0.508           3.102* 1.059 
ANALY_FOLL + -0.009     0.334 1.024 
INVEST_RELATE + 0.592     6.113*** 2.892 
TGTPRCE_CHNG + 1.926         11.609**** 20.79 
R2  
Likelihood ratio 
Chi-square 
N 
     19% 
     64.57**** 
 
         332 
   
Note: The Wald statistics are distributed Chi-square with 1 degree of freedom 
****,***, **, and * denote significance at 0.1% 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively 
 
The parameter estimate for BTOM is negative as expected and significant at P<0.01. 
This result suggests that buy recommendations which lack appropriate market impact 
are generally glamour stocks. The chances of obtaining a nonconforming buy 
recommendation decreases when book-to-market increases. This finding is inconsistent 
with null hypothesis H50 that the firm’s book-to-market does not have any significant 
impact on the type of stock recommendation that analysts issue on the stock. Also, this 
finding implies that, according to financial analysts, book-to market is representative of 
future performance of the stock. 
 
The parameter estimate for TGTPRCE_CHNG is statistically significant at p<0.001 
which suggests that there is a strong relationship between target price and the type of 
recommendation that analysts issue on the stock. Thus, when the target price on a stock 
increases (decreases) then the probability (odd ratio = 20.790) that analysts will issue a 
nonconforming buy (sell) recommendation increases. Although the role of the target 
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price is not clear, particularly when issued together with stock recommendations, from 
this result, the conjecture is that financial analysts view target prices as being 
representative of what type of stock recommendations to issue. The finding is 
inconsistent with null hypothesis H60 that target price is not significantly important in 
predicting whether analysts will issue stock recommendations that lack market impact. 
 
INVEST_RELATE looks at whether a corporate finance relationship between 
investment bank and firm has any bearing on the type of recommendation that analysts 
issue. The parameter estimate for INVEST_RELATE is positive, as expected, and 
significant at p< 0.01. These results are consistent with Lin and McNichols (1998), 
Michaely and Womack (1999), Barber et al., (2004) and Cliff (2004) that analysts’ tend 
to issue more favourable recommendations on the stocks of firms with which their 
employer investment banks have a relationship. The probability that analysts will issue 
a nonconforming buy recommendation if there is a corporate finance relationship 
between brokerage house and firm is 2.89. Thus, the existing relationship between 
brokerage house and firm has a significant impact on the type of recommendation that 
analysts issue. 
 
The log-likelihood ratio chi-square which is aimed at testing the joint effect of all model 
variables is 64.573, significant at p<0.001 suggesting that the model variables as a 
group play a significant role in the type of stock recommendation that analysts issue, 
particularly in differentiating buy and sell recommendations that do not perform as 
expected. The significant log-likelihood ratio chi-square suggests a significant logistic 
model. 
 
Table 8-3 presents logistic regression results when target price is excluded as an 
independent variable. The log-likelihood ratio chi-square of 5.883 (p = 0.1%) shows 
that even without target price, the model variables as a group still play a significant role  
in the type of stock recommendation that  financial analysts issue. When target price is 
excluded from the model, however, OPTIMISM is the only variable that becomes 
insignificant while all the other variables that are significant in the previous model still  
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Table 8-4  Determinants of new buy/sell recommendations using model variables (excluding target 
price) and control variables  
 
This table presents the logit regression on model variables (excluding target price) and control variables. The logit 
regression is as shown in Eq.(8-1). The dependent variable is the stock rating. For each variable included in Eq.(8-1) 
the predicted sign, coefficient estimate, Wald Chi-square and odds ratio (EXP (B) are presented in column 2-5 
respectively. R-Square, likelihood ratio and number of observations the regression is provided below the variables.  
 
Independent 
variable 
Predicted 
sign for buys 
Parameter 
Estimates 
Wald 
Chi-Square 
EXP (B) 
Intercept ? -1.398      0.092 - 
OPTIMISM + 0.085      1.941 1.089 
CERTAINTY + -0.032      0.218 0.968 
ACTIVITY - -0.045      1.471 0.956 
PRICE_MOM + 12.843 18.878**** >999.999 
FIRM_SIZE + 0.311 3.935** 1.366 
BTOM - -0.734 7.073**** 0.480 
ANALY_FOLL + -0.005      0.104 0.995 
INVEST_RELATE + 0.426      3.990** 1.532 
R2  
Likelihood ratio 
Chi-square 
N 
      17% 
      58.83**** 
 
               332 
   
Note: The Wald statistics are distributed chi-square with 1 degree of freedom 
****,***, **, and * denote significance at 0.1% 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively 
 
remain significant. It could be argued that OPTIMISM becomes insignificant when 
target price is taken out of the model because target price elevates the optimism in the 
language that analysts write to justify their recommendations. 
 
8.4  Can the important determinants of stock ratings help us explain target prices as 
well? 
Because of the strong positive relationship that exists between stock ratings and target 
prices, and the fact that two signals are often used together, I set out to test whether the 
same factors that explain nonconforming buy (sell) recommendations are also 
significant determinants of analysts’ target prices issued concurrently with these stock 
ratings. I fit the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model where 
TGTPRCE_CHNG is a dependent variable and OPTIMISM, CERTAINTY, 
ACTIVITY, PRICE_MOM, FIRM_SIZE, BTOM, ANALY_FOLL, INVEST_RELATE 
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and RATING are independent variables.  ANALY_FOLL is a control variable. The 
model is specified in equation 8-2 as follows: 
 
 TGTPRCE_CHNG = α  + β 1 OPTIMISMj,t  +β 2   CERTAINTYj,t  +β 3 ACTIVITYj,t   
                                 +β 4PRICE_MOMj,t-1+ β 5FIRM_SIZE j,t-1  + β 6BTOM j,t-1  
                                 + β 7 ANALY_FOLL j,t  + β 8 INVEST_RELATE j,t  + RATING 
          (8-2) 
 
All the variables in equation 8-2 are defined as in equation 8-1. Table 8-5 presents my 
OLS results when TGTPRCE_CHNG is a dependent variable. The results show that 
PRICE_MOM is positive and statistically significant (t = 4.24, p<0.001). This finding 
indicates that the estimation of the stocks’ target price is highly influenced by the 
previous performance of the stock just as in the case of the stock rating. That is, firms 
that have performed well in the past obtain increased target prices and vice versa. This 
finding is interpreted as showing that previous stock performance is viewed as being 
representative (representativeness bias) of what the stocks’ target price should be.  
 
Not surprisingly, RATING, which is a dummy variable measuring the type of 
recommendation an analyst issues is significant (t = 2.27, p<0.05). This result indicates 
that there is a strong relationship between target price and stock recommendations and 
that in this sample, target prices serve to justify the stock recommendations that 
financial analysts issue (Bradshaw 2002).  The rest of the variables in this model are 
insignificant.   
 
The fact that INVEST_ RELATE is significant in predicting the type of stock 
recommendations and not significant in predicting TGTPRCE_CHNG may be 
interpreted as suggesting that stock recommendations may be related to the investment 
baking relationships whereas the analysts’ true view resides in the target price which 
can’t be readily interpreted by the finance director.  The total variance explained (R-
square) is 10%. 
 
 
 131
Table 8-5  Determination of factors which influence target prices 
 
This table presents the ordinary least squares multiple regression results. The dependent variable is 
TGR_REV and all other model variables and control variables are independent variables. For each 
variable included in Eq.(8-2) the predicted sign, coefficient estimate and t-statistics are presented in 
columns 2-4 respectively. R-square and number of observations in the regression are provided below 
the variables. 
 
Independent variable 
 
Predicted sign for 
buys 
Parameter 
Estimates 
t-statistics 
Intercept ? -1.183          -1.20 
OPTIMISM + 0.005            0.43 
CERTAINTY + 0.015             1.00 
ACTIVITY - 0.002             0.49 
PRICE_MOM + 2.100 3.48**** 
FIRM_SIZE + -0.021           -0.72 
BTOM - -0.040            -0.81 
INVEST_RELATE + -0.004            -0.11 
RATING12 + 0.191                 2.27** 
ANAL_FOLL + 0.004             1.47 
R2  
N= 
  10% 
332                       
  
  ****,***, **, and * denote significance at 0.1% 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 When RATING is excluded from the model. PRICE_MOM becomes the only significant variable in 
predicting target price  
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8.5 Summary of results and discussion 
In this chapter, I set out to predict the factors that may be influencing investment 
analysts to issue stock ratings (buy/sell) which are associated with significantly 
contradictory performance. This is done by fitting a logistic regression model where 
RATING in a dependent variable and OPTIMISM, CERTAINTY, ACTIVITY, 
PRICE_MOM, FIRM_SIZE, BTOM, TGTPRCE_CHNG and INVEST_RELATE are 
independent variables. ANALY_FOLL is the only control variable in the model. 
 
The model shows that OPTIMISM, PRICE_MOM, FIRM_SIZE, BTOM, 
TGTPRCE_CHNG and INVEST_RELATE are individually statistically significant in 
explaining the nonconforming buy (sell) recommendations. The results show that an 
increase in OPTIMISM increases the chance of analysts issuing new buy 
recommendations for stocks which subsequently underperform their respective 
benchmarks. The results suggest that analysts believe they have superior investment 
abilities and tend to overestimate the likely performance of the stocks they follow. 
Various studies such as Odean (1998b); Barber and Odean (2001) have attested to 
investors’ overconfidence. I provide some evidence of analyst behaviour consistent with 
this.  
 
The previous performance of the firm is very important in influencing analysts’ stock 
ratings. When momentum is increased slightly, the chance of having a buy 
recommendation which underperforms the benchmark increases hugely. This finding is 
consistent with the existing literature in that analysts have incentives to give buy 
recommendations to stocks with recent positive relative price momentum and good 
financial characteristics following from documented momentum pricing anomalies and 
because they are actionable ideas that generate trading commissions (Stickel, 2000). 
Analysts appear to associate good previous stock performance with good future stock 
performance and vice versa. Thus analysts have representativeness bias because they view 
the past is being representative of the future.   
 
Cateris paribus, larger market capitalisation stocks have a higher probability of being 
issued with buy recommendations which eventually underperform their respective 
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benchmarks. This indicates that analysts associate larger firms with positive 
recommendations and smaller firms with negative recommendations (representativeness 
bias). It may also be possible that there are other benefits that analysts derive when they 
issue a buy rating on large market capitalisation stocks. 
 
Buy recommendations which lack appropriate market impact are generally glamour 
stocks. This results show that analysts associate firms which have high growth rate with 
good performance. Using the growth status of the company for making a decision about 
the type of recommendation to issue is another example of analysts’ representativeness 
bias.  
 
As is expected, the variable measuring the relationship between the brokerage firm and 
the company is important in determining the type of recommendation issued. Thus, 
companies which have some corporate finance relation with the investment bank are 
more likely to receive nonconforming buy recommendations. These results confirm the 
concern that analysts make “buy” and “strong buy” recommendations for stocks which 
were not necessarily undervalued but were recommended because their investment bank 
employers were seeking profitable corporate finance relationships with them. Analysts 
would also be rewarded for their part in promoting these deals via additional 
compensation (Financial Times, April 10, 2002).  
 
As is documented in the literature, there is a close link between stock ratings and target 
prices. It is therefore, not surprising that an associated increase in target price 
significantly increases the likelihood of analysts issuing underperforming new buy 
recommendations. This strong relationship between target price and stock 
recommendation supports the suggestion by Bradshaw (2002) that target prices that are 
issued concurrent with stock recommendations serve to justify the type of 
recommendation that the analyst issues. Thus target price is representative of the type of 
stock recommendation that analysts issue. 
 
In a further analysis, I test whether the same factors that are posited to explain 
nonconforming buy (sell) recommendations also drive the target price. The results show 
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that previous firm performance (PRICE_MOM) and the type of stock recommendation 
issues (RATING) are important factors in explaining the target prices. These results, 
again, provide me with a classic example of analysts’ representativeness bias. Thus, 
their decision to increase or decrease the target price is dependent on the previous 
performance of the firm and on what the analysts perceive as the appropriate stock 
rating. When RATING is excluded from the model, PRICE_MOM remains the only 
significant variable in explaining target prices. 
 
In summary, this chapter shows that the factors that differentiate between 
nonconforming new buy and new sell recommendations are optimism (OPTIMISM), 
momentum (PRICE_MOM), market capitalisation (FIRM_SIZE), book-to-market 
(BTOM), target price (TGTPRCE_CHNG) and the existing relationship between the 
firm and its employer brokerage firm (INVEST_RELATE). Optimism serves as a proxy 
for psychological bias - overconfidence. Overconfidence is defined as overestimating 
what one can do compared to what objective circumstances would warrant. The other 
five factors are meant to measure representativeness bias and the results support the 
hypotheses that analysts’ nonconforming stock recommendations are dependent on the 
previous stock performance, on the size of the firm, on the firm’s book-to-market, on 
the current target price level and on the relationship between the brokerage house and 
the firm. 
 
The results also show that there is a close link between target price and the type of 
rating that analysts award to stocks. The results are interpreted as showing that target 
prices serve to justify the type of stock recommendations that analysts issue. But on the 
other hand, the role of target prices may be viewed as a way for analysts to ameliorate 
the effects of their overly optimistic reports, or part of the sales hype used to peddle 
stocks (Asquith, et al., 2005). This is more so because the findings of other authors like 
Cornel (2001) and Bradshaw (2004) suggest that change in analyst recommendations 
does not seem to depend on valuation models.  
 
In general terms this chapter shows that in as far as nonconforming stock 
recommendations are concerned, investors tend to recognise the analysts’ conflicts of 
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interest as well as other factors that may be influencing their stock recommendations 
and rationally discount their opinions. Thus, investors do not necessarily take analysts 
recommendations at face value as presumed by the Global Settlement (Agrawal and 
Chen, 2005), hence the observed performance which is contrary to the one expected. 
 
 In the next chapter, I carry-out additional test of analysts’ representativeness bias over 
the sample period and in different sub-periods using a larger sample size compared to 
the sample size used in this chapter. 
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Chapter 9 Further tests 
9.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I confirmed the important factors that differentiate between 
nonconforming new buy and new sell recommendations using both report-based 
(OPTIMISM, CERTAINTY, ACTIVITY, TGTPRCE_CHNG and INVEST_RELATE) 
and market-based factors (PRICE MOM, FIRM_SIZE, BTOM and ANALY_FOLL). In 
this chapter I carry out further tests of my underlying hypotheses relating to analysts’ 
representativeness bias but using momentum, size and book-to-market only (null 
hypotheses 3, 4 and 5 respectively in chapter 3). Looking at the effect of only these 
factors and excluding other factors, particularly INVEST_RELATE, enables me to 
establish whether authorities are addressing the real issues by passing laws and 
implementing regulations which address the problem of bias arising from corporate 
finance relationships between firms and investment banks, or should they also look into 
the problem of analysts’ psychological bias which, may, in fact, be difficult to regulate. 
The chapter investigates analysts’ representativeness bias underlying analysts’ 
nonconforming recommendations in the whole sample period, during the bull and the 
bear markets, and before and after the implementations of Rule NASD 2711. 
 
In chapter 8, the samples of new buy (sell) recommendations consist only of 
underperforming new buys and outperforming new sells for which analysts’ research 
reports are available from the IBES database.  In this chapter, my samples consist of all 
new buy stocks which underperform the relevant benchmarks by at least <-20% and all 
new sell stocks that outperform the relevant benchmarks by at least >+20%. Because 
there is no restriction imposed by the availability of analysts’ research reports, my 
samples are larger, i.e., 1,349 new buys and 429 new sells, compared to the samples in 
the previous chapter. 
 
The chapter is organised as follows: Section 9.2 discusses the characteristics of  all 
conforming and nonconforming new buy and new sell recommendations. Section 9.3 
presents the important factors differentiating groups of conforming and nonconforming 
new buy and new sell recommendations. Section 9.4 discusses the important factors 
differentiating groups of conforming and nonconforming of new buy and new sell 
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recommendations during the bull and the bear markets as well as before and after the 
implementation of NASD 2711. Section 9.5 summarises and concludes the chapter. 
 
9.2 Characteristics of samples of nonconforming new buy and sell 
recommendations 
Table 9-1 presents descriptive statistics for the complete samples of nonconforming new 
buy (sell) recommendations. The underperforming new buy recommendations generally 
performed better in the past (mean PRICE_MOM = 0.011) compared to outperforming 
new sell recommendations (mean PRICE_MOM = -0.013) with the mean difference 
significant at the 0.1% level. Also, the underperforming new buy recommendations 
have larger market capitalisation (mean FIRM_SIZE = $9,388 million), have a lower 
book-to-market (mean BTOM = 0.484) and have a stronger analyst following base 
(mean ANALY_FOLL = 30.065) compared to their sell counterparts whose mean 
FIRM_SIZE = $5,276 million, mean BTOM = 0.827 and mean ANALY_FOLL = 
26.526. The mean difference for all the variables is significant at the 0.1% level. In 
summary, underperforming buy stocks have most of the characteristics that the extant 
finance literature (e.g., Stickel, 2000) argues are associated with investment analysts 
awarding a buy rating to stock.  
 
9.3 Important factors differentiating nonconforming new buy and new sell 
recommendations 
In this section, I use a logit model approach to predict which measures of 
representativeness bias are significant in differentiating between nonconforming new 
buy and new sell recommendations. I fit a logit model which regresses the independent 
variables momentum (PRICE_MOM), size (FIRM_SIZE), book-to-market (BTOM), 
and analyst’s following (ANALY_FOLL) against the dependent variable RATING. 
ANALY_FOLL serves as a control variable. RATING equals 1 if an analyst issues a  
new buy recommendation which subsequently underperforms the benchmark by <- 20% 
and 0 if a new sell recommendation outperforms the benchmark by >+20%.  
13
8 
T
ab
le
 9
-1
  C
ha
ra
ct
er
is
tic
s o
f t
he
 c
on
fo
rm
in
g 
(n
on
co
nf
or
m
in
g)
 b
uy
 r
ec
om
m
en
da
tio
ns
 
Th
e 
ta
bl
e 
sh
ow
s s
ta
tis
tic
s o
n 
ch
ar
ac
te
ris
tic
s o
f c
on
fo
rm
in
g 
(n
on
co
nf
or
m
in
g)
 b
uy
 a
nd
 se
ll 
re
co
m
m
en
da
tio
ns
 th
at
 a
re
 is
su
ed
 b
et
w
ee
n 
Ja
nu
ar
y 
1,
 1
99
7 
an
d 
D
ec
em
be
r 3
1,
 2
00
2.
 C
ol
um
n 
1 
sh
ow
s t
he
 v
ar
ia
bl
es
 a
nd
 c
ol
um
ns
 2
- 9
 sh
ow
 th
e 
m
ea
n,
 1
st
 q
ua
rti
le
, m
ed
ia
n 
, 3
rd
 q
ua
rti
le
, s
ta
nd
ar
d 
de
vi
at
io
n,
 k
ur
to
si
s, 
 
sk
ew
ne
ss
,  
ex
tre
m
e 
va
lu
es
 a
nd
 m
ea
n 
di
ff
er
en
ce
 o
f c
on
fo
rm
in
g 
an
d 
no
nc
on
fo
rm
in
g 
ne
w
 b
uy
 a
nd
 n
ew
 se
ll 
st
oc
ks
. 
 
Pa
ne
l A
: c
ha
ra
ct
er
is
tic
s o
f n
on
co
nf
or
m
in
g 
(u
nd
er
pe
rf
or
m
in
g)
 n
ew
 b
uy
 re
co
m
m
en
da
tio
ns
 
 N
 =
 1
,3
49
 
         
Pa
ne
l B
: P
an
el
 B
: C
ha
ra
ct
er
is
tic
s o
f n
on
co
nf
or
m
in
g 
(o
ut
pe
rf
or
m
in
g)
 n
ew
 se
ll 
re
co
m
m
en
da
tio
ns
 
 N
 =
 4
29
 
         
**
**
, *
**
, *
*,
 a
nd
 *
 d
en
ot
e 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e 
at
 0
.1
%
, 1
%
, 5
%
, a
nd
 1
0%
 le
ve
ls
 re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y.
 
 
PR
IC
E_
M
O
M
 j,
t-1
   
   
   
= 
is
 fi
rm
 j’
s  
on
e 
ye
ar
 a
ct
ua
l c
ha
ng
e 
in
 st
oc
k 
pr
ic
e 
at
  t
im
e 
t c
om
pu
te
d 
as
  [
st
oc
k 
pr
ic
e 
at
 ti
m
e 
t /
st
oc
k 
pr
ic
e 
at
 ti
m
e 
 
  
t-1
 ) 
* 
10
0]
; 
FI
R
M
_S
IZ
E  
(lo
g)
j,t
-1
   
   
 =
 
is
 fi
rm
 si
ze
 in
 m
ill
io
n 
do
lla
rs
, m
ea
su
re
d 
us
in
g 
th
e 
na
tu
ra
l l
og
ar
ith
m
 o
f t
he
 m
ar
ke
t v
al
ue
 o
f e
qu
ity
 fo
r f
irm
 j 
at
 th
e 
en
d 
of
 th
e 
ye
ar
 p
re
ce
di
ng
 
   
   
   
   
   
 th
e 
ch
an
ge
 o
f r
ec
om
m
en
da
tio
n;
 
FI
R
M
_S
IZ
E  
(r
aw
) j,
t- 
 1
   =
 
is
 fi
rm
 si
ze
 in
 m
ill
io
n 
do
lla
rs
, m
ea
su
re
d 
as
 a
 th
e 
m
ar
ke
t v
al
ue
 o
f e
qu
ity
 fo
r f
irm
 j 
at
 th
e 
en
d 
of
 th
e 
ye
ar
 p
re
ce
di
ng
 th
e 
ch
an
ge
 o
f r
ec
om
m
en
da
tio
n;
 
B
TO
M
 j,
t-1
= 
is
 fi
rm
 j’
s b
oo
k 
va
lu
e 
pe
r s
ha
re
 d
iv
id
ed
 b
y 
m
ar
ke
t v
al
ue
 o
f e
qu
ity
 a
t t
he
 e
nd
 o
f t
he
 y
ea
r p
re
ce
di
ng
 th
e 
ch
an
ge
 in
 re
co
m
m
en
da
tio
n;
 
A
N
A
LY
_F
O
LL
 j,
t-1
   
   
   
 =
 
is
 th
e 
nu
m
be
r o
f a
na
ly
st
s f
ol
lo
w
in
g 
(f
or
 a
ll 
br
ok
er
ag
e 
fir
m
s a
va
ila
bl
e 
on
 IB
ES
) t
he
 fi
rm
 in
 th
e 
ye
ar
 th
at
 fi
rm
 j’
s r
ec
om
m
en
da
tio
n 
ar
e 
ch
an
ge
d 
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
ch
an
ge
 in
 re
co
m
m
en
da
tio
n.
 
Ex
tre
m
e 
va
lu
es
M
od
el
 V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
M
ea
n 
1(
a)
 
1s
t  q
ua
rti
le
 
M
ed
ia
n 
3r
d  q
ua
rti
le
 
St
an
da
rd
  
D
ev
ia
tio
n 
K
ur
to
si
s 
Sk
ew
ne
ss
 
Lo
w
es
t
H
ig
he
st
 
M
ea
n 
di
ff
er
en
ce
 
1(
a)
-1
(b
) 
PR
IC
E_
M
O
M
 
0.
01
1 
-0
.0
18
 
0.
00
9 
0.
03
7 
0.
05
5 
3.
64
3 
0.
61
7 
-0
.1
90
 
0.
34
24
 
0.
02
4*
**
* 
FI
R
M
_S
IZ
E 
(lo
g)
 
7.
65
9 
6.
50
2 
7.
52
3 
8.
61
6 
1.
63
6 
0.
01
7 
0.
37
3 
3.
61
2 
12
.7
47
 
 0
.4
12
**
**
 
FI
R
M
_S
IZ
E 
(r
aw
) 
9,
38
8 
66
6 
1,
85
1 
5,
52
2 
26
,2
94
 
48
.8
71
 
6.
10
7 
37
.0
64
 
34
2,
55
8 
 4
,1
12
**
**
 
B
TO
M
 
0.
48
4 
0.
13
4 
0.
30
9 
0.
57
9 
0.
68
0 
34
.4
25
 
4.
96
3 
0.
00
1 
7.
26
6 
-0
.3
43
**
**
 
A
N
A
LY
_F
O
LL
 
30
.0
65
 
19
.0
00
 
28
.0
00
 
39
.0
0 
15
.4
12
 
0.
47
8 
0.
77
2 
2 
88
 
 3
.5
38
**
**
 
Ex
tre
m
e 
va
lu
es
M
od
el
 V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
M
ea
n 
1(
b)
 
1s
t  q
ua
rti
le
 
M
ed
ia
n 
3r
d  q
ua
rti
le
 
St
an
da
rd
  
D
ev
ia
tio
n 
K
ur
to
si
s 
Sk
ew
ne
ss
 
Lo
w
es
t
hi
gh
es
t 
M
ea
n 
di
ff
er
en
ce
 
1(
a)
-1
(b
) 
PR
IC
E_
M
O
M
 
-0
.0
13
 
-0
.0
42
 
-0
.0
08
 
0.
01
5 
0.
05
4 
1.
52
63
 
0.
03
0 
-0
.1
90
 
0.
20
4 
0.
02
4*
**
* 
FI
R
M
_S
IZ
E 
(lo
g)
 
7.
24
7 
6.
31
1 
7.
11
1 
8.
20
6 
1.
58
1 
0.
07
2 
0.
21
44
 
2.
98
9 
11
.9
96
 
0.
41
2*
**
* 
FI
R
M
_S
IZ
E 
(r
aw
) 
5,
27
6 
55
0 
1,
22
5 
3,
66
6 
13
,8
86
 
60
.7
62
 
6.
79
2 
19
.8
81
 
16
2,
22
4 
 4
,1
12
**
**
 
B
TO
M
 
0.
82
7 
0.
22
4 
0.
45
6 
0.
79
2 
1.
35
2 
35
.8
77
 
5.
11
8 
0.
01
7 
14
.2
36
 
-0
.3
43
**
**
 
A
N
A
LY
_F
O
LL
 
26
.5
26
 
15
.0
00
 
25
.0
00
 
34
.0
00
 
14
.4
35
 
0.
74
0 
0.
87
2 
2 
84
 
 3
.5
38
**
**
 
139 
 
The following is the logistic regression model fitted:  
RATING = LOGIT (π ) = LOG 



−π
π
1
  
                                       = α  + β 1PRICE_MOMj,t- 1+ β 2FIRM_SIZE j,t-1   
                                                 + β 3BTOM j,t-1 +  β 4ANALY_FOLL j +ε  j,t            
                                                                                                                                                                                                                (9-1)     
                                                                     
where PRICE_MOM, FIRM_SIZE, BTOM and ANALY_FOLL are independent 
variables for firm j, β 1…… β 4 are the regression parameter estimates and ε  j,t  is the 
error term. Independent variables PRICE_MOM, FIRM_SIZE, BTOM and 
ANALY_FOLL included in the above model are as defined in section 8-2, table 8-1. 
The dependent variable RATING is a dummy variable indicating nonconforming new 
buy (sell) recommendations. 
 
Tables 9-2 reports the results of running the logit model for nonconforming new buy 
and new sell recommendations for the whole sample period. The results show that 
PRICE_MOM and BTOM are the two measures of representativeness bias which are 
individually significant in differentiating between new buy underperformers and new 
sell outperformers. The parameter estimates for PRICE_MOM and BTOM are 8.223 
and -0.290 respectively. Both are significant at p<0.1%. The significance of 
PRICE_MOM and BTOM is interpreted as indicating that the previous performance of 
the firm and firm’s growth status are viewed by analysts as being representative 
(representativeness bias) of what the future performance of the firm should be. The 
control variable ANALY_FOLL is also highly significant (p<0.1%) in predicting 
analysts’ nonconforming ratings which suggests that over the sample period, the 
number of analysts following the firm is also essential in predicting analysts’ 
nonconforming stock recommendations. Theoretically, ANALY_FOLL is linked to the 
size of the firm in that the larger the firm the more analysts there are following the 
firm’s stock. 
 
 
 
 140
 
Table 9-2   Factors that differentiate between nonconforming new buy and new sell 
recommendations 
 
This table presents the logit regression on the important factors which differentiate between 
nonconforming new buy (sell recommendations. For each variable, the predicted sign, coefficient 
estimate, Wald Chi-square and odds ratio (EXP (B)) are presented in columns 2-5 respectively. R-Square, 
likelihood ratio and number of observations in the regression is provided below the variables. The 
dependent variable RATING is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the recommendation is an 
underperforming new buy and 0 if the recommendation is an outperforming new sell recommendation. 
The independent variables are as shown in Eq. (9-2)  
 
Independent variablea 
 
Predicted sign 
outperforming 
buys 
Parameter 
Estimates 
Wald 
Chi-square 
EXP (B) 
Intercept ? 0.818          6.169**** - 
PRICE_MOM + 8.223 54.623**** >999.999 
FIRM_SIZE + 0.031 0.358 1.031 
BTOM - -0.290        17.509**** 0.748 
ANALY_FOLL + 0.010          3.500**** 1.010 
R2  
Likelihood ratio Chi-
square 
N 
           6% 
      109.08**** 
 
1,778 
   
Note: The Wald statistics are distributed Chi-square with 1 degree of freedom 
                               ****,***, **, and * denote significance at 0.1% 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively 
 
9.4 Factors differentiating between conforming and nonconforming buy (sell) 
recommendations during the bull and the bear markets 
The sample period in this study spans two market conditions which are the bull (January 
1, 1997 to March 10, 2000) and the bear (11th March 2000 to 31st December 2002). The 
bull market is defined as a period when the market experiences a steady increase in 
stock prices and the bear market is when there is a steep market decline. The cut-off 
dates for the bull and the bear dates are adapted from Barber et al., (2004). Both these 
conditions have characteristics that may influence the way analysts do their job and the 
type of recommendations they issue on stocks. It is, therefore, interesting to establish 
which measures of representativeness bias influence analysts’ decision-making in the 
two different time periods. Generally the bull market is characterised by increasing 
stock prices and flourishing economy while during the bear market prices are expected 
to drop and the economy is by and large gloomy for investing. 
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Table 9-3  Factors influencing the issuance of nonconforming buy and sell recommendations during 
bear and bull markets 
 
This table presents the logit regression on the important market factors which differentiate between 
nonconforming new buy (sell) recommendations in different market conditions. The variables are as 
defined in chapter 6, section 6.2. For each variable, the predicted sign, coefficient estimate, Wald Chi-
square and odds ratio (EXP (B)) are presented in columns 2-5 respectively. R-Square, likelihood ratio and 
number of observations in the regression is provided below the variables.  
 
PANEL A: Factors influencing nonconforming stock recommendations during bull market 
Independent variable 
 
Predicted sign 
outperforming 
buys 
Parameter 
Estimates 
Wald 
Chi-square 
EXP (B) 
Intercept ? 3.038        12.414**** - 
PRICE_MOM + 8.484 5.566**** >999.999 
FIRM_SIZE + -0.120 0.889 0.886 
BTOM - -0.313 2.067 0.731 
ANALY_FOLL +  0.021 2.320 1.022 
R2  
Likelihood ratio Chi-
square- 
N 
          2% 
      13.551**** 
 
   664 
   
PANEL B: Factors influencing nonconforming stock recommendations during bear market 
Independent variable 
 
Predicted sign 
outperforming 
buys 
Parameter 
Estimates 
Wald 
Chi-square 
EXP (B) 
Intercept ? -0.522 1.717 - 
PRICE_MOM + 7.235 35.491**** >999.999 
FIRM_SIZE + 0.151          5.620**** 1.163 
BTOM - -0.185          6.142**** 0.831 
ANALY_FOLL + 0.006 0.876 1.006 
R2  
Likelihood ratio Chi-
square- 
N 
          6% 
      76.511**** 
 
1,114 
   
Note: The Wald statistics are distributed Chi-square with 1 degree of freedom 
****,***, **, and * denote significance at 0.1% 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively 
 
Table 9-3 Panel A shows that during the bull period, the only measure of 
representativeness bias which plays a significant role in influencing analysts to issue 
nonconforming stock recommendations is PRICE_MOM. The parameter estimate for 
PRICE_MOM is positive and significant at p<0.1% indicating that analysts’ 
recommendations are largely biased by the previous price performance of the stock 
during the bull market. Thus, they regard the previous good price performance of stocks 
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as representative of the good future performance and the reverse is true for previous 
poor performers. 
 
Table 9-3 Panel B shows that during the bear market, all the three measures of 
representativeness bias, PRICE_MOM, FIRM_SIZE and BTOM are individually 
significant at p<0.1% in influencing analysts’ decision to issue nonconforming 
recommendations. It may be that, because of the state of affairs in the bear market, 
analysts tend not to rely only on the previous price performance of the firm, as is the 
case during the bull market but tend to also believe that the firm’s market capitalisation 
and growth status are representative of what the future performance of the stock is likely 
to be. 
 
9.5 Which factors influenced the type of stock rating before and after the 
implementation of NASD 2711? 
In the recent past there has been concern by Congress and security regulators that 
analysts’ recommendations do not reflect their true beliefs. Rather, it was believed that 
the recommendations are intended to attract and retain investment banking business 
(Barber et al., 2004). In order to regulate the provision of research, the National 
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) proposed Rule 2711, Research Analysts and 
Research Reports. This rule was implemented on September 9, 2002. This subsection 
sets out to test which factors differentiate between nonconforming stock 
recommendations before and after the implementation of NASD 2711.  
 
Table 9-4 Panel A shows that pre-NASD 2711 the issuance of nonconforming new buy 
and new sell recommendations is influenced by the firm’s previous price performance 
(PRICE_MOM) and the growth status of the firm (BTOM). The coefficient for 
PRICE_MOM is positive and significant at p<0.1% indicating that pre-NASD 2711 
underperforming new buys have performed well in the past and outperforming new sells 
have performed poorly in the past. Firms that are awarded a buy rating and perform 
contrary to expectation are also glamour stocks while those that are awarded a sell 
rating are value stocks. 
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Table 9-4  Factors influencing the issuance of nonconforming buy and sell recommendations before 
and after the implementation of NASD 2711 
  
This table presents the logit regression on the important market factors which differentiate between 
nonconforming new buy (sell) recommendations before and after the implementation of NASD 2711. The 
variables are as defined in chapter 6 section 6.2. For each variable, the predicted sign, coefficient 
estimate, Wald Chi-square and odds ratio (EXP (B)) are presented in columns 2-5 respectively. R-Square, 
likelihood ratio and number of observations in the regression is provided below the variables.  
PANEL A: Factors affecting nonconforming recommendations issued before the implementation of NASD 2711 
Independent variable 
 
Predicted sign 
outperforming 
buys 
Parameter 
Estimates 
Wald 
Chi-square 
EXP (B) 
Intercept ? 1.860        21.254**** - 
PRICE_MOM + 8.142 35.562**** >999.999 
FIRM_SIZE + -0.016 0.069 0.984 
BTOM - -0.343        20.049**** 0.710 
ANALY_FOLL + 0.004 0.586 1.005 
R2  
Likelihood ratio Chi-
square- 
N 
          5% 
      74.248**** 
 
1,536 
   
 
PANEL B: Factors affecting nonconforming recommendations issued before the implementation of NASD 2711 
 
Independent variable Predicted sign 
outperforming 
buys 
Parameter 
Estimates 
Wald 
Chi-square 
EXP (B) 
Intercept ? -4.018        14.650**** - 
PRICE_MOM + 6.021          2.994* 412.009 
FIRM_SIZE + 0.333          4.092** 1.396 
BTOM - -0.057          0.042 0.944 
ANALY_FOLL + 0.015 0.787 1.016 
R2  
Likelihood ratio Chi-
square- 
N 
           9% 
        23.95**** 
 
   242 
   
Note: The Wald statistics are distributed Chi-square with 1 degree of freedom 
****,***, **, and * denote significance at 0.1% 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively 
 
Table 9-4 Panel B shows that post-NASD 2711, previous firm performance is still 
important in predicting analysts’ nonconforming recommendations together with firm 
market capitalisation, as opposed to firm growth status as was the case pre-NASD 2711. 
The coefficients for PRICE_MOM and FIRM_SIZE are positive and significant at 
p<0.1% indicating that after the implementation of NASD 2711, analysts view 
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momentum and the size of the firm as being representative of what the stock’s future 
performance will be. 
 
What is interesting between the two time periods (pre and post Rule NASD 2711) is that 
the magnitude of the significance of PRICE_MOM is higher pre-NASD 2711 (p<0.1%) 
and lower post-NASD 2711 (p<10%). This is interpreted as indicating that Rule NASD 
2711 may have reduced but not obliterated analysts’ representativeness bias as 
measured by PRICE_MOM by requiring analysts, among other things, to disclose the 
percentages in their recommendations that are buys, holds and sells. Although analysts’ 
bias is accentuated by FIRM_SIZE post-NASD 2711 as opposed to BTOM, as was the 
case pre-NASD 2711, it seems the significance of the reliance on the size of the firm is 
not very high compared to how significant book-to-market was pre-NASD 2711. Based 
on this, I conclude that although Rule NASD 2711 is meant to address the problems 
created by the relationships between investment banks and firms, it may also have 
helped to reduce analyst psychological bias which appears to be playing an important 
role in analysts’ investment decisions. 
 
9.6 Discussion and summary 
Hypothetically, I expect stocks that are awarded a buy rating to outperform the 
appropriate benchmarks and the stocks that are awarded sell rating to underperform the 
appropriate benchmark. However, in practice, and as shown by the evidence in my 
samples of new buy and new sell recommendations, there is a large percentage of stocks 
that perform in an extremely opposite direction to the one analysts expect.  While there 
may be different reasons for this, in this chapter I aim at highlighting the fact that it is 
not only because of the corporate finance relationships that investment banks have with 
firms, but also because of psychological biases (representativeness bias in particular) as 
measured by stocks’ previous price performance, stocks’ market capitalisation and 
firms’ growth status. 
 
The descriptive statistics show that stocks that are awarded buy rating but  subsequently 
underperform the benchmark are those that have more positive previous price 
momentum, have larger market capitalisation, have lower book-to-market (i.e., are 
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glamour stocks) and have more analysts following compared to stocks that are awarded 
a sell rating and subsequently  outperform their respective benchmarks. The mean 
difference between all the characteristics of the underperforming buys and 
outperforming sells is significant at the 0.1% level. 
 
Univariate statistics, therefore, show analysts issue buy recommendation on stocks that 
have ‘best’ characteristics. This finding is in line with the findings of, for example, 
Stickel (2000).  The ‘best’ characteristics namely, positive price momentum, larger 
market capitalisation and lower book-to-market, are linked to higher future returns by 
the anomaly literature. Chan et al., (1996) find higher returns following positive price 
momentum.  This might be the reason why analysts place so much importance on 
stocks’ previous performance. Also, the empirical evidence (e.g., Fama and French, 
1992, Lakonishok et al.,1994) shows that abnormal returns are earned by stocks with 
low book-to-market, suggesting that financial analysts should issue a buy rating on the 
stocks that have low book-to-market but as shown above they do just the opposite. 
Again, empirical evidence (e.g., Banz, 1981; Fama and French, 1992) shows that stocks 
with lower market capitalisation have higher returns. Here too, analysts do just the 
opposite by awarding a buy rating to stocks with large market capitalisation. It is 
possible that financial analysts issue buy rating to large market capitalisation stocks 
because, among other things, stocks with higher market capitalisation have the potential 
for greater investment banking. My findings and what has been documented in the 
finance literature so far are outstanding examples of analysts’ representativeness bias 
when they make a decision on the type of rating to award to stocks. 
 
Over the sample period, price momentum and book-to-market are the two measures of 
representativeness bias which differentiate between nonconforming buy and sell 
recommendations. Analysts’ following comes out significantly as well, which is 
interpreted as showing that strong analyst following is essential in predicting 
nonconforming stock recommendations. 
 
During the bull market when the stock prices are generally increasing and the economic 
conditions are flourishing. The only measure of representativeness bias that analysts 
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rely upon to make their decisions on the type of rating is momentum. But during the 
bear market when the stock prices are decreasing and the economic conditions are 
somehow gloomy for investing, analysts tend to rely on other measures of 
representativeness bias as well (i.e., size of the firm and book-to-market) in addition to 
momentum. Reliance on additional measures of psychological bias during the bear 
market is not surprising given the bear market conditions. 
 
Momentum seems to be a consistently important psychological factor both before and 
after NASD 2711, but what is interesting is the fact that after NASD 2711, its 
significance is reduced substantially. The significance of firm size is also not at the 
maximum at this time. These results are interpreted as showing that the requirements of 
NASD 2711, which include the fact that analysts should display the proportion of 
issuing firm’s recommendations that are buys, holds and sells, have helped to reduce but 
not obliterate analysts’ representativeness bias, particularly the representativeness bias 
as measured by reliance on momentum. 
 
While other factors such as firm size and book-to-market are important in their own 
right in differentiating nonconforming stock recommendations, it is interesting that 
price momentum is the only persistent factor in differentiating between nonconforming 
buys and sells in the whole sample period, during the bull and the bear markets and 
before and after the implementation of NASD 2711. The persistence of momentum 
shows that analysts believe that past winners are future winners while past losers are the 
losers of the next period (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993, 2001).  The findings in this 
study indicate that the momentum strategy does not work all the time, but analysts do 
not realise or adjust accordingly when this happens, but continue to issue stock 
recommendations that lack market impact. These results further show that analysts’ 
representativeness bias, as measured by momentum, is at play almost all the time when 
analysts are making decisions about stock recommendations. 
 
In summary, this chapter shows that the new buy stocks which lack market impact have 
characteristics that are preferred by financial analysts. The most important of these 
characteristics is positive price momentum which influences financial analysts 
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throughout the sample period and in different sub-periods. Thus, financial analysts use 
momentum strategy extensively when making decisions on what they perceive as an 
appropriate stock rating and do not take into account that momentum, like any other 
strategy, does not always work. The fact that the stock recommendations do not perform 
as expected, particularly buy recommendations, may be interpreted as showing that 
investors do realise when analysts are psychologically biased by relying too heavily on 
factors such as momentum or size of the firm to make recommendation decisions and as 
a result are (investors) able to discount analysts’ bias accordingly. If this interpretation 
is correct, I may as well argue that investors may not have been misled to a great extent 
in the last decade as alleged by the Global Settlement.  
 
It is also interesting to observe the important role played by measures of 
representativeness bias in predicting nonconforming analysts’ stock recommendations 
even without the variable that measures the corporate relationship between investment 
banks and firms. This result suggests the possibility that the rules and regulations that 
are meant to address the bias in analysts recommendations arising from corporate 
relationships are likely to have a limited role in addressing analysts’ bias at large, as 
psychological bias, in particular representativeness, seems to be pervasive as well.  
 
The next chapter summarises and makes conclusions about the findings in my thesis, 
present my contribution to theory and practice, points out the limitations and suggests 
opportunities for future research. 
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Chapter 10 Summary and conclusion, implications for theory and practice 
limitations and future work  
10.1 Introduction 
This thesis sets out to investigate the following overarching research question, what are 
the factors associated with nonconforming new buy (sell) stock recommendations? In 
order to answer this question, two sets of literature which provide an overview of the 
job financial analysts do are reviewed. The two strands of literature are the traditional 
finance literature on the role of financial analysts in the stock market and the 
behavioural finance literature which provides information about the cognitive thinking 
of analysts. To answer my basic research question I develop hypotheses in chapter 3 and 
explain the methodologies I employ to answer the research questions and test my 
hypotheses in chapter 4. I conduct a pilot study to test whether the content analysis 
method I employ works. The procedure, data and results of my pilot study are presented 
in chapter 5. Chapter 6 provides my data selection process, details of the data and a 
description of the stock recommendation and target price characteristics of my sample 
data. 
 
The aim of my empirical work is to establish why some stocks which receive new buy 
or new sell recommendations do not necessarily perform as expected in the subsequent 
12 months. I evaluate stock recommendation and target price performance as well as 
select conforming and nonconforming stock recommendations in chapter 7. The 
performance of target prices is also evaluated because analysts often issue target prices 
concurrent with stock recommendations, which implies stock recommendations may be 
drivers of target prices and they are both important financial analysts’ outputs.  
 
Chapter 8 tests for the psychological factors that are associated with nonconforming 
stock recommendations using logistic regression analysis. In this analysis, RATING is a 
dependent variable which takes the value 1 if a stock receives a new buy 
recommendation and underperforms the benchmark by <-20% or more over the 
subsequent 12 month period and 0 if the stock receives a sell recommendation and 
outperforms the benchmark by >+20% or more. The dependent variables are as depicted 
by my conceptual model in section 2.4 with the exception of corporate information. 
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Chapter 9 takes the analysis in chapter 8 further by investigating representativeness bias 
in nonconforming stock recommendations during the sample period, during the bull and 
the bear markets, and before and after the implementation of NASD 2711. The sample 
size used for the analysis in this chapter is larger than the sample size in chapter 8 as 
there are no sample size restrictions imposed by research report characteristics. The 
main aim of this chapter is to specifically assess the role of analysts’ representativeness 
bias in issuing nonconforming stock recommendations.  As in chapter 8, in this analysis, 
underperforming new buys are those that underperform the respective benchmark by <-
20% while sells are those that outperform the benchmark by >+20%. To establish which 
representativeness bias factors underlie these nonconforming stocks, I fit the logistic 
regression model where RATING is a dependent variable which takes a value of 1 if the 
stock is underperforming new buy and 0 otherwise. The independent variables are 
momentum, size, and book-to-market while analyst following is a control variable.  
 
In this final chapter, a summary and discussion of my main empirical findings are first 
provided in section 10.2. This is followed by a discussion of the implications of my 
results for theory in section 10.3. Section 10.4 discusses my results’ implications for 
public policy and practice. Section 10.5 discusses the limitations of this research and the 
final section outlines possible future developments. 
 
10.2 Summary and Discussion 
Research shows that until very recently, analysts’ stock recommendations were very 
optimistic, i.e., analysts issued more buy recommendations than sells. Other studies 
point out that analysts’ stock recommendations lack market impact, implying that 
investors would not profit from trading on analyst stock recommendations. In addition, 
another set of studies has alluded to the fact that the information analysts use in 
preparing their recommendations differs from that used to justify their 
recommendations. However, what is not clear in all these studies is what factors are 
actually influencing financial analysts to issue optimistic stock recommendations which 
do not seem to perform as expected. Also, where do analysts obtain the information that 
they use to make decisions on the stock recommendations if the information they use is 
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not from individual companies’ financial reports? My initial proposition is that analysts’ 
stock recommendations lack market impact because in making decisions about the type 
of rating to award stocks analysts are influenced by their psychological biases (in 
particular, overconfidence and representativeness) and are also influenced by the 
relationship between their investment bank employers and the firms they research. 
 
To test my hypotheses about psychological bias and investment relationships in 
analysts’ nonconforming stock recommendations, the first step is to evaluate the 
performance of stocks 12 months after the recommendations are changed from their 
previous categories to new buy and new sell categories. The intention is to select stocks 
that perform contrary to expectations after a change is made and analyse them further.  
 
Chapter 7 shows the performance of stocks after they have been moved to new buy and 
new sell categories. The results show that in aggregate, analysts’ stock 
recommendations do have an economic value. Thus, stocks that receive a new buy 
rating have an increased abnormal return. However, this abnormal return is only 
significant in month 0 which corroborates the findings of Stickel (1995), Womack 
(1996), Barber et al., (2001) and Ryan and Taffler (2005) that the value of new buy 
recommendations lasts only for one month. On the other hand, there is a continuing 
negative market reaction for up to 12 months after recommendations are changed to sell 
category. Again these findings support the findings of Stickel (1995), Womack (1996), 
Barber et al., (2001) and Ryan and Taffler (2005) that the market reaction to new sells 
lasts longer and is incomplete.   
 
Similarly, there is a significant market reaction observed when target prices are 
changed. Increase in target prices results in stock price increases of 6.30% only in the 
month, suggesting that profit from trading on increased target prices last only for one 
month as is the case with new buys.  The decrease in target price stocks accrues a 
negative abnormal return that lasts for up to 12 months after the change is made. 
Generally, the findings about target prices support the finding of Brav and Lehavy 
(2003) that target prices are informative.  
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Although the findings show that, in aggregate, new buy and new sell recommendations 
have economic value, most of the new buy recommendations actually underperform the 
benchmark while a relatively small percentage of new sells outperform the respective 
benchmarks in the subsequent 12 months after the change is made. Specifically, 55% of 
new buy recommendations earn negative abnormal returns over the 12 months period 
and 34% of those that underperform actually underperform the benchmark by -20% or 
more.  On the other hand, 30% of new sell recommendations earn positive returns 12 
months after the recommendations are changed to sell, but only 16% of these new sell 
stocks outperform the benchmark by +20% or more. From these findings I conclude that 
more than 50% of new buys do not accrue the expected return during the 12 months 
period after the change in recommendation is made, contrary to the prediction of 
financial analysts at the time that they issue a buy rating (see Appendix 1). Compared to 
new buys, a larger percentage of stocks that are awarded sell rating perform as expected, 
i.e., underperform the respective benchmark. Thus, about 84% of the new sell stocks 
earn negative abnormal returns over the period predicted by financial analysts. This 
finding about sells implies that new sell recommendations are more informative than 
new buys. The next interesting question, which is also the research question for this 
study, is what influences financial analysts to issue these recommendations that do not 
perform as expected or that lack market impact? 
 
Chapter 8 shows that, as postulated by the conceptual model illustrated by figure 2-1 in 
section 2.4, there are certain factors that influence analysts to issue stock 
recommendations which lack market impact. My hypothesis is that analysts’ decisions 
to issue nonconforming stock recommendations are associated with their psychological 
bias, in particular overconfidence (as measured by optimism and certainty in the tone 
language that analysts use to justify their recommendations) and representativeness (as 
measured by activity, momentum, size, book-to-market and target price) as well as the 
investment banking relationships that exist between investment banks and firms. 
 
The logit analysis in section 8.3 shows that the probability that analysts will issue a buy 
recommendation that lacks market impact increases with analysts’ optimism (a proxy 
for overconfidence bias). In addition to optimism, measures of representativeness bias, 
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positive previous stock price performance, market capitalisation, book-to-market and 
changes in target price are individually statistically significant in explaining analysts’ 
nonconforming stock recommendations. Not surprisingly, a variable measuring the 
existence of the relationship between brokerage firm and a company is also significant.  
 
Optimism serves as a proxy for analysts’ overconfidence and is a measure of “language 
endorsing some person, group, concept or highlighting their positive entailment” (Hart, 
2001 p. 45). Optimism is measured from the tone of language that analysts use in their 
research reports to justify the type of recommendations that they issue. Overconfidence 
is defined as overestimating what one can do compared to what circumstances would 
warrant. The findings, that overconfidence increases the chance of analysts issuing new 
buy recommendations that lack market impact, compel me to reject the null hypotheses 
that   the tone of language used by investment analysts in their research reports to justify 
the stock ratings is not optimistic and conclude that overconfidence bias is one of the 
factors that make analysts issue recommendations that lack market impact. These results 
are interpreted as showing that analysts believe they have superior investment abilities 
and tend to overestimate the likely performance of the stocks they follow. This 
argument is consistent with other studies such as Odean (1998 a and b); Barber and 
Odean (2001), and Massey and Thaler (2005) who document that when investors are 
faced with difficult tasks they tend to overestimate the precision of their information 
and thereby become overconfident. However, the difference between the current study 
and these studies lies in the methodology used to measure overconfidence. Thus, they 
assess overconfidence from the market reaction to the decisions made by analysts but 
fail to trace directly the existence of judgemental bias in the way that analysts prepare 
their reports. The current study highlights the fact that financial analysts’ 
overconfidence observed in the market actually originates from their research reports.  
 
Activity is used as a proxy for analysts’ representativeness bias. Activity is a measure of 
“movement, change, [and] the implementation of ideas and avoidance of inertia” (Hart 
2001 p. 46). Representativeness bias is defined by Tversky (1974) as decisions based on 
stereotypes.  Various studies such as those of Shefrin and Statman (1995) have 
indicated that investors are influenced by representativeness bias. The findings in this 
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study do not support evidence that analysts use stereotypes such as using their 
knowledge of eminent mergers and acquisitions or change in management to justify 
their recommendations. This finding is also contrary to Fogarty and Rogers (2005) who 
document that analysts make positive recommendations about stocks if they know of 
the company’s broad range of future plans for change, including mergers and 
acquisitions.  The reasons for inconsistency of my results and existing literature may be 
due to different measurement methods. Thus, some of the studies measure 
representativeness bias using hard market data (as opposed to textual data except 
Fogarty and Rogers, 2005) while in the current study, Activity, as a measure of 
representativeness bias is measured from the tone of the language and other variables 
that analysts use to justify their recommendations. Measuring representativeness bias 
from research reports assumes that analysts will declare the stereotypes they use to 
make their recommendation decision, but this may not be the case.  
 
The lack of evidence to support representativeness bias (as measured by Activity) is 
also inconsistent with the findings in the pilot study. The pilot study results indicated 
that the high level of activity within the company is believed to mean good for the 
future stock performance and vice versa. In other words, activity is seen as 
representative of future performance. The difference between the pilot results and the 
main study results with regard to representativeness bias may be due to different sample 
sizes. The pilot study sample was quite small compared to the main study sample. But 
most importantly, the procedure used to conduct the pilot study is different from the 
procedure used in the main study.  
 
In addition to overconfidence, stocks’ characteristics which serve as measures of 
representativeness bias are found to be important in influencing analysts’ decisions on 
the type of stock rating to issue. Specifically, analysts prefer stocks with positive 
previous stock price performance and stocks with large market capitalisation and with 
high book-to-market. These results suggest that stock characteristics are very important 
for analysts’ decision making regarding the future performance of the stocks. The 
findings echo the conclusion of Stickel (2000) and Jegadeesh et al., (2004) that analysts 
prefer stocks with ‘best’ characteristics.  
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The dependence on the previous price performance of stocks by analysts may be 
influenced by the findings of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) that stocks that have 
performed well in the past will continue to perform well in the future. But, the fact that 
they also prefer large market capitalisation stocks is surprising because research (e.g., 
Fama and French, 1992) has established that smaller market capitalisation stocks have 
higher returns, in which case I would expect analysts to prefer stocks with smaller 
market capitalisation. The clear preference of stocks with positive characteristics may 
also be linked to representativeness bias documented by Solt and Statman (1989), 
Shefrin and Statman (1995), and DeBondt and Thaler (1985). They argue that analysts 
believe that past good performance represents good future performance and large 
market capitalisation represents good future performance. 
 
The effect of size and book-to-market on stock returns is well documented in the 
literature. For instance Fama and French (1992) find that book-to-market, together with 
firm size, has a significant relation with future stock returns. It is interesting therefore, 
to find that these two factors (which measure representativeness bias in this study) 
underlie analysts’ recommendations that lack market impact as well. 
 
Not surprisingly, the change in target price influences the type of recommendation that 
analysts issue. Thus, the probability of obtaining a buy recommendation that 
underperforms the benchmark increases with an increase in target price. Although Brav 
and Lehavy (2003) conclude that target prices are informative when used with or 
without stock recommendations, from the findings in this study it is not very clear what 
the role of target price is. It could be argued that the target prices that are issued 
concurrent with stock recommendations serve only as a way for analysts to ameliorate 
the effects of their overly optimistic or overly pessimistic reports, or as part of the sales 
hype to peddle stocks (Asquith et al., 2005). 
 
Interestingly, conflicts of interest are also found to have a significant impact on the type 
of recommendations that analysts issue. These findings are consistent with the findings 
of Lin and McNichols (1998) and other studies (e.g., Barber et al., 2004; Cliff, 2004, 
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Agrawal and Chen, 2005; and Madureira, 2004) that have been carried out after the 
implementation of various rules that are meant to govern analysts. All these studies 
conclude that the relationships between brokerage firms and companies have an effect 
on analysts’ decisions about stock ratings. The results further confirm the recent 
concern by policy-makers and investors that analysts’ recommendations do not reflect 
their true beliefs about the stocks they follow. Further, the findings justify the 
regulations that have been implemented recently by policy-makers to govern analysts 
and brokerage firms.  
 
Chapter 9 serves as a further test of my basic thesis that analysts’ decisions to issue 
nonconforming stock recommendations are driven by their psychological biases, in this 
case representativeness bias is measured by momentum, size and book-to-market.  Over 
the sample period, price momentum and book-to-market are the two measures of 
representativeness bias which differentiate between nonconforming buy and sell 
recommendations. During the bull market the only measure of representativeness bias 
that analysts appear to rely upon to make their decisions on the type of rating is 
momentum. But during the bear market when stock prices are decreasing and the 
economic conditions are gloomy for investing, analysts tend to rely on other measures 
of representativeness bias as well (i.e., they also rely on size of the firm and book-to-
market) in addition to momentum. Reliance on additional measures of psychological 
bias during the bear market is not surprising given the bear market conditions. 
 
Momentum seems to be the consistently important psychological factor both before and 
after NASD 2711, but what is interesting is the fact that after NASD 2711, its 
significance is reduced substantially. These results are interpreted as showing that the 
requirements of NASD 2711, which include the fact that analysts should display the 
proportion of issuing firm’s recommendations that are buys, holds and sells, have 
helped to reduce but not obliterate analysts’ representativeness bias, particularly the 
representativeness bias as measured by reliance on momentum. This result implies that 
analysts have to think more deeply about why they are making particular 
recommendations. 
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While other factors such as firm size and book-to-market are important in their own 
right in differentiating between nonconforming stock recommendations, it is interesting 
that price momentum is the only persistent factor in differentiating between 
nonconforming buys and sells in the whole sample period, during the bull and the bear 
markets and before and after the implementation of NASD 2711. The persistence of 
momentum shows that analysts believe that past winners are future winners while past 
losers are the losers of the next period (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993, 2001).  The 
findings in this study indicate that the momentum strategy does not work all the time, 
but analysts do not realise or adjust accordingly when this happens, but continue to 
issue stock recommendations that lack market impact. These results further show that 
analysts’ representativeness bias as measured by momentum is at play almost all the 
time when analysts are making decisions about stock recommendations 
 
The research question addressed in this study is to establish the factors that are 
associated with optimistic analysts’ recommendations which lack market impact, 
particularly the role of overconfidence and representativeness bias. From my analysis, I 
conclude that overconfidence bias (as measured by optimism), representativeness bias 
(as measured by price momentum, firm price, book-to-market, compensation, target 
price) and corporate finance relationships between investment banks and firms are the 
main factors that are associated with analysts’ nonconforming stock recommendations. 
Therefore, the conceptual framework in figure 2-1, section 2.4 needs to be modified to 
reflect only those factors that are supported by the empirical evidence. 
 
This research contributes to research on the current furore about whether analysts’ 
optimistic recommendations are influenced by analysts’ conflicts of interest and also of 
whether implementation of regulations to govern analysts will be efficient in the long-
term. Unlike most studies in this area, this study specifically analyses stocks that lack 
market impact. Investigating stocks that lack market impact alone provides a clean test 
of the factors that could have influenced analysts to issue these stocks in the first place.  
 
The rules implemented to date in the US address the optimism in analysts’ 
recommendations arising from the relationships that investment banks (conflicts of 
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interest) have with firms, suggesting that SEC and agencies believe that the problem of 
optimistic recommendations is a problem caused by conflict of interest only. The 
current study looks at the problem of optimistic recommendations from a broader 
perspective and shows that there are other factors over and above conflicts of interest 
that are causing the problem, in particular, analyst cognitive bias.   
 
10.3 Implications for theory 
Research has established that financial analysts’ stock recommendations have 
substantial market impact (e.g., Womack, 1996 and Ryan and Taffler, 2005). The 
results of this study confirm the findings in these earlier studies that, in aggregate, there 
is a significant market reaction to changes in recommendations. However, the current 
studies contribute further by showing that when performance is disaggregated, there is a 
large proportion of buy and new sell recommendations that does not perform as 
predicted by analysts. However, the problem of lack of market impact is more prevalent 
with new buy recommendations than with new sells. 
 
Other studies have shown, however, that after taking into account the transaction costs, 
investors do not profit from trading on analysts stock recommendations (e.g. Barber et 
al., 2001; Mikhail et al., 2004). Theoretically, it is expected that analysts’ 
recommendations would have significant impact, given that they have both public and 
private information about the stocks they follow. These studies, however, do not go any 
further to investigate why analysts are issuing the recommendations that lack market 
impact in the first place. This research augments these studies by identifying the factors 
that influence analysts to issue stock recommendations that lack market impact by using 
a theoretically derived and empirically tested framework. The empirical framework 
developed is robust as it also provides an answer to the issues raised in other studies 
such as Rogers and Grant (1997), Breton and Taffler (2001) and Amir et al., (1999) that 
the information which analysts actually use differs from that used to justify their 
recommendations.  
 
It has been highlighted in chapter 4 that measuring analysts’ cognitive biases outside the 
abstracted situation of a psychological laboratory is very difficult. This may be a reason 
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why various studies that document the psychological biases to which analysts might be 
prone, only look into how stocks might react to their recommendations (see Barberis et 
al., 1998, Daniel et al., 1998 and DeBondt and Thaler, 1985) but fail to trace directly the 
existence of judgemental bias in the way that analysts prepare their reports. This 
research contributes methodologically by tracing the existence of heuristics from the 
financial markets back to the way that analysts prepare their reports. Thus, the 
documented cognitive biases, particularly overconfidence can be measured by the tone 
of language that analysts use in their reports. 
 
10.4 Implications for policy and practice 
The issue of analysts’ optimistic recommendations is currently of significant concern to 
the SEC and other agencies such as the NASD and NYSE. This research makes a 
contribution to their public policy task. In the recent past the SEC, NYSE, NASD and 
the New York Attorney General have issued rules and regulations (i.e. Regulation Fair 
Disclosure, NASD 2711, Rule 472 and Global Analyst Research Settlement) to govern 
analysts and brokerage firms. Effectively all these bodies assumed the problem of 
optimistic research recommendations to be caused by analysts’ conflicts of interest that 
arise from the firms’ corporate relationships with investment banks. However, this 
research shows that in addition to their conflicts of interest, other factors such as 
psychological biases (overconfidence and representativeness) influence the type of 
recommendations that analysts issue. These findings imply that the regulations that are 
set up to govern analysts may work only in as far as regulating their conflicts of interest 
but cannot regulate other factors, such as psychological biases which are found to play a 
significant role in this research. Studies on conflicts of interest such as Kadan et al., 
(2004) and Kolasinski and Kothari (2004) conclude that conflicts of interest do not 
explain all the bias in analysts’ recommendations. Although they posit that the 
remaining bias is due to selection bias, it is argued here that the remaining bias is also 
due to analysts’ overconfidence and representativeness bias. 
 
This research should also be of importance to both investors and analysts. Once 
investors (including naïve investors) are aware of the factors that influence analysts in 
addition to conflicts of interest, they may be able to filter analyst recommendations 
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accordingly before acting on them. On the other hand, this study may help analysts to 
review their role in the financial markets to facilitate regaining a complete investor 
confidence through debiasing themselves. 
 
10.5 Limitations 
The findings in this study are subject to the following limitations: 
a) The main analysis in this research is on the factors driving analysts’ 
recommendations that are found to lack necessary market impact. As such the 
inferences drawn on the findings are limited to this set of stocks only and not to 
the stocks that have market impact.  
 
b) The factors that influence analysts’ stock recommendations as depicted by the 
conceptual model are developed from theory. However, these factors have been 
selected idiosyncratically. It is possible that there are other factors that may 
explain analysts’ recommendations which are not included in the model used. 
The inclusion of additional factors or exclusion of some of the currently 
included factors in the model may change the inferences made. 
 
c) An effort was made to use the most appropriate return-generating model to 
evaluate the performance of stock with changes in recommendations. However, 
it is likely that the use of a different return generating model will produce 
different results.  
 
10.6 Implications for further work 
The current research brings together traditional finance and behavioural finance and has 
crucial public policy implications by shedding light on the factors that influence 
financial analysts to issue stock recommendations that lack necessary market impact. 
Any further work in these areas, which builds on the results of this study has a potential 
to contribute to further knowledge.       
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The main idea in this research is to investigate the role of psychological biases 
(overconfidence and representativeness) in influencing analysts to issue a particular    
recommendation on a stock.  Investigating financial analysts’ cognitive thinking in 
laboratory experiments may provide more robust results in the role of psychological 
biases on influencing analysts’ stock recommendations. In addition, other research 
methodologies such as questionnaires may be used to gather information from analysts 
regarding what they perceive to be the main factors influencing their decisions. 
Obtaining data directly from analysts by way of experiment or questionnaire may 
provide more authentic results about the factors that affect their decision-making about 
stock recommendations than methodologies that make inferences about analysts’ 
behaviour from publicly available data. 
 
There has been extensive research on analysts’ conflicts of interest particularly after the 
implementation of recent rules that govern analysts and brokerage houses. Overall, 
these studies investigate optimism in stock recommendations of affiliated and 
unaffiliated brokerage firms. Future work may take these studies further by 
investigating the extent to which all the significant factors found in this study 
differentiate between affiliated and unaffiliated brokerage houses. 
 
The latest in the regulations implemented is the Global Settlement. It would, therefore, 
be interesting in further work to establish whether conflict of interest is still significant.  
 
Finally, for this study to have a broader impact, it could be replicated in other 
environments, such as the UK, to explore the impact of different institutional contexts. 
The results from such a study could provide a broader understanding of analyst 
behaviour across different international markets, places of value to international 
investors and international regulators. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Brokerage firms’ definition of stock recommendations 
1) Credit Suisse First Boston  
Analysts' stock ratings are defined as follows: 
 
Outperform: The stock's total return is expected to exceed the industry average* by at 
least 10-15%(or more, depending on perceived risk) over the next 12 months. 
 
Neutral: The stock's total return is expected to be in line with the industry 
average*(range of (10%) over the next 12 months. 
 
Underperform**: The stock's total return is expected to underperform the industry 
average* by 10-15% or more over the next 12 months. 
 
*The industry average refers to the average total return of the analyst's industry 
coverage universe(except with respect to Asia/Pacific, Latin America and Emerging 
Markets, where stock ratings are relative to the relevant country index, and CSFB 
HOLT Small and Mid-Cap Advisor stocks, where stock ratings are relative to the 
regional CSFB HOLT Small and Mid-Cap Advisor investment universe. 
 
**In an effort to achieve a more balanced distribution of stock ratings, the Firm has 
requested that analysts maintain at least 15% of their rated coverage universe as 
Underperform. This guideline is subject to change depending on several factors, 
including general market conditions. 
 
Restricted: In certain circumstances, CSFB policy and/or applicable law and regulations 
preclude certain types of communications, including an investment recommendation, 
during the course of CSFB's engagement in an investment banking transaction and in 
certain other circumstances. 
 
Volatility Indicator (V): A stock is defined as volatile if the stock price has moved up or 
down by 20% or more in a month in at least 8 of the past 24 months or the analyst 
expects significant volatility going forward. All CSFB HOLT Small and Mid-Cap 
Advisor stocks are automatically rated volatile. All IPO stocks are automatically rated 
volatile within the first 12 months of trading. 
 
Analysts' coverage universe weightings are defined as follows*: 
 
Overweight: Industry expected to outperform the relevant broad market benchmark over 
the next 12 months. 
 
Market Weight: Industry expected to perform in-line with the relevant broad market 
benchmark over the next 12 months. 
 
Underweight: Industry expected to underperform the relevant broad market benchmark 
over the next 12 months. 
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*CSFB HOLT Small and Mid-Cap Advisor stocks do not have coverage universe 
weightings. 
 
2) UBS Warburg 
 
UBS Investment Research Global Ratings: Definitions and Allocations  
 
Source: UBS; as of 31 March 2004.  
 
KEY DEFINITIONS  
Forecast Stock Return (FSR) is defined as expected percentage price appreciation plus 
gross dividend yield over the next 12 months.  
 
Market Return Assumption (MRA) is defined as the one-year local  market interest rate 
plus 5% (an approximation of the equity risk premium).  
 
Predictability Level The predictability level indicates an analyst's conviction in the FSR. 
A predictability level of '1' means that the analyst's estimate of FSR is in the middle of a 
narrower, or smaller, range of possibilities. A predictability level of '2' means  that the 
analyst's estimate of FSR is in the middle of a broader, or larger, range of possibilities.  
 
Under Review (UR) Stocks may be flagged as UR by the analyst, indicating that the 
stock's price target and/or rating are subject to possible change in the near term, usually 
in response to an  event that may affect the investment case or valuation.  
 
Rating/Return Divergence (RRD) This qualifier is automatically appended to the rating 
when stock price movement has caused the prevailing rating to differ from that which 
would be assigned according to the rating system and will be removed when there is no 
longer a divergence, either through market movement or analyst intervention.  
 
3) Prudential 
When we assign an Overweight rating, we mean that we expect that the stock's total 
return will exceed the average total return of all of the stocks covered by the analyst (or 
analyst team). Our investment time frame is 12-18 months except as otherwise specified 
by the analyst in the report. 
When we assign a Neutral Weight rating, we mean that we expect that the stock's total 
return will be in line with the average total return of all of the stocks covered by the 
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analyst (or analyst team). Our investment time frame is 12-18 months except as 
otherwise specified by the analyst in the report. 
When we assign an Underweight rating, we mean that we expect that the stock's total 
return will be below the average total return of all of the stocks covered by the analyst 
(or analyst team). Our investment time frame is 12-18 months except as otherwise 
specified by the analyst in the report. 
 
4) Lehman Brothers 
Stock Rating 
 
1-Overweight - The stock is expected to outperform the unweighted expected total 
return of the industry sector over a 12-month investment horizon. 
 
2-Equal weight - The stock is expected to perform in line with the unweighted expected 
total return of the industry sector over a 12-month investment horizon. 
 
3-Underweight - The stock is expected to underperform the unweighted expected total 
return of the industry sector over a 12-month investment horizon. 
 
RS-Rating Suspended - The rating and target price have been suspended temporarily to 
comply with applicable regulations and/or firm policies in certain circumstances 
including when Lehman Brothers is acting in an advisory capacity on a merger or 
strategic transaction involving the company. 
 
Sector View 
1-Positive - sector fundamentals/valuations are improving. 
2-Neutral - sector fundamentals/valuations are steady, neither improving nor 
deteriorating. 
3-Negative - sector fundamentals/valuations are deteriorating. 
 
Stock Ratings From February 2001 to August 5, 2002 (sector view did not exist): This 
is a guide to expected total return (price performance plus dividend) relative to the total 
return of the stock’s local market over the next 12months. 
1-Strong Buy - expected to outperform the market by 15 or more percentage points. 
2-Buy - expected to outperform the market by 5-15 percentage points. 
3-Market Perform - expected to perform in line with the market, plus or minus 5 
percentage points. 
4-Market underperform - expected to underperform the market by 5-15 percentage 
points. 
5-Sell - expected to underperform the market by 15 or more percentage points. 
 
5) Salomon Smith Barney 
Guide To Investment Ratings: 
Smith Barney's stock recommendations include a risk rating and an investment rating. 
Risk ratings, which take into account both price volatility and fundamental criteria, are: 
Low (L), Medium (M), High (H), and Speculative (S). Investment ratings are a function 
of Smith Barney's expectation of total return (forecast price appreciation and dividend 
yield within the next 12 months) and risk rating. 
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For securities in developed markets (US, UK, Europe, Japan, and Australia/New 
Zealand), investment ratings are: Buy (1) (expected total return of 10% or more for 
Low-Risk stocks, 15% or more for Medium-Risk stocks, 20% or more for High-Risk 
stocks, and 35% or more for Speculative stocks); Hold (2) (0%-10% for Low-Risk 
stocks, 0%-15% for Medium-Risk stocks, 0%-20% for High-Risk stocks, and 0%-35% 
for Speculative stocks); and Sell (3) (negative total return). Investment ratings are 
determined by the ranges described above at the time of initiation of coverage, a change 
in risk rating, or a change in target price. At other times, the expected total returns may 
fall outside of these ranges because of price movement and/or volatility. Such interim 
deviations from specified ranges will be permitted but will become subject to review by 
Research Management. Your decision to buy or sell a security should be based upon 
your personal investment objectives and should be made only after evaluating the 
stock's expected performance and risk. 
 
Between September 9, 2002, and September 12, 2003, Smith Barney's stock ratings 
were based upon expected performance over the following 12 to 18 months relative to 
the analyst's industry coverage universe at such time. An Outperform (1) rating 
indicated that we expected the stock to outperform the analyst's industry coverage 
universe over the coming 12-18 months. An In-line (2) rating indicated that we 
expected the stock to perform approximately in line with the analyst's coverage 
universe. An Underperform (3) rating indicated that we expected the stock to 
underperform the analyst's coverage universe. In emerging markets, the same ratings 
classifications were used, but the stocks were rated based upon expected performance 
relative to the primary market index in the region or country. Our complementary Risk 
rating system -- Low (L), Medium (M), High (H), and Speculative (S) -- took into 
account predictability of financial results and stock price volatility. Risk ratings for Asia 
Pacific were determined by a quantitative screen which classified stocks into the same 
four risk categories. In the major markets, our Industry rating system -- Overweight, 
Marketweight, and Underweight -- took into account each analyst's evaluation of their 
industry coverage as compared to the primary market index in their region over the 
following 12 to 18 months. 
 
Prior to September 9, 2002, the Firm's stock rating system was based upon the expected 
total return over the next 12 to 18 months. The total return required for a given rating 
depended on the degree of risk in a stock (the higher the risk, the higher the required 
return). A Buy (1) rating indicated an expected total return ranging from +15% or 
greater for a Low-Risk stock to +30% or greater for a Speculative stock. An Outperform 
(2) rating indicated an expected total return ranging from +5% to +15% (Low-Risk) to 
+10% to +30% (Speculative). A Neutral (3) rating indicated an expected total return 
ranging from -5% to +5% (Low-Risk) to -10% to +10% (Speculative). An 
Underperform (4) rating indicated an expected total return ranging from -5% to -15% 
(Low-Risk) to -10% to -20% (Speculative). A Sell (5) rating indicated an expected total 
return ranging from 
-15% or worse (Low-Risk) to -20% or worse (Speculative). The Risk ratings were the 
same as in the current system. 
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6) Morgan Stanley 
Analyst Stock Ratings 
Overweight (O). The stock's total return is expected to exceed the average total return of 
the analyst's industry (or industry team's) coverage universe, on a risk-adjusted basis, 
over the next 12-18 months. 
 
Equal-weight (E). The stock's total return is expected to be in line with the average total 
return of the analyst's industry (or industry team's) coverage universe, on a risk-adjusted 
basis, over the next 12-18 months. 
 
Underweight (U). The stock's total return is expected to be below the average total 
return of the analyst's industry (or industry team's) coverage universe, on a risk-adjusted 
basis, over the next 12-18 months. 
 
More volatile (V). We estimate that this stock has more than a 25% chance of a price 
move (up or down) of more than 25% in a month, based on a quantitative assessment of 
historical data, or in the analyst's view, it is likely to become materially more volatile 
over the next 1-12 months compared with the past three years. Stocks with less than one 
year of trading history are automatically rated as more volatile (unless otherwise noted). 
We note that securities that we do not currently consider "more volatile" can still 
perform in that manner. 
 
Unless otherwise specified, the time frame for price targets included in this report is 12 
to 18 months. Ratings prior to March 18, 2002: SB = Strong Buy; OP = Outperform; N 
= Neutral; UP = Underperform. For definitions, please go to 
http://www.morganstanley.com/companycharts 
 
Analyst Industry Views 
 
Attractive (A). The analyst expects the performance of his or her industry coverage 
universe over the next 12-18 months to be attractive vs. the relevant broad market 
benchmark named on the cover of this report. 
 
In-Line (I). The analyst expects the performance of his or her industry coverage 
universe over the next 12-18 months to be in line with the relevant broad market 
benchmark named on the cover of this report. 
 
Cautious (C). The analyst views the performance of his or her industry coverage 
universe over the next 12-18 months with caution vs. the relevant broad market 
benchmark named on the cover of this report. 
 
7) Bear, Stearns & Co. Equity Research Rating System: 
Ratings for Stocks (vs. analyst coverage universe): 
Outperform (O) - Stock is projected to outperform analyst's industry coverage universe 
over the next 12 months. 
 
Peer Perform (P) - Stock is projected to perform approximately in line with analyst's 
industry coverage universe over the next 12 months. 
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Underperform (U) - Stock is projected to underperform analyst's industry coverage 
universe over the next 12 months. 
 
Ratings for Sectors (vs. regional broader market index): 
Market Overweight (MO) - Expect the industry to perform better than the primary 
market index for the region over the next 12 months. 
 
Market Weight (MW) - Expect the industry to perform approximately in line with the 
primary market index for the region over the next 12 months. 
 
Market Underweight (MU) - Expect the industry to underperform the primary market 
index for the region over the next 12 months. 
 
8) Merrill Lynch 
Opinon Key: 
 
Opinon include a volatility Risk Rating, Intermediate-Term and Long-term Investment 
ratings and Income Ratings. 
VOLATILITY RISK RATINGS – indicators of potential price fluctuations. Are A – 
low, B – Average, D-high. 
INTERMEDIATE-TERM INVESTMENT RATINGS, indicators of expected total 
return (price appreciation plus yield) within the 12 months period from the date of 
initial rating are: 
Strong Buy (minimum 20%...more for high risk securities 
Buy (minimum 10%) 
Neutral (0-10%) 
Reduce/sell (negative return) 
No rating 
LONG-TERM INVESTMENT RATINGS, indicators of fundamental company factors 
demonstrating potential total return for the 3-year period from the period of the initial 
rating, are 
Strong Buy (aggregate minimum 40%) 
Buy (aggregate minimum 20%) 
Neutral (aggregate 0-20%) 
Reduce/Sell (negative return 
No Rating 
INCOME RATINGS 
Indicators of potential cash dividends are: 
Same/higher (dividends considered to be secure) 
Same/lower ( dividends not considered to be secure) 
Pays no dividends  
 
9) Deutsche Bank: Definition not found 
 
 
10) Goldman Sachs: Definitions not found  
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Appendix 2: Formulas for Diction’s variables used and description of dictionaries 
and scores 
Formulas for the Master Variables 
  
Certainty = [Tenac. + Level. + Collec. + Insist.] - [Numer. + Ambiv. + Self + Variety] 
 
Optimism = [Praise + Satis. + Inspir.] - [Blame + Hard. +Denial] 
 
 Activity = [Aggres. + Accomp. + Commun. + Motion] - [Cog. + Passv. + Embell.] 
 
 
Calculated variables 
Insistence, a measure of  “code-restriction” that indicates a “preference for a limited, 
ordered world” 
 
embellishment, a measure of the ratio of adjectives to verbs; (3) variety, a measure of 
conformity to, or avoidance of, a limited set of expressions (different words/total words) 
 
variety, a measure of conformity to, or avoidance of, a limited set of expressions 
(different words/total words); 
 
Description of the dictionaries and scores 
Praise: Affirmations of some person, group, or abstract entity. Included are terms 
isolating important social qualities (dear, delightful, witty), physical qualities (mighty, 
handsome, beautiful), intellectual qualities (shrewd, bright, vigilant, reasonable), 
entrepreneurial qualities (successful, conscientious, renowned), and moral qualities 
(faithful, good, noble). All terms in this dictionary are adjectives. 
 
Satisfaction: Terms associated with positive affective states (cheerful, passionate, 
happiness), with moments of undiminished joy (thanks, smile, welcome) and 
pleasurable diversion (excited, fun, lucky), or with moments of triumph (celebrating, 
pride, auspicious). Also included are words of nurturance: healing, encourage, secure, 
relieved. 
 
Inspiration: Abstract virtues deserving of universal respect. Most of the terms in this 
dictionary are nouns isolating desirable moral qualities (faith, honesty, self-sacrifice, 
virtue) as well as attractive personal qualities (courage, dedication, wisdom, mercy). 
Social and political ideals are also included: patriotism, success, education, justice. 
 
Blame: Terms designating social inappropriateness (mean, naive, sloppy, stupid) as 
well as downright evil (fascist, blood-thirsty, repugnant, malicious) compose this 
dictionary. In addition, adjectives describing unfortunate circumstances (bankrupt, rash, 
morbid, embarrassing) or unplanned vicissitudes (weary, nervous, painful, detrimental) 
are included. The dictionary also contains outright denigrations: cruel, illegitimate, 
offensive, miserly. 
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Hardship: This dictionary contains natural disasters (earthquake, starvation, tornado, 
pollution), hostile actions (killers, bankruptcy, enemies, vices) and censurable human 
behavior (infidelity, despots, betrayal). It also includes unsavory political outcomes 
(injustice, slavery, exploitation, rebellion) as well as normal human fears (grief, 
unemployment, died, apprehension) and incapacities (error, cop-outs, weakness). 
 
Denial: A dictionary consisting of standard negative contractions (aren't, shouldn't, 
don't), negative functions words (nor, not, nay), and terms designating null sets 
(nothing, nobody, none). 
 
Aggression: A dictionary embracing human competition and forceful action. Its terms 
connote physical energy (blast, crash, explode, collide), social domination (conquest, 
attacking, dictatorships, violation), and goal-directedness (crusade, commanded, 
challenging, overcome). In addition, words associated with personal triumph (mastered, 
rambunctious, pushy), excess human energy (prod, poke, pound, shove), disassembly 
(dismantle, demolish, overturn, veto) and resistance (prevent, reduce, defend, curbed) 
are included. 
 
Accomplishment: Words expressing task-completion (establish, finish, influence, 
proceed) and organised human behavior (motivated, influence, leader, manage). 
Includes capitalistic terms (buy, produce, employees, sell), modes of expansion (grow, 
increase, generate, construction) and general functionality (handling, strengthen, 
succeed, outputs). Also included is programmatic language: agenda, enacted, working, 
leadership. 
 
Communication: Terms referring to social interaction, both face-to-face (listen, 
interview, read, speak) and mediated (film, videotape, telephone, e-mail). The 
dictionary includes both modes of intercourse (translate, quote, scripts, broadcast) and 
moods of intercourse (chat, declare, flatter, demand). Other terms refer to social actors 
(reporter, spokesperson, advocates, preacher) and a variety of social purposes (hint, 
rebuke, respond, persuade). 
 
Motion: Terms connoting human movement (bustle, job, lurch, leap), physical 
processes (circulate, momentum, revolve, twist), journeys (barnstorm, jaunt, wandering, 
travels), speed (lickety-split, nimble, zip, whistle-stop), and modes of transit (ride, fly, 
glide, swim). 
 
Cognitive Terms: Words referring to cerebral processes, both functional and 
imaginative. Included are modes of discovery (learn, deliberate, consider, compare) and 
domains of study (biology, psychology, logic, economics). The dictionary includes 
mental challenges (question, forget, re-examine, paradoxes), institutional learning 
practices (graduation, teaching, classrooms), as well as three forms of intellection: 
intuitional (invent, perceive, speculate, interpret), rationalistic (estimate, examine, 
reasonable, strategies), and calculative (diagnose, analyse, software, fact-finding). 
 
Passivity: Words ranging from neutrality to inactivity. Includes terms of compliance 
(allow, tame, appeasement), docility (submit, contented, sluggish), and cessation 
(arrested, capitulate, refrain, yielding). Also contains tokens of inertness (backward, 
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immobile, silence, inhibit) and disinterest (unconcerned, nonchalant, stoic), as well as 
tranquillity (quietly, sleepy, vacation). 
 
 
Tenacity: All uses of the verb "to be" (is, am, will, shall), three definitive verb forms 
(has, must, do) and their variants, as well as all associated contractions (he'll, they've, 
ain't). These verbs connote confidence and totality. 
 
Leveling: Words used to ignore individual differences and to build a sense of 
completeness and assurance. Included are totalizing terms (everybody, anyone, each, 
fully), adverbs of permanence (always, completely, inevitably, consistently), and 
resolute adjectives (unconditional, consummate, absolute, open-and-shut). 
 
Collectives: Singular nouns connoting plurality that function to decrease specificity. 
These words reflect a dependence on categorical modes of thought. Included are social 
groupings (crowd, choir, team, humanity), task groups (army, congress, legislature, 
staff) and geographical entities (county, world, kingdom, republic). 
 
Numerical Terms: Any sum, date, or product specifying the facts in a given case. This 
dictionary treats each isolated integer as a single "word" and each separate group of 
integers as a single word. In addition, the dictionary contains common numbers in 
lexical format (one, tenfold, hundred, zero) as well as terms indicating numerical 
operations (subtract, divide, multiply, percentage) and quantitative topics (digitize, tally, 
mathematics). The presumption is that Numerical Terms hyper-specify a claim, thus 
detracting from its universality. 
 
Ambivalence: Words expressing hesitation or uncertainty, implying a speaker's 
inability or unwillingness to commit to the verbalization being made. Included are 
hedges (allegedly, perhaps, might), statements of inexactness (almost, approximate, 
vague, somewhere) and confusion (baffled, puzzling, hesitate). Also included are words 
of restrained possibility (could, would, he'd) and mystery (dilemma, guess, suppose, 
seems). 
 
Self-Reference: All first-person references, including I, I'd, I'll, I'm, I've, me, mine, my, 
myself. Self-references are treated as acts of "indexing" whereby the locus of action 
appears to reside in the speaker and not in the world at large (thereby implicitly 
acknowledging the speaker's limited vision). 
 
 
[source: http://rhetorica.net/diction.htm] 
 
 
 
